The non-state actors using AI to transform warfare

Technology has made it easier for anyone to access military know-how, triggering a policy debate on how to constrain non-state actors in the digital space

Al Majalla

The non-state actors using AI to transform warfare

Generative AI gives anyone access to specialised technical knowledge across domains, from building missile control programmes to simulations and cyber warfare. Technology has made it easier for anyone to access military know-how, triggering a policy debate on how to constrain non-state actors in the digital space.

For their part, the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen are using commercially available AI tools such as Claude and ChatGPT to make their missile and drone engineering more adaptable, resilient and disruptive. AI company Anthropic’s September 2026 report Detecting and Countering Misuse of AI identified a cell in north-western Yemen pursuing three distinct weapons programmes, including a ballistic missile with a range of 2,000km and a hypersonic variant. Analysts suspect that the Houthis are working with Iran and Hezbollah, an assessment broadly shared by France’s Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

The Houthi cell used Claude code “in place of human software engineers” for guidance, troubleshooting, and simulation. After a failed rocket test, the cell operators were diagnosing the reasons within hours. They also developed an offline simulation software that survived the ban on their accounts. “Our safeguards blocked many of their requests,” said Anthropic, “but not all of them.”

A July 2026 Cambridge study, based on interviews including 27 former members of Boko Haram (which originated in north-eastern Nigeria), found dedicated AI units already integrated in major armed factions, partly trained by foreign IS operatives. However, the study did not measure how much AI tools contributed to improving the groups’ strike capability and impact.

Anthropic also recorded a suspected freelance Russian team developing software for an autonomous kamikaze drone swarm, a China-based researcher building electronic-warfare targeting tools, and propaganda bodies aligned to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) employing Claude through virtual private networks (VPNs) and foreign phone numbers.

AFP
Motorists drive their vehicles past a billboard depicting named Iranian ballistic missiles in service, with text in Persian reading "Israel is weaker than a spider's web" in central Tehran on 15 April 2024.

Learning curve

This is likely to be the tip of the iceberg in terms of who is using AI to advance their agendas. Those close to the fighting in ongoing conflict zones, such as in Ukraine and the Gulf, say that armed forces are on a steep learning curve, experimenting with AI to develop offline software, test military hardware, examine operational failures, and improve weapons systems. AI accelerates progress, innovation, problem-solving, and efficiency.

The Houthis and others are deploying the technology in assembly workshops, production lines, and procurement networks. Assembly is proving crucial. A Century Foundation study in February 2026 drew on almost 140 interceptions and more than 370 documented items in 2024-25. More than 80% of intercepted items intended for the Houthi militia were manufacturing components, not complete weapon units. Of these, 35% were made in China and 21% in Iran, underscoring a shift toward decentralised local assembly.

Houthi rebels in Yemen are using commercially available AI tools such as Claude and ChatGPT to improve their missile and drone engineering

Among the tasks asked of AI technology centres is the design of protection systems against electronic jamming. Off-the-shelf flight controllers and satellite-navigation modules are cheap to procure but easy to jam, so manufacturers are working backwards to rewrite software to navigate on inertial data and switch to optical, dynamic target tracking when satellite signals collapse.

How AI fits in

The emerging threat comes from the combination of weapons production lines, intelligence, and AI-assisted engineering. They are all linked. For instance, improved real-time information about the location of targets makes accurate long-range strikes more consequential.

Nawaf Obaid, founder of the Geneva-based AURORAH Geosignal Intelligence, identified Russian reconnaissance activity around the targets of all 40 Houthi and Iraqi-militia attacks on Saudi Arabia that it examined between July and October, according to the Associated Press investigation. A senior Houthi figure separately said Iranian intelligence advisors were providing targeting information obtained from Russian satellites.

REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
Houthi activists stand on a platform against a banner depicting Houthi missiles amid an escalation campaign against Saudi Arabia, in Sanaa, Yemen, on 31 July 2026.

Iran's own operations during the 40-day war against Israel and the United States mirror the wider pattern. CNN reported Russian satellite activity before a March strike on Prince Sultan Air Base (which destroyed a US radar aircraft) or on the US embassy in Riyadh. Additionally, the US State Department said last year that China's Chang Guang Satellite Technology had provided Jilin-1 satellite imagery to the Houthis to target US assets in the region.

The US Maritime Administration counted more than 160 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels between November 2023 and October 2026, affecting over 60 nations, with Red Sea traffic levels 50% down on pre-crisis levels. The Houthis' arsenal, regeneration capacity, networks, and integration within Iran's security framework mean that its use of AI has consequences far beyond its borders.

For Iran's proxies, AI has sped up the learning process but without severing their dependence on Tehran. Designs, components, and advisors are all still needed, but assistance that once required hand-to-hand intervention now increasingly takes the shape of offline software and technical routines, so each transfer of know-how could yield a higher return from Iraq to Yemen.

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