Syria's isolation is ending; al-Sharaa's work has just begun

At the same time, success requires a formula that guarantees the rights of Syria's different communities and prevents any side from feeling that it is losing its security, political presence or even the 'gains' it secured during the years of the revolution. This is what makes the SDF issue one of the most sensitive tests of the next phase.

The same applies to southern Syria. Relations with Israel cannot be separated from rebuilding the Syrian state, because sovereignty, security and borders are directly linked to Damascus's ability to consolidate its regional position. Washington is expected to play a role that cannot be ignored, particularly given the intransigence shown throughout this period by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the elections due to be held in Israel. The language al-Sharaa uses on this issue will be an important indicator of the nature of Syrian policy in the next phase. Is Damascus seeking specific security arrangements, or a broader negotiating process that would redefine its relationship with Israel?

While security is one of the most important pillars of state-building, security alone does not make a state. The more difficult stage begins when Syria moves from managing political balances to building institutions. International recognition of the government can open doors, but it does not automatically confer legitimacy on institutions. That legitimacy requires an independent and effective judiciary, a capable public administration, security and military institutions subject to the law, and a clear political process that addresses questions of elections, representation, accountability and transitional justice.

The debate over decentralisation should also be understood in this context. The issue is not simply the administrative allocation of powers, but the reshaping of the relationship between the centre and the regions. Who manages resources? How is wealth distributed? Who decides how money is spent? Which powers remain with the central state, and which are transferred to local authorities? The answers to these questions will largely determine the shape of the future Syrian state.

Then comes the economy, as the result of everything that precedes it rather than as a separate issue. Lifting sanctions removes an important obstacle, but it does not automatically generate investment. Investors need security, a functioning legal system, institutions, banks, infrastructure and clear rules. Talk of reconstruction will therefore not be convincing unless it translates into an integrated economic policy that attracts capital, revives productive sectors and creates jobs.

Political stability creates the conditions for security. Security allows institutions to be built. Capable institutions create an environment for investment, and investment gives the state the resources it needs to consolidate stability. Any weakness in one of these links can cause problems to re-emerge in the others.

Measuring success

Success will not be measured by the number of meetings al-Sharaa holds on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, but by his ability to move this integrated process forward. What is said in those meetings matters less than whether understandings emerge that can be translated into policies, decisions and projects.

The real question surrounding al-Sharaa's visit to New York is how Damascus can turn the end of isolation into a state-building project. How he manages the transition could determine the nature of cooperation between Syria and the global community going forward.