From McGurk’s militias to Barrack’s pipelines

McGurk stood at the heart of American policy in Iraq when Nouri al-Maliki secured a second term after the 2010 elections, even though Ayad Allawi's list had won two more seats than Maliki's State of Law Coalition. The result was a government that grew increasingly sectarian and centralised, while partnership with Sunni Arabs receded and the army became ever more politicised. McGurk was also among Washington's leading figures in the negotiations over the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, carried out under an agreement signed by Bush and implemented by Obama.

When the Islamic State (IS) attacked Mosul in June 2014, entire military formations collapsed, opening the way for the organisation to seize vast swathes of Iraq and proclaim its "caliphate." McGurk subsequently oversaw the international coalition's campaign against IS, relying on two local pillars: Iraqi factions, several of them linked to Iran, and the Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, in Syria. The YPG formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, despite its organic and ideological ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, which Washington and Ankara designate as a terrorist organisation.

The policy achieved a major objective. IS was defeated militarily and lost the territory it controlled. Yet a vast vacuum remained on the ground. In Iraq, Tehran's proxies grew stronger. In Syria, a military and administrative entity emerged east of the Euphrates, dependent on American protection, viewed with alarm by Türkiye and standing outside the institutions of "Assad's Syria." IS lost its territory, while Iran gained a parallel army in Iraq that facilitated its reach into Syria and Lebanon. Türkiye, meanwhile, found along its border a force it regards as an extension of the PKK.

Barrack arrived with a different lexicon. For him, Iraqi factions had no reason to remain stronger than the state or threaten neighbouring countries on Tehran's behalf. Nor did the SDF's role in fighting IS justify its indefinite survival. His position was that its original mission had ended, that the rationale for Washington's alliance with it had disappeared with the fall of the Assad regime, and that the "new Syria" could become the coalition's partner while granting the Kurds constitutional, social and cultural rights broader than those offered by the Autonomous Administration that arose under McGurk's umbrella.

At the beginning of the year, during the confrontation between Damascus and the SDF, Barrack withdrew Washington's political cover from the Kurdish forces. He told Mazloum Abdi that Washington would not allow Israel to be drawn into the conflict to defend the SDF and fight Türkiye. The shift moved Kurdish protection away from reliance on an armed entity and towards incorporation into the state, rather than abandoning the Kurds altogether. Several months later, the SDF's independent military mission came to an end. Its dissolution was announced, and its forces were integrated into the Syrian army.

In Sweida, Barrack applied the same logic. A separate zone under Israeli protection had no place in his approach, nor did armed power outside the state. Working with Jordan and Syria, he helped draw up a roadmap approved in Amman, centred on addressing abuses, restoring services, establishing security arrangements and reintegrating the governorate into the state. An Israeli veto prevented its implementation.

This approach, advanced by Trump's envoy and backed by Arab and regional actors, included lifting sanctions, removing terrorism designations, engaging with President Ahmed al-Sharaa's government as a partner, and opening doors to economic activity, energy, and investment. The logic is straightforward: if the state is expected to control its borders, dismantle militias, fight IS and block the Iranian corridor, it must be given the instruments of statehood. You cannot keep it besieged and fragmented and then demand sovereignty from it.

Different points of view

This is where the two presidential envoys part company. McGurk treated the state's weakness as a reality to be managed through local proxies. Barrack sees restoring the state as the main way to end the need for those proxies. McGurk relied on militias that operated across borders; Barrack strengthens the state so that pipelines and projects can cross them instead.

Barrack is no conventional diplomat in McGurk's mould. He is a businessman from outside the bureaucracy. His strength lies in his direct friendship with Trump. He speaks in jarring language and sometimes makes remarks that later require clarification. His words on the Golan, before he walked them back, therefore amounted to more than a slip of the tongue. It is unlikely to be the last such remark, so long as he retains his friend's favour.