Airstrikes reveal fragile Jordan-Syria security partnership

Jordanian airstrikes that killed 10 people in southern Syria on 26 October have brought relations between Amman and Damascus to their most critical point since Assad’s fall

Airstrikes reveal fragile Jordan-Syria security partnership

Jordanian airstrikes that killed 10 people in southern Syria on 26 October have brought relations between Damascus and Amman to their most critical point since Assad’s fall. Despite conflicting accounts of prior coordination and the targets struck, both governments have publicly signalled a determination to contain the fallout and preserve their growing cooperation.

That restraint is welcome, but it leaves a central question unanswered: why did Jordan reportedly bypass Damascus in a military operation on Syrian territory? The episode exposes a vulnerability in Syria’s “zero problems” policy: diplomatic rapprochement remains fragile without effective security cooperation.

Leaving this gap unresolved risks turning cross-border threats into recurring diplomatic crises. Damascus and Amman should use this moment to define their mutual responsibilities and build a security partnership capable of protecting people on both sides of the border.

The strikes followed an attack on a Greek Orthodox church in Jordan’s Karak governorate on 23 October that killed nine people. Three days later, Jordanian warplanes targeted alleged terrorist hideouts in southern Syria. Amman cited intelligence about imminent threats and claimed the operation killed more than 20 Islamic State (IS) members and destroyed a major weapons depot.

Damascus presented a sharply different account. Syrian authorities reported 10 deaths, including three children and a woman, and four injuries. Five of those killed belonged to the same family, underscoring the devastating human cost of the operation. The authorities did not confirm any IS casualties, leaving Jordan’s claims unverified and raising questions about the intelligence used to identify the targets.

The disagreement extended to prior coordination. Jordan maintained that it had coordinated the strikes with Damascus, while Syria denied receiving advance notice and condemned the operation as a violation of its sovereignty.

Both governments subsequently agreed to establish a joint committee to investigate the strikes and improve intelligence sharing and operational coordination. The agreement eased diplomatic tensions but left unresolved questions about how their security institutions work together.

The two governments have shown that they can contain a diplomatic crisis. They must now demonstrate that their security institutions can prevent another one

Apparent gap

The strikes exposed an apparent gap between improving political relations between Damascus and Amman and their ability to cooperate effectively on security matters. Since Assad's fall, the two governments have expanded diplomatic engagement and cooperation to levels unseen in years. Yet this progress has not necessarily produced the mutual trust or operational arrangements needed to address threats along their shared border.

The issue is not whether the two governments are willing to cooperate. Their public statements suggest they are. The more important question is whether their existing arrangements can turn that political commitment into effective action when security threats emerge.

For Jordan, this means having confidence that intelligence shared with Damascus will be investigated and acted upon promptly. That requires capable Syrian security institutions, reliable communication channels and clear procedures for responding to urgent threats. Syria's sovereignty will also be better protected if neighbouring countries trust its institutions to address their security concerns.

Jordan, in turn, must help build that confidence by working through Syrian institutions to address threats originating on Syrian territory. Even when its security concerns are legitimate, bypassing Damascus risks weakening the credibility of the institutions Amman needs as dependable partners. The challenge is therefore to move beyond political assurances and establish practical security arrangements that both governments can rely on when threats emerge.

The affected families deserve credible explanations of how targets were selected, what precautions were taken and whether mistakes occurred

From rapprochement to cooperation

The newly agreed joint committee offers an opportunity to address this gap. Rather than focusing solely on investigating the latest strikes, it should establish practical arrangements that reduce the risk of similar incidents.

These should include clear procedures for sharing urgent intelligence, jointly assessing threats and determining which authorities are responsible for responding. Both governments also need to agree on how to handle cross-border threats, including in situations in which Syrian forces may lack the capacity to act or cannot respond within the available time.

Reliable intelligence should be central to these arrangements. Reports of militant activity do not automatically establish the identity of everyone at a targeted location or the imminence of an attack. Joint assessments, supported by local intelligence, could improve the quality of operational decisions and reduce risks to civilians.

Accountability for the civilian deaths must also form part of repairing the relationship. The affected families deserve credible explanations of how targets were selected, what precautions were taken and whether mistakes occurred. The findings should be made public where possible, accompanied by appropriate redress and accountability for any established failures.

The two governments have shown that they can contain a diplomatic crisis. They must now demonstrate that their security institutions can prevent another one. The test of their rapprochement will be whether the next credible threat produces a coordinated response that protects people on both sides of the border.

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