Iraq’s armed factions are still three steps ahead of Baghdad

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has vowed to dissolve armed groups by the end of September, but this is highly unlikely. Al Majalla explains why.

A member of the Popular Mobilisation Forces monitors the Iraq-Syria border in Al-Qaim, January 23, 2026.
AFP
A member of the Popular Mobilisation Forces monitors the Iraq-Syria border in Al-Qaim, January 23, 2026.

Iraq’s armed factions are still three steps ahead of Baghdad

Far from getting rid of its myriad armed factions, the Iraqi government has watched uncomfortably as more have sprung up over recent months, adding urgency and importance to a problem that is increasingly becoming a Western and regional deal-breaker for the new government of Ali al-Zaidi.

These armed groups do not necessarily fall under the authority of the state-run Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Often, their leadership structure is unclear, but it is known that several of the Shiite groups get direct support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and have attacked Gulf states and Jordan in successive waves.

Two new Iraqi groups have emerged this year alone, both with grand names (the ‘Men of Mighty Valour’ targeted Jordan, while the ‘Army of Wrath’ attacked Kurdistan). The Shiite group Saraya Awliya al-Dam (‘Companions of the Guardians of Blood’) first attacked Iraqi troops and Kurdistan in 2020-21, then went quiet, but has sprung up again of late and has once again resumed operations. Abu Mahdi al-Jaafari, the military spokesman for Saraya Awliya al-Dam, said: “We are not a faction affiliated with any organisation, nor are we a front for any party... We answer only to the demands of our religious, national and humanitarian duty.”

The activity follows American strikes against PMF headquarters, in a sign that the Pentagon has Iraq’s militias in its crosshairs. The PMF is a government institution established in 2014 to fight Islamic State and acts like an umbrella group, incorporating a wide range of armed factions. In the aftermath of American strikes, however, a new strategy (attributed to Iran) was adopted. Factions began operating through armed fronts bearing new names. Analysts think this may be designed, in part, to spare Baghdad the embarrassment.

Spreading their wings

Some factions have political and even economic wings, which are often treated as separate from their armed wings, because carrying out operations under their recognised names could threaten their political and financial interests. Announcing attacks under unfamiliar names through organisations with opaque structures therefore disperses attention and makes it more difficult to identify those responsible.

AFP
An Iraqi security officer stands guard on the Iraq-Saudi border on 2 September 2025.

To bypass Baghdad’s campaign to dismantle armed groups and place all weapons under state control, other new groups are expected to emerge in the coming weeks. These fronts allow factions that reject integration, or claim to have surrendered their arms, to continue military operations with relative freedom while avoiding an open confrontation with the security services.

So far, the effort to disarm Iraq’s factions involves formally linking them to the state, with no genuine surrender of heavy weaponry. Fighters continue to operate simultaneously within the factions and state institutions, while new names give them flexibility to carry out sophisticated cross-border attacks without drawing their parent organisations into a full-scale war. This was the case with the ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’ alliance, which denied launching any attacks against Saudi Arabia in recent months.

Under Iranian direction, the factions are broadening their range of targets to include the Gulf states. The aim is to keep American forces occupied inside Iraq, and then for Iran to use this as a source of leverage in negotiations. In recent days, four Iranian advisors were killed in US-Saudi airstrikes inside Iraqi territory.

Old faces, new names

A senior Iraqi official, speaking anonymously, said he felt that Iran and the US had drawn Iraq into an open theatre of war, adding that there was a clear desire to pull the Gulf states in as well, based on the belief that widening the war might hasten its conclusion. He said no genuinely new factions had been established in Iraq; rather, they were merely using new names and labels to avoid recognised identities, whilst still using their established names internally.

Fighters operate within both the factions and state institutions, while new names let them carry out sophisticated cross-border attacks

According to the official, this dual structure both protects influential political forces with military wings, and reflects Iran's attempt to establish genuinely new groups and factions as back-ups to the more established factions. The Iraqi government was fully aware that these newly named factions were largely fictitious, he said, and was closely monitoring their creation and use, but noted that no political decision had yet been taken to authorise an open confrontation with them.

The caution comes from fears of igniting a civil war in a country that has been flooded with weapons and where sectarian and even factional grievances run deep. Some Iraqi political forces profit from disorder, the official explained, and confronting the armed factions would threaten their influence and wealth. The prospect of voluntary disarmament was now a quaint idea, he suggested, even if Western forces withdrew.

Reuters
Members of the Iraqi Hezbollah militia at the funeral procession for those killed in an airstrike targeting a PMF base in the country's west, near the Syrian border, on 2 March 2026.

Iran is firmly opposed to the groups' disarmament, particularly if they possess strategic weapons capable of striking neighbouring states. Yet this is precisely why neighbouring states are so keen for the weapons to come under the Iraqi state. During a recent visit to Riyadh, Saudi officials presented an Iraqi delegation with evidence that militias based in Iraq had attacked Gulf states. Iraq is therefore now a danger to the region.

The hand of Iran

As last week's US-Saudi airstrikes showed, Iranian personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are operating in Iraq, coordinating military operations with the factions. Yet despite its stated intention to dissolve the groups by the end of September, Baghdad cannot 'charge the metaphorical hilltop' because of the extensive influence these armed groups wield within state institutions.

Haider al-Shakri, a researcher at Chatham House, told Al Majalla that the proliferation of names gave the factions considerable political and security flexibility. A group could operate officially through a brigade registered with the PMF, al-Shakri explained, thus receiving state funding and protection, while supporting organisations under different names to conduct more sensitive activities beyond the formal framework.

"When these activities serve their interests, the factions claim them or support them," he said. "When the political or legal costs rise, they disavow them. This makes responsibility harder to establish and accountability more difficult to enforce. The pattern is not confined to smaller factions. It also appears, to varying degrees, among major forces with considerable political weight."

Reuters
Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi chairs an emergency meeting of Iraq's national security council to discuss the recent attack on sites within Iraq on 29 July 2026.

The current moment is exceptionally sensitive, he said, because Saudi airstrikes had targeted armed factions as well as a PMF headquarters belonging to an official Iraqi security institution. The attacks are therefore linked to Iraqi sovereignty, even if Saudi Arabia is targeting groups that serve the interests of Iran. The Iraqi government must respond with prudence and resolve, said al-Shakri. It should stop Iraq from being used as a platform to attack neighbouring states and work with Riyadh to contain the crisis.

Iraq's lawless lands

Security expert Sarmad al-Bayati explained that some Iranian drones, including the Shahed models, "have a range of more than 2,000km, so they are launched from Iran, fly into Iraqi airspace because they can evade Iraqi radar, before being directed towards the Gulf states". He said radar installations in southern Iraq have been targeted by drones in recent months and forced out of service. Al-Bayati said attention should focus on their launch sites, rather than just their flight paths.

Iraq contains vast desert expanses that could also be used for such operations. Before the US-Israeli war against Iran, Israeli forces reportedly established a military base in Najaf province without the knowledge of the Iraqi government. This secret operating base provided logistical support. Its existence and use show what little control Iraqi forces have over the country's desert regions, which Iran exploits, with Jurf al-Sakhar, in particular, functioning as a military base.

Bringing Iraq's armed factions under control is therefore unlikely to be a realistic objective of the al-Zaidi government in the months ahead, in part because it lacks the capacity to influence events on the ground, which means it lacks the authority to ensure compliance with its directives. Factions such as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya know this all too well, and engaging Tehran diplomatically is unlikely to resolve the matter. They may operate in Iraq, but they answer to Iran.

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