Since 2010, Jordan’s increasingly complex political landscape has imposed what the philosopher Karl Popper might describe as a new form of holistic social engineering, its effects being felt deeply in the country, both economically, socially, and politically.
Confronted with rising pressures, the state sought to pre-empt any unrest, intervening directly to craft immediate remedies until June 2018, when the so‑called ‘banks’ revolt’ erupted against the second government of Hani al‑Mulki, after it introduced a draft income tax law that threatened banks’ high profitability. During that period, royal intervention took several forms. The king met citizens to hear their demands, suspended unpopular government decisions, initiated broad cabinet reshuffles, and even dissolved parliament. All were responses to an increasingly demanding public.
It was Jordan’s attempt to contain the impact of the Arab Spring, which had ushered in a new protest culture, an unfamiliar vocabulary of popular expression, and methods that at times exceeded traditional boundaries—particularly in peripheral regions long neglected by development. That neglect may have prompted the monarchy to undertake certain reforms, increase democracy, acknowledge poor living conditions and other grievances, and launch new development projects, especially in the south.
Navigating upheaval
The period also saw the emergence of social protest movements with distinct names, political identities and organising frameworks, but most failed to translate their broadly similar demands into a coherent reform agenda. Their trajectories called for a deeper reading, to understand the forces that shaped them and what might have followed had Jordan not navigated its own ‘spring’ without major upheaval.
Throughout these crises, Jordan did not sever its connection with its Arab sphere. Political Islamists were seeking to capitalise on revolutionary momentum. losing part of the pragmatism that had characterised their relationship with the monarchy since the mid-20th century. That relationship continued to deteriorate, until it ultimately ended in a formal ban of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Meanwhile, Jordan continued to move through the region’s minefields—from the disorder unleashed by Syria’s upheaval to Iraq’s crises and the export of terrorism. In confronting these challenges, Jordan demonstrated a remarkable resilience. The Covid-19 pandemic was a further test for the state and its institutions, but revealed a notable degree of administrative competence. Jordan then experienced a measure of economic recovery and embarked on a royal project of political modernisation.
