Israel's familiar demands and Lebanon's familiar deadlock

Tel Aviv's calls for Hezbollah's disarmament feel like deja vu, as does Beirut's inability to do anything about it

Israel's familiar demands and Lebanon's familiar deadlock

Israel has ended negotiations with Lebanon before they have even begun. As it so often does, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has imposed a fait accompli in southern Lebanon that the Lebanese state, given its current capabilities, will find impossible to reverse.

Most of the villages Israel has occupied since the war began on 2 March have been reduced to ashes. Rebuilding them and allowing residents to return would require a large-scale international effort that no one, at least for now, seems willing to fund. Such an effort would also depend on Israel withdrawing from the dozens of positions it has set up inside Lebanese territory, but there is little to suggest that it intends to take that step any time soon.

The villages have been wiped off the map. Entire towns such as Bint Jbeil and Al Khiyam, among the largest and most historic centres of Jabal Amel, have been reduced to rubble, with barely a stone left standing. This devastation reflects an Israeli vision, seemingly formed in advance, of what the border area in southern Lebanon should look like.

Israel pursued a similar approach in the West Bank while negotiating with the Palestinian Authority over the final stage of the Oslo Accords. It scattered thousands of settlement units and bypass roads across the territory, then built the separation barrier at the start of the Second Intifada.

Since then, any talk of dismantling settlements or establishing a contiguous Palestinian entity in the West Bank became little more than fantasy. The realities Israel creates on the ground, reinforced by its vast capabilities, enter negotiations as facts that cannot be ignored.

Familiar patterns

The same pattern has unfolded in Gaza, where the Israeli army now controls around 60% of the Strip and confines two million Palestinians to what is left of it. For those crowded into camps unfit for human life, any prospect of a solution—even a purely humanitarian one—has been all but foreclosed.

The realities Israel creates on the ground, reinforced by its vast capabilities, enter negotiations as facts that cannot be ignored.

Israel's likely agenda in the forthcoming negotiations with Lebanon will revolve around demands it already knows Beirut cannot meet. Representatives of Israel's far-right government will call for Hezbollah to be dismantled, disarmed, and stripped of its arsenal. Yet such a decision is not Beirut's to make. It rests with Tehran, which created the group, armed it, and made it a pillar of its regional strategy.

Lebanese negotiators will find themselves echoing what other Arab negotiators have said before them, demanding that Israeli forces withdraw to the international border. Israel, for its part, will revive its familiar argument that Lebanon started the war and must bear the consequences of its actions, and that the Lebanese authorities are incapable of enforcing even the decisions they themselves issue.

As Lebanon watched its unprecedented catastrophe deepen, it was left with little choice but to play its final card: calling for direct negotiations with Israel in the hope of sparing the country further devastation.

Tightening grip

On the ground, however, Israel's security grip over much of southern Lebanon will be almost complete, challenged only by sporadic Hezbollah operations within a war of attrition. This is a very different equation from Lebanon's campaign against the Israeli occupation in the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, the world has changed beyond recognition, and neither international nor regional powers occupy the positions they once held.

Israel will press its demands underwritten by brute force, and Lebanon will try to recover its rights while preserving a minimum of dignity

From bad to worse

At the same time, the tragedy of mass displacement and overcrowding in areas sheltering those forced from their homes will persist. Lebanon's internal crisis will deepen, and regional and sectarian divisions will become more entrenched, periodically erupting in ways unlikely to be spared violence or the ugliest expressions of communal hatred. All this will unfold amid severe economic pressure, worsened by a sharp fall in remittances from Lebanese expatriates as a result of the war in the Gulf.

Anyone who thinks such an atmosphere will allow Lebanese negotiators to follow the Egyptian or Jordanian model, or that Lebanon and Israel can reproduce either of those models, is mistaken. The more likely outcome is a reprise of the Syrian negotiating track, under the Assad family and now under the current government, as well as the Palestinian track—a process trapped in familiar deadlock, with Israel pressing demands underwritten by brute force, and Lebanon trying to recover its rights while preserving a minimum of dignity.

Against this backdrop, a grim joke has begun to circulate about improving Lebanon's negotiating position and gathering whatever points of strength it can still claim.

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