Iran's regime didn't fall, but it is being eroded

History has shown that collapse is not a sudden act but a steady chipping away of the fortifications that prop up regimes.

Iran's regime didn't fall, but it is being eroded

When the US and Israel waged war on 28 February, some expected the immediate collapse of the Iranian regime, following the assassination of its Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei or a situation in which an Iranian Delcy Rodríguez could emerge, who would be more receptive to American diktats. Some even thought a US ground troop invasion was imminent.

But none of this happened. The regime didn't fall, and Tehran did not wave the white flag. But does its survival mean it has won? Some would argue, yes.

My interpretation, however, is more nuanced. Even though it didn't fall, it has been significantly eroded. Looking back at past examples, one could argue that collapse is not a sudden act but a steady chipping away of the fortifications that prop up said regime.

Some say Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003 began with the 1991 Gulf War, Muammar Gaddafi’s collapse in 2011 began at the end of 2003, and Bashar al-Assad’s fall began in 2011, or perhaps in 2005, when his army withdrew from Lebanon.

Another example is the 1967 war. Arab states lost territory to Israel, but ideologues insisted that they had ‘not been defeated’ because Israel's objective had been to overthrow their governments and that had not happened. But that narrative did not last for very long. In reality, the war constituted a profound strategic defeat that reshaped the region for decades.

Some say Saddam's fall in 2003 began with the 1991 Gulf War, and Assad's fall began in 2011, or perhaps in 2005, when his army withdrew from Lebanon. 

First blow

As for Iran, I would argue that the first major blow came in 2020 when the US, under US President Donald Trump, assassinated IRGC commander and Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. The second came in June 2025, with the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities, again under Trump, and the shift from a shadow war to direct confrontation. The third wave struck at the heart of the regime in 2026: the killing of Ali Khamenei and several commanders belonging to the Revolutionary Guard.

This is hardly a superficial blow; it was an attack on the centre of decision-making itself and on the network of loyalties on which the regime depends. Ideological regimes survive through the cohesion of the security elite and the symbolism of leadership. When this layer is struck, erosion begins, even if it isn't immediately apparent.

Then came the raids: the destruction of nuclear facilities, the severe weakening of Iran's air-defence system, effective control of Iranian airspace, the destruction of much of its naval power, and repeated strikes on military infrastructure.

This means that Iran has lost a significant part of its ability to deter and defend. It is no longer the power capable of protecting its strategic depth or preventing attacks against it. Here, the greater loss becomes clear: the collapse of the strategic pillar that Iran's revolution has built since 1979.

Iran's regime may grow more rigid, but that hardening stems from weakness, not strength

A strategy derailed

Iran's strategy was always to keep the battle outside of its borders. This clearly didn't work, and the US and Israeli strikes are now penetrating deep inside Iran. Tehran's network of proxies, designed to serve as the first line of defence, project influence and penetrate borders, did not function as intended and failed at the moment of greatest test. The Houthis didn't decisively enter the war. Hezbollah, long seen as Iran's strongest card, was neither in a position to decide the course of the war nor the terms of negotiation. As for the Iraqi militias, they remained confined to threats and skirmishes, without producing any real change in the course of the conflict.

As a result, Iran was forced to play its last remaining cards by attacking Gulf countries and effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz. These are instruments aimed at disruption, but they cannot alter the clear trajectory of the looming outcome. Furthermore, Gulf states are now looking to strengthen their capabilities, develop more advanced defence systems, broaden their security partnerships with international and regional powers such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and Türkiye, and seek strategic alternatives to transporting oil and gas through pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.

True, the Iranian regime didn't collapse, but even if it remains in place, it has and still is eroding from within. Its leaders have been killed, its structure damaged, and its instruments of power weakened. It may grow more rigid, but that hardening stems from weakness, not strength.

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