Syria and the Iran war: opportunities and risks

Syria and the Iran war: opportunities and risks

Will Syria gain from the war with Iran, or lose because of it? Damascus has found itself facing a new test, hemmed in by multiple theatres of conflict: Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon along its western frontier, and rising tension between militias and the state in Iraq to the east. In its own skies, Israeli aircraft intersect with Iranian missiles and drones in a deadly crossfire.

On the downside, Syria’s reconstruction projects and the prospect of renewed investment now appear suspended. Allied states that form a central pillar in financing recovery have become preoccupied with their own security and economic priorities. European countries, whose partnership is indispensable to any reconstruction path, are themselves burdened by the mounting cost of war.

All of this is likely to deepen the economic crisis and its social and security repercussions inside Syria, furnishing new grounds for extremism and the return of the Islamic State (IS). A further challenge lies in Iran’s attempts, through drones, threats, and carefully planted leaks, to draw Syria into the war and to foster chaos. Tehran has yet to digest the loss of Assad’s Syria and the resulting contraction of its axis of influence.

Should the war end in Tel Aviv’s favour, Israel would be more firmly entrenched as the region’s dominant power, gaining additional leverage over Damascus and increasing the risk that Syria could become an arena of confrontation between Tel Aviv and Ankara, a key ally of Syria’s new leadership.

Such an outcome would also lessen the pressure on Israel to withdraw from the areas it occupied after the regime’s fall at the end of 2024, while inviting deeper Israeli intervention in southern Syria. Its strike on Sweida only days ago, during the war, offered a glimpse of that possibility.

Since the outbreak of the war, President Ahmed al-Sharaa has chosen to keep Syria away from the regional inferno while aligning himself with the Arab camp, and he has deployed the army along the western border to contain any spread of the flames.

It is only natural that exporting and importing states should seek alternative routes that do not lie exposed to the threats of Tehran and its militias.

Proceeding with caution

The Trump administration asked Sharaa to intervene in the Lebanese crisis, but he preferred to proceed with caution. The country is still licking its wounds and rebuilding its institutions. Any such intervention would have summoned the ghosts of the tutelage era and revived memories burdened by Assad's Syria.

It would also have inflamed sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shiites, recalling Hezbollah's involvement in Syrian bloodshed. More dangerous still, it would have made Syrian forces appear as a ground arm of Israel, and that serves no Syrian interest, neither now nor in the future.

The further deterioration of the Lebanese situation, together with the availability of an Arab and Islamic umbrella, may yet alter these calculations, though this time according to a logic far removed from that of the old tutelage era.

In the east, Damascus may be able to help contain the threats posed by Iraqi militias to Syria's Arab neighbours while opening a Syrian channel for state-to-state engagement, a role that could restore a measure of regional weight without drawing the country into the furnace of direct confrontation. In the south-east, the establishment of joint operations rooms in coordination with Jordan could help stem the flow of militias and weapons towards Jordan's borders and the Gulf.

The Iran war has altered many calculations. It has brought into view opportunities and risks that should not be overlooked. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the threat hanging over the Bab el-Mandab have redrawn the map of energy and trade, exposing the vulnerability of relying on both for oil, gas, and supply chains.

Syria is not a party to the war, yet neither is it spared its consequences. The real challenge lies in turning it into a strategic lever.

A geographical option

It is only natural that exporting and importing states should seek, first, an end to Iranian aggression, and then alternative routes that do not lie exposed to the threats of Tehran and its militias. Here, Syria emerges as a possible geographical option, through pipeline and railway projects stretching from the Gulf through Jordan to Türkiye and the Mediterranean, and onward to the wider world.

Should such routes materialise, Syria, by virtue of its new geopolitical position, would acquire a role within the global system, along with vital economic returns for its exhausted economy.

Given that the principal cable routes run through the Red Sea, the war has also given fresh momentum to a proposal to link these lines between Saudi Arabia and Syria through Jordan, providing communications many times faster than those currently available and offering a secure alternative for digital stability.

There is little doubt that these options and scenarios are now genuinely on the table. They have left the vault of ideas behind and arrived at the tables of decision.

Syria, like many other states, stands at a crossroads amid a regional storm. It is not a party to the war, yet neither is it spared its consequences. The real challenge lies in turning Syria into a strategic lever. The region is being reshaped to the rhythm of this war.

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