Politics

Iraq's establishment triumphs over hopes for change

A revised electoral law and the fragmentation of civil groups contributed to an election result that saw no clear parliamentary majority and the return of established parties

Reuters

Supporters of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition celebrate after preliminary election results were announced in Baghdad, Iraq, on 12 November 2025.

Iraq's establishment triumphs over hopes for change

Ayad Al-Anbar

last update on 16 Nov 2025

Contrary to expectations of major surprises, Iraq’s sixth parliamentary elections delivered predictable results, driven by the political dynamics set in motion by the 2021 election. That earlier vote ended with the withdrawal of the Sadrist Movement from parliament after failing to form a majority government, paving the way for a coalition of established political forces under the State Administration Alliance.

Ahead of the 11 November elections, Iraq had implemented a key revision to the electoral law, replacing the multi-district, first-past-the-post system with a single provincial constituency and the modified Sainte-Laguë method using a divisor of 1.7. This revision means that instead of several small districts, each province is treated as a single large electoral district, with seats allocated proportionally according to the overall vote share. Such a modified Sainte-Laguë formula favours larger parties.

The elections thus marked the return of established parties and their patronage-based electoral machinery. In Baghdad, the Reconstruction and Development Coalition led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani benefited greatly from the new law.

Al Sudani won more than 92,000 votes, Mohammed Al Halbousi of the Taqaddum (Progress) Alliance received over 71,000, and Nouri Al Maliki of the State of Law Coalition secured more than 68,000. The National State Forces Alliance, headed by Ammar Al Hakim, also returned to parliament with 18 seats. Under the Sainte-Laguë formula, nearly three million votes were scattered among both large and small lists.

For some observers, the most significant setback was the defeat of Iraq’s civic and reform-oriented political groups, including representatives of the Tishreen protest movement. Yet this outcome was entirely foreseeable and stemmed from the revised electoral law, the fragmentation of civil groups across multiple lists, their limited political experience, and the decision by some former Tishreen MPs to run under the banners of traditional parties.

Election workers gather parliamentary election ballots after the polls closed in Baghdad, Iraq, on 11 November 2025.

The rise in turnout to 56.11% was hardly unexpected either, especially when considered alongside the Sadrist boycott and compared with the 2021 and 2023 elections. Clientelism and political funding, long acknowledged by political leaders, once again proved more effective in mobilising voters than any electoral platform or manifesto.

The expansion of the intertwined sphere of arms and politics, which secured over 40 seats, highlights its tightening grip on state institutions and growing command over public finances. The transformation of armed influence into political power is unsurprising, particularly when the oft-repeated slogan about restricting weapons to state forces remains unfulfilled. Repeated in government statements and media briefings, it has yet to translate into action.

Armed actors have now entrenched themselves within the rentier economy, exerting control through a triad of force, financial resources, and political influence.

The most significant setback was the defeat of Iraq's civic and reform-oriented political groups, including representatives of the Tishreen protest movement

No big winner

Iraq's political framework since 2005 has consistently relied on alliances and quiet agreements rather than the direct impact of election results. Even so, the number of seats won continues to serve as a tool for securing political advantage and expanding control over ministries and senior posts.

Crises in Iraq often stem from personal rivalries instead of substantive political or ideological divides. Political calculations in Baghdad remain shaped by a logic in which one side must win outright or the entire process is questioned. This habit regularly produces accusations of fraud, objections to power sharing, and, at times, threats of armed escalation.

The 2025 elections intensified competition between long-established forces and a wave of emerging political groups. Neither camp achieved a clear majority that would allow it to form a government or control any of the three main executive positions.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by Al Sudani, won fewer than one-third of the seats held by Shiite parties, which together control more than 185 seats. These figures are insufficient for his bloc to assert dominance, steer Shiite political dynamics, or position him as the strongest contender for another term as prime minister.

No party or alliance emerged as a dominant force, which could pull the political process back into fragile coalitions and transactional bargaining

The Taqaddum party, under the leadership of former Speaker Al Halbousi, also failed to secure a commanding share of Sunni seats. He may remain the most influential Sunni figure and a significant voice in the choice of the next parliamentary speaker, yet rival groupings could block him. If these alliances receive backing from Shiite parties, Taqaddum's ability to name the speaker could weaken.

Among Kurdish parties, competition for the region's 44 seats was intense. The Kurdistan Democratic Party won 26 seats and may gain one or two more. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan secured 18. These results alone do not decide which party will nominate the next president of the republic. The choice depends on agreements between the two dominant Kurdish parties—negotiations that will be shaped by the parallel effort to form the Kurdistan Regional Government. The outcome will influence both the presidency in Baghdad and the distribution of key positions in the federal government.

Iraq may therefore return to so-called 'basket agreements', in which all top positions are approved together. No party or alliance emerged as a dominant force, which could pull the political process back into fragile coalitions and transactional bargaining.

Reuters — Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attends a State of Law Coalition election rally ahead of the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections, in Baghdad, Iraq, on 7 November 2025.

No room for opposition

Each election cycle reinforces a system in which everyone is in power, and everyone calls themselves the opposition. The tradition of including all factions in government has become deeply rooted. Any initial period of cooperation between groups that agree to form a government quickly fades. What follows is not a discussion of national priorities or strategic planning, but a slide into quarrels driven by narrow interests and political competition.

Power sharing has turned government formation into little more than the allocation of ministries. No party accepts responsibility for policy failures, and accountability disappears. Since 2006, five consecutive governments have been assembled in this way—coalitions created solely to divide ministries. These alliances routinely collapse, triggering a cycle of accusations and political undercutting instead of fostering a healthy parliamentary opposition.

Some members of parliament may try to act as opposition voices. Among Shiite groups, Ishraqat Kanoon may attempt that role. In the Kurdish arena, the New Generation Movement and the Kurdish group Al Mawqif have adopted critical positions.

Yet, together they hold no more than 20 seats, which limits their oversight to a measured and professional parliamentary presence rather than a forceful opposition capable of reshaping political life.

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