The pros and cons of a multipolar world

The emergence of this new, multipolar world was very much in evidence in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, when Western-led attempts at the UN to forge an international consensus condemning Moscow's action were frustrated by the opposition voiced by a wide range of countries, ranging from South Africa to the Gulf states.

The deepening fragmentation in world affairs was further highlighted by the international summit convened by China to mark the 80th anniversary of China's defeat of Japan at the end of World War II.

The presence of leaders from 26 countries in Beijing for China's Victory Day parade in early September was the clearest evidence yet of the dramatic realignment currently taking place in the world's geopolitical landscape.

In what some Western analysts have termed "the axis of upheaval", leaders of countries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea, who are known for their strong, anti-Western views, demonstrated their support for Chinese President Xi Jinping. Leaders from Myanmar, Mongolia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe and several Central Asian countries were also in attendance to witness China's unveiling of a range of combat-ready weaponry.

While this impressive show of support for China's Communist rulers is likely to encourage Beijing to adopt a more confrontational attitude in its future dealings with the Western alliance, the deepening divisions between the world's major powers will only make the task of resolving seemingly intractable conflicts all the more difficult.

So long as countries such as China and Russia remain viscerally opposed to any initiatives the US and its allies may advance to end the conflicts in, for example, Gaza and Ukraine, the harder it will be to provide a lasting solution to end these and other conflicts across the globe.   

The emergence of this new, multipolar world might benefit powers that were previously dominated by America's influence in world affairs. But the disadvantages of this trend are that it may not necessarily encourage peace and stability in world affairs. 

Multipolarity helps middle powers maximise benefits

By: Christopher Phillips

The emergence of a multipolar world order has, understandably, been met with consternation in Washington. Even if the US remains the world's largest economy and possesses its most formidable military, China is now a genuine peer challenger, Russia is a military threat once more, while many other states no longer bend so easily to the US agenda. The US western 'middle power', allies like the UK, France and Canada, similarly lament the end of a system that allowed them to punch above their weight.

Yet for non-Western states—especially middle powers like India, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and South Africa—the move to multipolarity is far less alarming. They generally have less nostalgia for either the Cold War or the unipolarity that followed, as they did not enjoy the same peace and stability as Western states during these eras. Indeed, many see it coming with advantages.

They have thus far proven able to maintain friendships with the US, Russia and China, leveraging relations to maximise their benefits. Whereas the eras of bipolarity and unipolarity limited manoeuvrability and the concessions the 'great' powers could extract for raw materials, commerce, or military alliances, they can now play global hegemons off one another.

A good example is Türkiye. During the Cold War, Türkiye aligned closely with the US to protect itself from its expansionist neighbour, the USSR. Ankara remained close to Washington in the 1990s, as did many states, as the US dominated the global order. Yet today, despite being a member of NATO, it has not joined the Western alliance against Russia in Ukraine and instead continues to trade with both Kyiv and Moscow.

Ankara refuses to join Western sanctions and continues to import considerable amounts of Russian gas, undermining efforts to stifle the Russian economy. At the same time, it joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015 and enjoys strong ties with China.

Yet none of this has cost Ankara its ties to the West, nor has there been any suggestion that Türkiye will leave NATO. Indeed, it was able to squeeze concessions out of the alliance over the membership of Finland and Sweden, such as Stockholm cracking down on Swedish-based Kurdish nationalists.

Other traditional US allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Ethiopia and South Africa have also been able to grow closer to China and Russia, joining the BRI and BRICS and refusing to sanction Moscow, without compromising vital security and economic relations with Washington. Like Türkiye, they have navigated the changing global climate to maximise their own benefits.