What the Taliban can learn from Ahmed al-Sharaa

It took 20 years for the Taliban to dislodge the US-backed government from Afghanistan, and when it fell, it was not so much due to a military defeat inflicted on the US forces keeping it in power, but because of the repeated failure of Ashraf Ghani to deliver good governance as president. The Taliban were ready when the tide turned.

This lesson in patience helped al-Sharaa in the years leading up to al-Assad's fall. He kept his nerve in 2016 when it appeared that the Russians decisively handed victory in Syria to al-Assad after the capture of Aleppo, and waited for events to change when the Russians had other priorities, in the form of the war in Ukraine.

Similarities and differences

Both militias have links to Al-Qaeda and host foreign Islamist fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Their puritanical religious vision overlaps, and HTS sees the Taliban as the experts in some forms of fighting.

Nonetheless, there are differences between the groups, including a view from the leader in Damascus that the Taliban's identity is more tribal than Islamic. In contrast with the reclusive Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada—the supreme leader of the Taliban, who rarely leaves Qandahar and is seldom seen in public—al-Sharaa took on an international profile, meeting a slew of global leaders including US President Donald Trump, France's Emmanuel Macron, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Türkiye's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Haibatullah is shrouded in mystery, with virtually no photographs or public appearances. His council of elders and Islamic scholars are not seen in Kabul. Meanwhile, the much-touted "new Taliban", which was pushed into a Doha peace deal by the Qataris and the US, has virtually no power. All the promises of doing away with Al-Qaeda links and foreign fighters remain broken.

The importance of compromise

Regional and international terrorist groups have gained influence in Afghanistan since August 2021, according to United Nations research. Women have also disappeared from public life according to the UN, and the other major ethnic groups from Afghanistan—such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkmen—face severe discrimination. The Taliban are making no effort to improve women's lives or those of non-Pashtuns. They are not even trying to appear to be doing so.

By contrast, al-Sharaa has learnt from the Taliban's inability to compromise. And although he is not able to exert full control over all his extremist fighters, with some carrying out sectarian massacres, al-Sharaa is aware that appearances matter and has made it a point to speak out against the crimes. In a clear break with the approach taken in Kabul over Afghanistan, al-Sharaa pledged to protect Syria's minority groups.

And while the Taliban kidnaps foreign workers, al-Sharaa welcomed foreign media and other institutions, allowing them to freely roam around Damascus and further afield.

The Taliban are simply unwilling to learn or even take advice from Muslim countries, let alone Western states. And yet they remain desperate for both recognition and foreign aid. They want embassies in Washington, London and Paris, but they will not listen to governments there.

They want their assets unfrozen yet criticise and kidnap people from the same Western institutions they are asking for help. As the Taliban supports Syria's new government and admires al-Sharaa's leadership, they could also learn a lot from him to unlock the isolation they face.