IS looks poised to exploit security vacuums in Syria

In what marks its most explicit recruitment effort in years, al-Naba extended a call to foreign fighters in Syria—including disillusioned HTS members—to join its ranks. IS is capitalising on fears that the transitional government may sideline or betray foreign militants, especially in pursuit of international legitimacy.

By casting itself as the unwavering guardian of jihadist orthodoxy, IS is seeking to reassert its relevance, offering ideological purity, safety, and renewed purpose to those left alienated by recent political shifts.

Disinformation campaigns

IS has also turned to social media to warn foreign fighters that al-Sharaa would eventually betray them to gain favour with the international community. These warnings coincided with the circulation of claims online alleging that the transitional authorities had launched a crackdown targeting foreign fighters.

While the extent of IS's direct involvement in these misinformation efforts remains unclear, the timing strongly suggests these narratives were not coincidental. IS, more than any other group, stands to benefit from the fear and mistrust such disinformation creates.

The reach and impact of these messages among foreign fighters in Syria are difficult to gauge. However, the fact that Syria's Interior Ministry issued a public statement denying the existence of any such arrest campaign indicates that the rumours were taken seriously and perceived as a significant enough threat to warrant an official response.

Regaining footholds

These messaging efforts are not occurring in a vacuum. They are accompanied by a visible uptick in IS activity in areas controlled by the new authorities. According to sources on the ground, IS operatives from the Homs desert have begun infiltrating urban areas—aligning with the group's historical pattern of exploiting transitional vacuums to regain a foothold.

Although this movement has not been independently verified, it aligns with reports of IS cell arrests by the new authorities in Daraa, Aleppo and Idlib. Authorities also claim to have foiled planned attacks, including plots targeting the Sayyida Zainab shrine and a church in Maaloula. Nevertheless, IS succeeded in carrying out a deadly car bombing at a security post in al-Mayadeen, Deir ez-Zor, on 18 May, killing five members of the Syrian security forces. More recently, the transitional authorities accused an IS cell of orchestrating a string of assassinations targeting members of the general security in Idlib.

Fragile transition

Though IS is a shadow of its former self, underestimating the threat it still poses would be a grave miscalculation. The frequency of its attacks is a poor barometer of danger. IS has long employed tactical silence—periods of apparent inactivity during which it quietly rebuilds, entrenches sleeper cells, and waits for the opportune moment to strike.

What makes the group especially dangerous at this moment is the fragility of Syria's transitional phase. With the country fractured along ideological, sectarian, and political lines, even small-scale operations or misinformation campaigns can have outsized consequences. IS understands this and is adapting its strategy accordingly—amplifying fears, exploiting grievances, and presenting itself as the steadfast alternative for the disillusioned. The recent circulation of a fake recording that incited violence against the Druze is just one example of how the group can weaponise perception as effectively as it once wielded force.

IS does not need to retake cities to reassert its relevance. In a nation still reeling from over a decade of war, instability is its oxygen, and there is no shortage of it.

For Syria to move forward, the transitional government must go beyond targeting IS operatives. It must confront the root causes—systemic injustices, unaddressed grievances, and political exclusion—that continue to nourish extremism. Failure to do so risks granting IS exactly what it seeks: a pathway back from the margins.