Tunisia's 'IMF shadow' disappears with Nemsia's sacking

The unexplained dismissal of the finance minister leaves more questions than answers as the highly indebted country seeks to avoid a 2025 default

Former Tunisian Minister of Finance, Siham Al-Boughdiri Namsia, presents the state’s general budget for 2022, Tunisia, December 28, 2021.
AFP
Former Tunisian Minister of Finance, Siham Al-Boughdiri Namsia, presents the state’s general budget for 2022, Tunisia, December 28, 2021.

Tunisia's 'IMF shadow' disappears with Nemsia's sacking

The standoff between Tunisia’s President Kais Saied and the International Monetary Fund came to a head this month, just days after he sacked his finance minister, Sihem Boughdiri Nemsia. The IMF has now closed its office in Tunisia, and its representative, Marc Gérard, has left after Nemsia—who negotiated an IMF bailout—was dismissed on 5 February after more than three years at the helm.

During her tenure, she wielded significant influence over the livelihoods and finances of Tunisians and led negotiations with the Fund, which, in 2022, resulted in a $1.9bn loan offer. Saied refused it in 2023 because it was conditional on subsidy cuts and slimming the vast public sector payroll, which he is against.

Seeking a rescue

A bailout is needed. At the end of 2024, public debt was close to 80% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), with 7% of that owed externally. In 2019, when Saied took office, it was at 67%. This year, Tunisia needs to borrow an estimated 14% of its GDP to avoid a default, but its bonds are rated as junk, and there are fears about the solvency of Tunisian banks.

Nemsia became the architect of what was branded as self-reliance policies, which the state pursued after Saied turned down the IMF. She also crafted four budgets which introduced austerity measures that manifested in higher taxes and reduced government spending on subsidies.

This led to social unrest, alongside soaring prices, anaemic growth of 0.4% in 2023, shortages of basic foodstuffs like milk, flour, and sugar, and a scarcity of gas cylinders, which are often used for cooking.

Food inflation reached 9%, and general unemployment among Tunisia’s 12 million population hit 16%, but for young people, joblessness is much higher—around 40%. State utility companies are owed around $1.5bn, most from residential customers who cannot afford to pay the high prices for water and electricity.

AFP
Tunisian demonstrators raise banners to protest the economic crisis, in the capital, Tunis, October 15, 2022 Al-Boughdiri Namsia, presenting the state’s general budget for 2022, Tunisia, December 28, 2021.

Initially, Saied backed Nemsia’s financial policies, as they demonstrated Tunisia’s financial resilience without needing help from the IMF and the World Bank, but Western capitals remained concerned about a collapse of Tunisia’s public finances and a social explosion that could ripple beyond its own borders.

Legitimising criminality

Nemsia’s dismissal comes just weeks after the approval of the most recent budget and after Saied appeared visibly angry while asking her about the commission managing confiscated assets since 2011, including those of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his in-laws.

Nemsia had worked at the Ministry of Finance for 35 years, giving her extensive experience and knowledge of its operations, but was suspended in March 2021 (when she was director-general of tax legislation) along with two other senior ministry directors.

Their removal let the ministry pass a law allowing for the settlement of exchange violations with companies and individuals and for an amnesty for tax violations—a law strongly opposed by Tunisia’s central bank. This law was described as allowing the laundering of money and the protection of smugglers.

The opposition argued that the trio's suspension and the law's approval paved a dangerous path towards legislative manipulation by tax evaders and smuggling barons, whose political influence had grown to such an extent that they could tailor laws that legitimised their crimes.

A World Bank report from 2015 titled Tax Evasion by the Influential Costs Tunisia $1.2bn highlights the losses incurred before and after the fall of Ben Ali's regime in 2011. Another report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group from 2017 cited "300 shadow figures", including businessmen and smugglers, controlling national decision-making and blocking reforms.

Through the funding of political parties and their election campaigns, this influence extended to controlling the appointment and dismissal of ministers and senior officials in critical state positions, from public administration to security and customs.

Nemsia worked at the Ministry of Finance for 35 years, giving her extensive experience and knowledge of its operations

In July 2021, Saied consolidated power by dismissing the government, dissolving parliament, and suspending the 2014 constitution. A week later, Nemsia was appointed as finance minister. It was seen as restoring the honour of a seasoned civil servant after a five-month suspension. One of her first tasks was to investigate the loans and grants received by Tunisia from 2011-21.

Tunisia's second-most powerful 

Nemsia ploughed on, and Saied's trust in her management of the finances gave her the freedom to make decisions and formulate policy. She soon became the second most powerful person in Tunisia after Saied, which meant that she could act with authority when dealing with prime ministers and the central bank governor, including the incumbent, Fethi Nouri and his predecessor, Marouane Abassi.

She led negotiations with the IMF over the $1.9bn loan but was told to reject anything that contradicted the government's reform philosophy. For Saied, this meant preserving the state's social role.

Tunisia had stopped borrowing from the IMF in the early 1990s after a series of structural reforms introduced in 1989. It was only in 2012, after the upheaval of the Arab Spring that ejected Ben Ali, that Tunis once again sought help.

The IMF recommended that the Tunisian government cut subsidies, cut government spending, freeze public sector recruitment, float the currency, and increase privatisation. Yet the revolution that had toppled Ben Ali called for social justice, and there was widespread public opposition to the IMF and its reforms.

FETHI BELAID / AFP
Tunisian demonstrators and lawyers shout slogans in front of the interior ministry in Habib Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis after Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's address to the nation on January 14, 2011.

When Tunisia did borrow from the IMF, Nemsia spun it as the country retaining control, in comments like: "The Tunisian delegation imposed its vision on the programme, which was developed by 400 experts from within Tunisia's administration." On 15 October 2022, Tunisia signed a framework agreement with the IMF but did not disclose its details to the public. 

On 6 April 2023, Saied announced his rejection of an IMF loan, saying the Fund's formula threatened social harmony. This seemed to undermine Nemsia's credibility, but she was not dismissed, unlike Prime Minister Najla Bouden, Economy Minister Samir Saied, and Central Bank Governor Marouane Abassi, who were. 

Policy of self-reliance

On 26 September 2023, during a National Security Council meeting, Nemsia was tasked with drafting a budget law based on the principles of national sovereignty and social justice while adhering to the policy of self-reliance. 

Given the country's fragile financial balances, she crafted stringent austerity policies, trimming subsidy expenditure by a third. These policies were criticised as encouraging stagflation. Soon, queues for food, fuel, and medicine became a common sight. Growth, which had been a healthy 2.4% in 2022, was down to 0.4% in 2023 and 1.6% in 2024.

In February 2024, a week before Nouri's appointment as central bank governor, Tunisia's parliament voted to amend an article that prohibited the central bank from financing the public treasury. The new measure allowed for a loan of $2.2bn, repayable in ten years after a three-year grace period, to help fill a budget deficit.

Seeking alternative (non-IMF) ways to secure resources to repay Tunisia's sovereign debt to avoid state bankruptcy was a top priority and a concern Nemsia openly expressed during a parliamentary session. In the end, debt repayment was accomplished through direct financing from the central bank, loans with sky-high interest rates of over 10% (such as one from the African Export-Import Bank), or reliance on Algeria for gas supplies and loans.

Nemsia crafted four budgets that introduced austerity measures, increasing taxes and cutting government spending on subsidies

High tax burden

Nemsia's budgets kept Tunisia's tax burden high (by some measures, the highest in Africa), while public investment spending was limited to just 6.9% of the overall budget. Public sector recruitment was frozen, and early retirement was encouraged. This cut the public sector wage bill from 16.1% of GDP in 2020 to 13.3% in 2024.

Her tenure at the ministry was not without controversy. She faced accusations of using state machinery to "financially punish" Saied's critics with unprecedented in-depth tax audits targeting economists, politicians, businesspeople, journalists, civil rights organisations, and lawyers.

While she was finance minister, Nemsia was also accused of effectively implementing IMF-like policies, but without the IMF money, earning her the moniker of "the IMF's shadow". News that she had been sacked came with no official explanation or even any mention of her name. Rather, the official statement
referenced only the appointment of her successor, a magistrate.

For anyone unclear as to the direction of travel, news quickly followed that, according to Reuters, Saied met Nouri last week and insisted on amending a 2016 law that guarantees the institution's independence. Many of those watching Tunisia's economy are increasingly closing their eyes.

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