Politics

An emboldened Erdoğan tries once more to resolve the 'Kurdish issue'

Buoyed by a string of recent successes, the Turkish president wants to capitalise on a ‘once in a lifetime’ opportunity to finally put to rest a longstanding battle with the PKK

AFP

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with Devlet Bahçeli, the chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

An emboldened Erdoğan tries once more to resolve the 'Kurdish issue'

Omer Onhon

last update on 10 Jan 2025

When Turkish ultranationalist Devlet Bahçeli shook hands with the co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) on 1 October 2024, it undoubtedly set something in motion. What it set off is still up for debate.

The handshake on the opening day of the new legislative year of the Turkish Parliament initiated by 77-year-old Bahçeli, the chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), could be a symbolic moment in Türkiye’s history with Kurds.

Türkiye’s battle has been focused on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)— widely recognised as a terrorist organisation, but Bahçeli’s initiative could more broadly be described as an effort to resolve ‘the Kurdish issue’, on which sensitivities abound. As such, it is best described as a “reconciliation process”.

Bahçeli’s offer

Three weeks after his highly political gesture, Bahçeli called on Abdullah Öcalan—the imprisoned founder of the PKK and a man he once said should be executed—to announce the group’s dissolution in the Turkish parliament.

Captured by Turkish intelligence agents in an operation in Nairobi in 1999, Öcalan is serving a life sentence in a one-man prison on the Island of Imralı in the Sea of Marmara. Bahçeli said that if Öcalan made the call, a legal arrangement to review the form and duration of his detention could be invoked despite many unknowns and concerns as to how this would be done.

Abdullah Ocalan during his trial in Imrali Island prison in 1999.

Until 2016, Bahçeli also the leader of the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves organisation—was the fiercest opponent of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who he accused of betraying Türkiye and the Turkish nation. Today, it is quite the opposite: he is Erdoğan’s most loyal ally and partner.

After a few days of silence, Erdoğan expressed support for Bahçeli’s proposal, ending speculations that he and Bahçeli were at odds on the issue. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that Bahçeli would ever have suggested Öcalan’s release for disbanding the PKK without Erdoğan’s prior consent.

Bitter experience

This is not uncharted territory. A similar process was initiated from 2012-15. It ended up as a bitter experience from which Erdoğan remains cautious. Mehmet Yilmaz, a leading Turkish journalist, thinks Erdogan would rather stay in the background for now, in part because he questions whether Öcalan still has control over the PKK and whether he could deliver.

Before getting actively involved (and therefore risking his own political capital), Erdoğan is waiting for concrete developments such as for Öcalan to issue a call to lay down arms—and for the PKK’s other leaders to signal that they may commit to it.

The legal interlocutor is the DEM Party, hence Bahçeli’s handshake. With 57 seats, DEM is the third-largest political party in the Turkish Parliament. On the one side, they will be talking to Bahçeli (and, by extension, the government). On the other, they will be talking to the PKK and its Syrian affiliates.

With government permission, DEM parliamentarians Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder met Öcalan in İmralı prison on 28 December. The next day, they shared his statement, in which Öcalan said he had the power and the will to make a positive contribution to the new paradigm that Bahçeli and Erdoğan had empowered.

Öcalan said he has the will to make a positive contribution to the new paradigm that Bahçeli and Erdoğan empowered

Öcalan further said that these efforts were aimed at a democratic transformation and called on all political segments in Türkiye to make a positive contribution. DEM delegates are expected to meet him again later in January.

Treading lightly

The Turkish public is highly sensitive to PKK terrorism and Kurdish separatism, but so far, there has been no groundswell of objections to the process Bahçeli initiated. Even those with the most serious misgivings seem to be giving peace a chance.

CHP, the main opposition party, said it would not put obstructions in the way, nor would it be part of a plan serving Erdoğan's political interests. It called for the parliament to be involved and become the centre of the process. The obvious opposer would have been the main Turkish nationalist party, the MHP, but since it was MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli who set things in motion, there is no such risk.

The model is familiar because something similar happened a decade ago. Turkish security officials held secret talks with Öcalan, and as talks progressed, Erdoğan revealed them and let Kurdish parliamentarians visit in İmralı.

Shortly after, Öcalan called for the silencing of arms, prompting PKK detainees to be released, Turkish operations against the PKK to stop, and initiatives such as the use of the Kurdish language to be introduced.

When wrestling with the Kurdish issue, Turkish delegates feel they need to speak to the PKK's Syrian affiliates, often judged to mean the YPG. In 2012-15, Turkish officials held talks with YPG/PYD representatives, including Salih Muslim.

Despite later Turkish denials of cooperation, the YPG said it worked with the Turkish army to move the tomb of Suleiman Shah, grandfather of Osman Bey, the founder of the Ottoman Empire, in the Eshme district of Syria to a different location close to the Turkish border, to counter the threat from the Islamic State (IS). Öcalan noted this cooperation and has since referred to "the Eshme spirit".

Different times

A decade ago, things were different. Erdoğan needed votes for both the 2014 presidential and the 2015 parliamentary elections. Getting the Kurds to lay down their arms and join the political process was expected to deliver them.

In the wake of the 2014 presidential elections, Kurdish HDP party co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş came third, with just less than 10% of the vote. In 2015, HDP came fourth with just over 13% of the vote, winning 80 of the parliament's 550 seats. This put the HDP on par with Bahçeli's ultranationalists. The international press dubbed him 'the Kurdish Obama'. In short, his star was rising.

In July 2015, talks with the PKK collapsed. Demirtaş blamed Erdoğan and his ruling AKP party, saying it had renewed offensive operations in the lead-up to elections to attract votes. For Erdoğan, this personal criticism was a step too far. In 2016, Demirtaş was arrested on charges of inciting violence, and he has been in prison ever since. The 2015 parliamentary elections also had a major impact on the country's political future.

Rather than voting for the AKP, Kurdish voters carried the HDP into parliament, and the AKP lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002. Attempts to form a coalition government failed, and elections had to be held again.

In the six months leading up to those new elections, Türkiye faced terror attacks from both the PKK and IS. Voters shifted back to the AKP, which regained its majority. Now, as then, political considerations are crucial to the process, which was initiated by Bahçeli at this time.

For Erdoğan to sustain his popularity boost, he needs new successes. A reconciliation with the PKK could provide it.

Popularity boost

Erdoğan's popularity was recently on the wane owing to the country's economic difficulties and the success of CHP, which recently overtook AKP in local elections. Yet the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, owing in part to the role Erdoğan claims Türkiye played, has given him a boost in the opinion polls.

For him to sustain that, he needs new successes. A reconciliation in which the PKK would lay down its weapons could provide it. That would let Erdoğan focus on the biggest (and most acute) problem that Turks face: the economy.

An end to the costly PKK-inspired terrorist operations and a withdrawal from its expensive military deployment in northern Syria would all ease the burden on Türkiye's finances, but the government must step carefully. For now, Bahçeli—a septuagenarian nationalist leader—is raising much less suspicion among the public.

A big question now relates to the new order in Syria and the future of the YPG. The country's new constitution and the possibility of a separate administrative system for the Kurds in the northeast will have implications for Türkiye and the reconciliation process.

Ankara is keen to give the impression that it separates the YPG from the reconciliation process in Türkiye, but in reality, they are two sides of the same coin, and Turkish-backed Syrian forces continue to attack the YPG around Manbij and the Tishreen Dam.

After years of fighting, Erdoğan will hope that a confluence of factors—including his influence in Damascus, Bahçeli's political reputation, Öcalan's receptiveness, and the Turkish public's acquiescence—could deliver a once-in-a-generation opportunity to finally put 'the Kurdish file' to rest.

Time will tell whether the stars align.

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