Israel in the new Middle East: A military giant with no legs
The region is changing, in part due to Israel’s own successes. But if it leaves foreign policy decision-making to a heavily politicised clique, it may not be able to reap the rewards.
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Israeli soldiers with their Merkava tanks near Gaza. A range of regional powers all willing and able to intervene increases the risk of conflict in the Middle East.
Israel in the new Middle East: A military giant with no legs
Before the 2011 Syrian Revolution and civil war that ensued, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) of Bashar al-Assad was deemed to be Israel’s most serious conventional threat. Years later, after a devastating conflict that already removed much of the threat, remnants of al-Assad’s army were effectively taken out in a matter of hours by a widespread Israeli air campaign dubbed “Arrows of Bashan” (in reference to the biblical name used for the northernmost region of Israel).
Before the Lebanon war that broke out this year, Hezbollah’s missile arsenal was also deemed to be a key threat to Israel, with expectations that the group would cripple Israel’s air defences and kill hundreds (if not thousands) of civilians. Weeks later, this arsenal had been severely degraded, and the group’s leadership decimated. Iran, Hezbollah’s main patron, has lost its most efficient air defences, with the destruction of four Russian-made S-300 batteries, leaving it open to follow-up strikes that may hit its nuclear programme.
The past year has proven that the Israeli military could do two things: Fight a multifront war and win—a feat the Israeli military has done in the past but never against so many unconventional enemies—and fight a long war, something it never did since the first independence war.
As the cascade of conflicts and crises that broke out following the October 7 attacks is receding, Israel has emerged a military giant, capable of operating far beyond its borders. Israel carried out some of its longest strikes, hitting the Yemen-based Houthis more than 1800 km from its borders. It now has complete air supremacy (rather than superiority) in Syria after removing almost all of the country’s air defences.
The most serious wish of Israel's far right is perhaps the least discussed: Smotrich's bid to annex the West Bank
Appetite for expansion
This certainly has some within the Israeli government thinking they can now capitalise on recent military successes and expand its territory. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, the duo of Israeli far-right leaders, are not hiding their intentions: They want to consolidate Israel's military success in a way that reshapes the region.
This includes their longstanding advocacy for the resettlement of Gaza, from which Israel pulled out in 2005. As the devastating war was taking place, the Israeli far right has constantly been pushing out plans for the recreation of settlements that were evacuated in 2005, even holding a conference on the resettlement of Gaza.
For his part, Smotrich is pushing once again for the annexation of the West Bank, arguing that Trump's election presents Israel with the perfect opportunity to do so. Just days after Trump's election, Smotrich posted a statement declaring that 2025 would be the "year of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria", referring to the biblical name of the West Bank.
In Syria, Israeli troops have entered several areas, but the strategic Hermon Mount, which is one of the highest points in the Eastern Mediterranean, is most likely to be deemed "essential" to Israel's security—and prompt calls for a permanent "stay" of Israeli forces.
To be clear, those bombastic statements by far-right leaders should not be exaggerated. There were calls to create settlements in Lebanon after the beginning of the war in October—statements that have found very little echo in the wider Israeli public and beyond far-right circles.
#Israeli settlers gather at an event near #Gaza to promote plans for building Jewish settlements in the Strip. The event was attended by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and members of Knesset from #Netanyahu's #Likud.
With regards to the more serious calls to settle Gaza, despite regular rhetoric in that regard by far-right figures, there is little appetite in Israel for such an endeavour. Recent polls have shown that a solid majority of Israelis oppose the resettlement of Gaza. Though Netanyahu has said he wants overriding security control of the Gaza Strip—referring to the same model used in the West Bank, which sees Israeli troops regularly enter Palestinian towns—he has also been cautious not to support such initiatives.
This is not to say that those initiatives should be dismissed. Perhaps the most serious of them is the least discussed: Smotrich's bid to annex the West Bank. With rhetoric on Gaza, Lebanon or even Syria, the far-right may be pushing Netanyahu to give ground on what they really want: sovereignty over the West Bank.
While Trump appears to have warned that he would not support such an initiative, some of the rhetoric coming from members of his new administration seems to suggest otherwise. The mere appearance of support could be enough to change dynamics and push the Israeli government to more overtly pursue annexation.
Post-October 7 mentality
Recent military successes have had an impact even in more mainstream circles within the government. This is in part due to the post-October 7 mentality that has taken shape after the unprecedented attack carried out by Hamas. Israeli political and military leaders no longer want to sit by a fence, waiting for possible threats to turn into real ones. Threats need to be prevented or even "pre-empted"—i.e. cut off before they grow into actual threats.
This mentality was one of the key drivers behind Operation "Arrows of Bashan" and the entry of Israeli troops into southern Syria. Israel is not waiting to see how the new Syrian government will turn out: It is defanging any future power in Syria while acting to remove weapons situated close to the border and left by al-Assad's army and creating a new line of defence that includes elements both inside Israel, but also outside of it.
Israeli army soldiers inspect a Syrian army battle tank that they captured in the UN-monitored buffer zone separating Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, on December 21, 2024.
Israeli troops were, for instance, shown to have taken position in Tal Kudna, a former base of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Footage and satellite images suggest other bases have now been turned into Israeli bases inside southern Syria, just outside of the buffer zone.
This security-driven strategy finds far less opponents inside Israel than the boisterous rhetoric coming from the far-right. There is little to no criticism inside Israel of the operation, which is seen as a way to prevent attacks from the Syrian side. The repeated statement by Syria's new de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa (who was most commonly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), claiming that Syrian territory would no longer be used to threaten its neighbours, has done little to assuage Israel's concerns.
While Israel is right to view al-Sharaa's statements with a healthy dose of scepticism, the "pre-emptive" strategy is not without risks: By operating in Syrian territory, Israel risks repeating mistakes of the past by prompting resistance that its enemies can then use. Hezbollah owes its success to Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. Iran is unlikely to be in a position to repeat its successful strategy in Syria, but others could.
At the height of the Syrian civil war, Israel was a lot more subtle and open to building ties with local communities, including through its operation "Good Neighbours", which included contacts with local rebel leaders and treatment for wounded Syrians at Israeli hospitals.
Attacking Iran?
Then comes the question that, according to Netanyahu himself, will be at the forefront in 2025, namely Iran. After wrecking Iran's air defences, Israel will certainly be tempted to go a step further and either remove Iran's nuclear programme or act even more directly to remove the Islamic Republic altogether.
The removal of Iran's nuclear programme could reshape the region even further, but a failed attack could convince it to cross the nuclear threshold
The Israeli government may wait for Trump as it seeks to gauge the kind of support the new US administration will provide. To have the best chance of success, any strike against Iran's nuclear programme would have to entail the use of several US weapon systems that are not currently at Israel's disposal.
President Trump may be inclined to give Israel these tools or to go a step further and directly involve the United States. The removal of Iran's nuclear programme could serve to reshape the region even further, but a failed attack could also have the opposite effect and convince Iran to cross the nuclear threshold.
As of now, military deterrence is one of the key factors preventing Iran from crossing this threshold: If the military option proves ineffective, Iran will likely make the jump, particularly after its whole regional strategy collapsed under Israel's attacks and after the fall of al-Assad. Attacking nuclear installations is a one-shot option.
Rather than pressing the outright military option, Israel and the US could seek to pursue a continued "containment" policy that will eventually force Tehran to face its own limitations, including the fact that much of its own population despises its government and that the country barely can provide electricity and water to all.
Vehicles drive near damaged buildings in Beirut's southern suburbs after a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect, Lebanon November 27, 2024.
A giant with no legs
Israel finds itself as a new military superpower in the Middle East, following the success of its campaign against Iranian proxies, Iran itself, and Hamas. But the overbearing weight of the military tool as a way to shape Israel's environment is not without risks. The Netanyahu years (even before the war) have been characterised by the hollowing out of a much-needed pillar of Israel's newfound strength: diplomacy.
During his mandates, Netanyahu has acted in a way that deprived Israel of a real Foreign Affairs Ministry with the tools and resources necessary to take advantage of Israel's military successes. Diplomats have been so badly mistreated that they have regularly held labour strikes in protests of poor working conditions and salary, while the foreign ministry itself has been vacant for years or held by less-than-deserving yes-men whose words rarely translated into action.
Without diplomacy, Israel is a giant with no legs: It can hit and slap around its enemies, but it can't go places. The region is changing, in part due to Israel's own successes, but the country could very well find itself not able to benefit from it if it leaves foreign policy decision-making to a heavily politicised clique, more concerned with narrow self-serving interests than long-term national goals that require more subtle tools of influence.
