Republicans' Project 2025
Donald Trump and the Republican Party were clear about Iran. Project 2025, the policy programme prepared by Republican Party experts and former Trump administration officials, identified Iran as one of the five key states threatening America (along with China, Russia, North Korea and Venezuela, and China is the top concern). Trump, in July and again in September, emphasised that tough sanctions against Iran during his presidency had weakened Iran and threatened to attack it on 25 September.
Former Trump officials who might return to Washington, such as Mike Pompeo, Trump’s Secretary of State; Robert O’Brian, Trump’s last national security advisor; Nikki Haley, Trump’s ambassador to the United Nations; and Chris Miller, Trump’s last Secretary of Defence, all urge greater pressure against Iran, including more sanctions, and against countries that support Iran, such as China. All of them could return in a new Trump administration. Similarly, some Republican experts urge halting humanitarian aid to Iran’s allies in Syria and Yemen. It is also worth noting that Project 2025 also calls for Washington to begin supporting opposition groups in Iran.
The Republican Party is not suggesting regime change in Iran, however. Project 2025 cautions, “The decision to be free of the country’s abusive leaders must, of course, be made by the Iranian people.” President Trump, in the Oval Office, avoided risking a war with Iran; his order to strike General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 was aimed only at deterring Iran.
The exception to this approach is an Iranian nuclear weapon. Republicans in Congress (and most Democrats), as well as figures like Pompeo and Haley, would strongly urge Trump to use military force as a last choice if Iran is on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon.
We know what his advisors and political allies will say, but Trump is unpredictable. He threatened North Korea in 2017 but did not attack. It is easy to imagine him ordering a powerful attack on Iran, but it also is possible to imagine him trying to make a bold, last-minute deal with Tehran, as he did with North Korea. Of course, the politics in Washington about Iran and Israel are vastly different from North Korea.
Hawkish Harris?
At the beginning of the Middle East portion of the August 2024 Democratic Party policy statement is the goal of deterring Iran. The statement sharply criticised Trump for his “weakness” in not responding militarily to Iranian provocations in the Gulf, such as the January 2020 Iranian missile attack on an American base in Iraq following the US killing of Soleimani. Harris, who has little experience with the Middle East, likely would follow Biden’s approach. Thus, Harris—who will bring some officials from Biden’s team—might well strike at pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq in response to attacks on American interests and perhaps those of American partners.
But, like Biden and Trump, Harris will try to avoid a major war with Iran. She would face the same kinds of pressure as Trump were Iran to be on the verge of producing a nuclear weapon. Neither Trump nor Harris wants to confront such a question. If Trump decides to attack, he would do so unilaterally or perhaps act with Israel. Harris would seek to create a broader international consensus before acting, garnering regional support from European and Asian allies.
Given the advances in the Iranian programme since Obama’s deal in 2015, it is unclear how Harris could negotiate a new deal. Biden failed. It would be easier for Harris to continue Biden’s approach of not trying to stop Iranian oil sales to China in return for Iran not producing a nuclear bomb. Certainly, Harris would confront a sceptical Congress, and it would be extremely hard to get ratification in the American Senate—a step Tehran prefers.
Instead, in the absence of negotiations, Harris will likely impose more sanctions on Iran and Chinese companies importing oil from Iran if Iran makes more small advances on the nuclear programme. It is worth mentioning that Trump, despite his harsh rhetoric on Iran, has on two occasions in September hinted that he might lift sanctions on Iran and Russia to forestall wider use of the Chinese currency in those two countries. By comparison, Harris and the Democrats stress containment of Iran over any long-term threat to the dominance of the dollar in world markets.
Saudi defence and Israel normalisation
The Republican Project 2025 policy programme recommended building up the capabilities of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states so that they can do much more for their own defence, an idea that the Democratic Party also favours. Trump and Harris would, therefore, continue the US Central Command’s programme under the Biden administration of training with regional states in joint air and sea military exercises.
Both Trump and Harris will continue arms sales to the kingdom and the Gulf states as part of building their capabilities. The commercial gains from arms sales for American defence industries would also appeal strongly to Trump. Concerns about Chinese penetration, not human rights, would be the cause of delays in any large sale, although a Harris administration would pay more attention to Yemen than would a Trump administration.
The Republican policy paper also recommended an American diplomatic initiative to bring Israel, India, Egypt, and the Gulf states together in a coalition to deter Iran and already the Biden administration has worked to build trilateral ties between India, Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
Similarly, both Trump and Harris would renew Biden’s effort to bring Saudi Arabia into regional agreements with Israel, but they would probably differ on a defence treaty between Washington and Riyadh. Biden saw the treaty as part of a package agreement for normalising relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and a Harris administration likely would renew technical discussions quickly. Several Democratic and Republican senators told Semafor News on 17 September that the Senate was open to considering a treaty on condition that it include normalisation with Israel.
It is easy to imagine that a Harris administration would try to convince Riyadh to accept normalisation with Israel with whatever vague language Washington might extract from Tel Aviv about a possible chance for a Palestinian state in some undefined future without any interim steps or timelines. It would be Riyadh’s decision whether to accept the American assurance.
By contrast, Donald Trump perceives formal alliances as obligations for the Americans without corresponding obligations from the allies. His unhappiness with NATO and the military alliances with Japan and South Korea suggest he will not rush to create a new alliance with Saudi Arabia.
It is worth noting that Trump declined to use American military forces to respond to the Iranian attack against Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia in 2019. It is easy to imagine that if Trump does pursue a bilateral defence treaty with Saudi Arabia, he would demand Saudi (or even Israeli) financing of all the costs to the United States of military deployments. Trump will be much more interested in commercial deals with the Gulf states, ranging from energy to aeroplanes and sectors where China might try to penetrate deeply into the Saudi market.
No difference on Palestine
Whatever Riyadh can get on the Palestine issue from a Harris administration would be greater than what it would get from Trump. During his 2024 campaign, Trump praised Israeli military operations in Gaza and pledged to support Israel fully. Trump also called some Democrats, including President Biden, “Palestinian” to criticise Biden’s brief hesitation to supply large bombs to Israel for the Gaza war. From the Oval Office in 2017-2020, Trump and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and his ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, all aimed to isolate the Palestinian Authority and help consolidate Israel’s control of Jerusalem and the West Bank.
Trump moved the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and when the Palestinian Authority cut contacts with the Trump administration, Trump closed its office in Washington. Trump in 2019 eliminated all economic and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian Authority, including aid to the Palestinian Security Forces that were cooperating with Israel. When Israel tried to restore the funding for the Palestinian Security Forces, Trump told his aides that if Netanyahu wanted to help the Palestinian Security Forces, Israel could pay for it.
Similarly, the Trump administration eliminated all US funding to UNRWA in 2109, as Pompeo and Haley accused UNRWA of mismanagement and promoting Palestinian terrorism. It is impossible to imagine a new Trump administration will try to advance a two-state solution, and easy to imagine it would give a blank cheque to Israel in Gaza.
In contrast to Trump, Harris would verbally be more sympathetic to the Palestinians. In March 2024, she spoke with real human feeling about the suffering of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and demanded Israel allow the delivery of more humanitarian aid in a way that Biden never did. However, practically speaking, her words had little impact on the Netanyahu government.
Furthermore, on the campaign trail, Harris avoided meeting Democratic Party activists demanding an embargo on arms deliveries to Israel. Nor did she allow the activists to speak at the national Democratic Party convention. Instead, Harris has emphasised repeatedly that Israel has a right to defend itself from attacks that occurred on 7 October, and Washington will provide Israel with all the weapons it needs for its self-defence.
It is also worth remembering that the Biden administration did not honour its pledge to re-open the Palestinian Liberation Office in Washington or reopen the American Consulate General in Jerusalem, which had been responsible for bilateral relations with the Palestinian Authority until Trump closed it. (The Israeli Government objected to this Biden idea, and the White House did nothing further.)
Harris has spoken about the need for the Palestinians to have security and freedom. A Harris administration will likely try to maintain the economic and humanitarian aid that Biden restarted for the Palestinians. Her administration would maintain communication with the Palestinian Authority, who her administration would envision assuming administrative powers in postwar Gaza, at least initially. It might also sanction a few more settlers abusing Palestinians in the Occupied West Bank.
In the end, however, the Democratic Party’s foreign policy experts have no innovative ideas about how to reach a two-state solution or even how to compel Israel to accept the Palestinian Authority's return to Gaza.
The left wing of the Democratic party is prepared to put earnest pressure on Israel; Senator Bernie Sanders is pressing for an arms embargo. The left wing of the party, however, lost two prominent members of Congress who favoured pressure on Israel after they lost primary elections in New York and Missouri.
Israel’s allies are strong in Congress, and Harris has shown no sign of wanting to confront them with tough policies to extract concessions from Israel. She is more likely to fight her political battles for other domestic issues. Therefore, while a Harris administration would sound more balanced than a Trump administration on the Palestinian issue, in reality, it would change little on the ground.
