Behind the façade: understanding Syria’s parliamentary election

Local sources reported that there were more significant violations than officially acknowledged, extending beyond the districts where re-elections were held.

This includes incidents of vote-buying, repeated voting at different polling stations, and voting on behalf of refugees and internally displaced Syrians.

In addition, election participation rates were significantly lower than the 38% announced, despite the regime's efforts to compel residents—especially civil servants and military personnel—to vote.

Surprise, surprise

Syrian elections have historically been rigged and this one was no exception. That was evident in the final results, announced on 18 July, which gave the ruling Ba'ath Party and its allies near-complete control of the parliament.

This coalition won 185 of the 250 seats, up from the 177 seats it secured in 2020. Many successful candidates are known for corruption or involvement in human rights violations, including retired military personnel and leaders of loyalist militias.

Figures such as Issam Sbahiy, Mustafa Al-Mustafa, and Youssef Al-Salameh from the Baath Brigades, as well as Maher Qawarma, Ali Al-Jadaan, Hassan Saloumi, Firas Al-Jaham, and Ammar Al-Assad from the National Defense, are considered by some to be problematic for various reasons.

Similarly, several militia leaders, warlords, and even individuals associated with illicit activities like drug trafficking emerged victorious as independent candidates.

Mujahid Ismail from the Baath Brigades, Madloul Al-Aziz linked to the Baqir Brigade, and Khalifa Al-Hamad from the National Defence forces, are among those who have been elected as members of parliament.

To prevent any surprises, the Syrian regime has maintained decades-long regulations that effectively allocate two-thirds of the seats to the Ba'ath Party and its allies. One such is the "block vote" system.

Syria is the only country in the world where this is still used. It ensures that all candidates on the Ba'ath final list win seats. In theory, it lets people vote for individual candidates. In practice, voters use a pre-selected ballot, rather than a blank 'write-in' ballot.

Additionally, all candidates are thoroughly vetted to ensure that only those loyal to Assad can run. Through these various measures, the Ba'ath Party secures the majority of seats in parliament and maintains full control over the legislative body, even if it serves only a nominal function.

Boycotts and bias

Assad's history of manipulating elections and his regime's lack of legitimacy have led to low voter turnout and increased scepticism about the fairness of the elections.

The poll was banned by de facto authorities in non-regime areas, including the opposition-held north-west Syria and the country's north-east, which is currently under the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration.

It was also boycotted in pockets of resistance within regime-controlled areas, particularly in the south.

Most residents outside the city of Daraa refused to participate. The governorate's candidates were reportedly limited to members of the Ba'ath Party and those loyal to the government's security apparatus, reinforcing a view of bias.

In neighbouring Sweida, where protesters have been demonstrating against the regime for almost a year, residents and armed groups actively prevented the election from taking place, rather than simply boycotting it.

They stormed more than a dozen polling stations and seized ballot boxes, with anti-election demonstrations recorded in several towns and cities.

Western countries such as the UK and Germany condemned Syria's parliamentary elections, saying they fall short of international norms, defy UN Resolution 2254 calling for a political shift, and exacerbate the ongoing conflict and discord.

Consolidating power

Holding elections on time signals to external actors—particularly rivals—that the Damascus regime is resilient and will not succumb to pressure or interference in Syria's domestic affairs. Assad also hopes that elections will further boost normalisation efforts with other countries.

Even though Syria's parliament is a rubber-stamping body with no power to initiate or shape legislation, it remains crucial for Assad to legalise and legitimise his policies and actions.

The regime has historically used parliament to tighten its control over state institutions and to legalise its human rights violations. It is also likely to be needed to amend the constitution to allow the continuation of Assad's quarter-century rule.

He requires the Assembly to amend the constitution so he can run again in 2028. This would mirror what happened in 2000, when the Assembly lowered the candidacy age from 40 to 34, which let him run for the presidency.

Although these amendments are merely window dressing, Assad wants to ensure the process appears proper and legal.

Stick and carrot

Parliamentary elections also enable the regime to adjust its patronage networks. Devoted loyalists are rewarded, while underperformers are kicked out.

New businessmen, tribal figures, and militia leaders have been integrated into each new parliament since 2011, while others have been banned from running again.

In June, the Baath Party barred 19 members currently serving as MPs from various Syrian provinces from running again due to their "failure to comply with leadership instructions". Conversely, Mohammad Hamsho, a pro-regime businessman previously barred from running, was allowed to run… and won.

Notably, there are no fixed criteria for the number of Parliament members allocated from each governorate. This is decided at the president's discretion, rather than based on population size.

Crucially, this allows the regime to over-represent its strongholds in parliament and adjust proportions to fit the list of individuals being rewarded or punished.

For example, the regime stronghold of Latakia has seven more seats allocated to it than Daraa, a region strongly associated with the opposition, even though the two governorates have roughly the same population size.

Through manipulating parliament in this manner, the regime has been able to foster competition among loyalists behind closed doors, boosting their support for Assad.

Given the regime's intention of using elections to legitimise its rule, observers should not expect them to deliver any substantial change. They remain primarily a tool by which Assad exercises control and demonstrates legitimacy. 

So long as Assad maintains internal support from his patronage network and external backers like Iran and Russia, his ability to dictate the terms of elections looks unassailable.

Genuine transformation will only be possible when Syria transitions to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, as articulated by UN Resolution 2254. For now, genuine democracy remains a dot on the horizon.