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Iran’s threat to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz—the narrow waterway in which one-fifth of the world’s daily oil supplies must pass—is a bluff, and the international community knows it. They know, just as the Iranian government knows, that if Iran were to close the strait it would deprive itself of the ability to export oil. Without the sale of oil, the Iran cannot finance itself and its economy could collapse. In short, closing the Strait of Hormuz would hurt Iran far more than any sanctions the Obama administration could ever dream up, so why run the risk?
The crisis began on 27 December, when Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, the commander of Iran’s navy, issued a warning to the United States and the European Union that if they were to proceed with their threat to boycott Iranian oil or punish those who purchase Iranian oil (as US legislation proposes) Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz, which was once described by former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, as the “jugular vein of the West.”
Since the initial threat, the US and Iran have engaged in a war of words over the waterway, with General Atollah Salehi, Iran’s army chief, warning the US Navy that a recently departed aircraft carrier group—led by the USS John D. Stennis—must not return to the Persian Gulf. In his statement, Salehi said: “Iran will not repeat its warning … the enemy’s carrier has been moved out to the Sea of Oman because of a [military] drill. I recommend and emphasize to the American carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf … we are not in the habit of warning more than once.”
[inset_left]The fact is that while Iran has the capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz for a limited period of time, doing so would harm Iran and its allies just as much as its enemies.[/inset_left]Then, in an ironic twist of fate, two days later, the Stennis carrier group saved thirteen Iranian fishermen from Somali pirates in a magnanimous gesture of good faith. The following day the Iranian Foreign Ministry, in a rare display of gratitude, thanked the United States for rescuing its sailors, only to be contradicted by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), who called it a Hollywood-style publicity stunt. More recently, on 10 January, a US Coast Guard vessel, operating off Iraq in the Northern Gulf, rescued another batch of Iranian sailors as their vessel was taking on water. And yet, in spite of these gestures of goodwill on the part of the Americans, the Iranian government has continued its adversarial posture.
As much as the export of oil from the Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz is crucial to the economies of Europe and Asia, the strait is equally vital to Iran’s economy, which exports approximately 2.6 million barrels per day (bpd)—the vast majority of which is loaded at the Kharg Island oil platform in the northern Gulf and transported to foreign markets through Hormuz.
This being the case, the likelihood of Iran following through on the threat to close the waterway seems remote, as it would seriously affect Iranian ability to export oil and harm its already weakened economy, which is struggling under a harsh sanctions regime.
Threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz is not a new Iranian tactic. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the Islamic Republic repeatedly threatened to close the strait to international shipping, as a means of putting pressure on Gulf States—specifically Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—to cease their support for Iraq.
Iran never acted on the threat, simply because it could not afford to lose an important means of revenue, especially since at the time the Iranian economy was also being hampered by American sanctions resulting from the 1979-80 hostage crisis.
On one particular occasion in August 1983, when Iraq announced that it intended to extend the war into the Gulf, the Iranian regime responded by threatening to close the strategic channel, reversing promises made at the start of the conflict to keep the strait open.
According Edgar O’Ballance, a journalist and academic, Iran had more than one means of closing the waterway. First, it could create a so-called wall of fire, whereby it would threaten to open fire on any unauthorized vessel passing by islands in the strait. Iran could conceivably fire on ships passing through the strait from island-based artillery or from the air. Little has changed since 1983 in terms of the viability of this option, if anything Iran’s military ability has improved, particularly given the expansion of its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in recent years. The wall of fire option is undoubtedly Iran’s best chance at closing the strait to shipping. It will allow Iran to continue to export oil through the waterway, while inhibiting the Gulf States (and Iraq) from doing so. But, while this appears to be Iran’s best option, the US Navy is more than capable of disabling Iran’s military facilities around the strait.
A second option also harks back to the nineteen-eighties, whereby Iran could mine the waterway. While this would certainly slow international shipping through the strait, it would not stop it altogether. The US could—just as it did during 1987-88— conduct mine-sweeping operations and implement a convoy system, which would limit the effectiveness of laying mines. At the same time, by mining the strait Iran runs the risk of striking its own vessels, which are just as susceptible to a mine strike as any other ship. As such, it could negatively inhibit its ability to export oil.
And finally, O’Ballance suggested that Iran could sink a super tanker in the middle of the narrow waterway, which would prevent any other ships from passing. At face value, this option is one of the few ways in which Iran could close the strait for a long time, but upon closer examination, it appears that the main transit route of the strait is too deep for this tactic to prove effective, though it could have a deterrent effect.
A more plausible approach for Iran, as suggested by American academic Gary Sick, would be to use its cruise missiles to attack the Gulf States’ loading platforms within the Gulf. While this certainly would prove effective in disrupting the West’s oil supplies—not to mention causing panic in already shaky global oil markets—such an act could very likely lead to a regional war with a high probability of foreign (i.e. US) intervention.
In its recent edition, The Economist discusses the possibility that Iran could rely on its asymmetric warfare capabilities, notably the use of fast-moving speedboats equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as its growing fleet of mini-submarines and armed drones. As The Economist points out, “The Iranians believe that with ‘swarming’ tactics in confined waters they may be able to overwhelm even the sophisticated defenses of an American carrier group.” In essence, this is a modern adaptation of the wall of fire option and could potentially render the strait hazardous to transit, but these tactics will not be able to deter shipping altogether. After all, at the height of the Iran-Iraq War, when both Iraq and Iran were targeting international shipping, ships still entered the Gulf at great risk and still loaded up with oil.
The fact is that while Iran has the capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz for a limited period of time, doing so would harm Iran and its allies just as much as its enemies. There are two reasons for this. First, if Iran were to force the strait’s closure, it would deprive itself of its primary thoroughfare for exporting oil. The only contingency available to Iran would be to transport oil via truck to a port south of the strait, in the Sea of Oman, but that would be very expensive and logistically difficult. It is rather remarkable that Iran has not built an emergency pipeline bypassing the strait, after observing this strategic weakness during the war with Iraq.
Secondly, the United States, European and Asian countries—particularly China, Iran’s ally that also relies heavily on Iranian oil exports—would not tolerate such a move. If Iran were to close the strait, China would react in a very negative way, after all, according to Reuters, it purchases nearly 550,000 bpd from Iran—not to mention its imports from Saudi Arabia, which also have to pass through the strait. It is difficult to imagine that Iran would want to anger its Chinese ally.
At the same time, the Iranians know that closing the strait would violate international law and could be perceived by some (i.e the US) as an act of war.
Given these international factors, it seems unlikely that the Iranian government would ever actually follow through with this threat, simply because it cannot afford to do so. After all, even during the height of the Iran-Iraq War, when the Iraq was regularly bombing Iranian ships and the US was conducting a massive convoy system through the waterway, the Iranians never moved to close the strait, but why?
The answer to this question boils down to domestic considerations. According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran’s official news outlet, in 2006 over 90 percent of its oil exports were from the oil export terminal at Kharg Island. In 2009, Kharg Island was reported to have exported 950 million barrels annually, which, when broken down to a daily figure, matches Iran’s known daily oil exports of 2.6 million bpd. Therefore, the Iranians are just as reliant on exporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz as the rest of the Gulf States.
The idea that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz, in response to a threat of boycott by the US and EU, is highly unlikely, as closing the strait would affect the Iranian economy far worse than any foreign sanctions. In effect, the Iranian government would be sanctioning themselves. Given these factors, the Iranian threat to close the strait is completely empty. After all, a regime committed to self-preservation, like that in Tehran, will not purposely commit suicide and closing the Strait of Homuz would result in just that. In short, the Iranians are bluffing and everyone knows it.
