Decoding the alarming surge of IS prison breaks in north Syria

A similar incident occurred on 24 March at the Inshaa prison in Raqqa, where prisoners seized weapons from guards. This event resulted in the death of six and injury to fifteen others, with a few individuals managing to escape. Local authorities claimed to have recaptured all escapees, though these assertions were not independently confirmed.

On 29 March, another escape attempt occurred, this time in Afrin, northwest Syria. Twelve IS members fled from a prison in the Bulbul district under the control of Turkish-backed forces.

Unlike incidents in northeast Syria, these IS members managed to escape without violence, allegedly bribing guards with amounts ranging between $3,000 and $10,000 per person.

The Black Prison break

This incident is not isolated; last year, 20 IS members reportedly escaped from the Raju prison north of Aleppo, also known as the notorious "Black Prison," with the collusion of prison officials.

These recent incidents indicate increased intensity and a heightened focus on self-organised breakout attempts. This shift stands in stark contrast to IS's large-scale attack on the Sinaa prison in Hasakah, northeast Syria, in early 2022.

The operation mirrored the group's 2013 actions under the operational name "Breaking the Walls," releasing 500 IS members from Abu Ghraib and Al-Taji prisons in Iraq, many of whom later formed the core IS leadership.

Change in focus

The change in focus toward staging riots to facilitate breakouts seems to be a response to IS's decreased ability to carry out large-scale operations.

Increased counteroperations by the SDF and the international coalition have made such operations increasingly difficult. Consequently, IS members appear to be resorting to orchestrating escapes from within prison facilities.

This tactic seems relatively easier due to several factors. Overcrowded detention centres, many facilities, and inadequate security resources contribute to vulnerability. Additionally, navigating political and legal complexities hinders prosecution efforts.

As a result, prisons remain an ad-hoc solution for IS members. As they grow desperate, such operations will likely continue, posing the risk of future attempts becoming more sophisticated.

The ability of IS members to use bribes to escape prisons under Turkish-backed forces likely results from higher levels of corruption among guards. High inflation rates and low salaries compound this. Additionally, fewer IS members in these prisons may not incite power riots to facilitate escapes.

Growing risks

However, IS's reliance on self-organised operations increases risks. Large-scale operations typically require extensive coordination, raising the likelihood of interception. On the other hand, self-organised operations are more difficult to anticipate and intercept, making them just as dangerous.

The recent surge in prison break attempts underscores the urgent need to address the thousands of IS prisoners held in poorly secured makeshift prisons.

Tackling these challenges demands more than security measures; it requires comprehensive strategies for rehabilitation and reintegration to prevent the group's resurgence.

The repercussions of ignoring this issue are not merely local—they are a ticking time bomb with potentially catastrophic consequences, echoing far beyond the borders of Syria.