Part-time terrorists: How US interests decide terror designations

Now, militias aligned with Iran, including the Houthis, are focusing their activities against American interests, not only in the Red Sea but in Syria and Iraq as well.

While Iran and its proxies claim to be retaliating against Israeli aggression in Gaza, they have primarily targeted American interests and, before that, Arab nations' interests, along with Iraqi and Syrian citizens.

While Tehran's tactics are not new, this is the first time US President Joe Biden's administration has launched a military response.

It is a far cry from the statements made by the early Biden White House administration in 2020-21 when there were suggestions that the US could rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, which Trump abandoned.

With US presidential elections looming, Biden appears to be leaving his option open, as indicated by Sullivan. This approach, accompanied by limited public condemnation, allows for reversible designations and shows a muted reaction to attacks in other areas.

Tactical designations

This tread-carefully approach has led to speculation about a possible US-brokered deal between Lebanon and Israel, with some wondering if it would remove Hezbollah from its terrorism list in exchange for a broader agreement with Iran.

Could the Biden administration sideline Hezbollah's human rights concerns and overlook its history of violence, often against Americans? Such a reclassification could help Lebanon address its current financial crises.

Biden could also ease sanctions on Syria as part of a broader deal with Iran, similar to the one struck during Barack Obama's presidency.

During Obama's tenure, Bashar al-Assad's regime used chemical weapons to kill 1,500 Syrians in a single incident, which crossed a US "red line". Despite this, Obama declined direct intervention in exchange for al-Assad's commitment to relinquish his stockpile of chemical weapons. Some reports suggest that al-Assad, in fact, continued to use such weapons thereafter.

The region continues to grapple with the lasting impacts of Obama's foreign policy decisions. Biden appears to be largely adhering to Obama's framework.

The definition of terrorism, particularly concerning Iranian-backed groups, seems increasingly subjective and politically motivated.

For instance, Washington is unlikely to remove Al-Qaeda from the terrorism list, even if it were to stop targeting American interests. Yet there seems to be a greater flexibility when it comes to Iran-aligned militias.

This overlooks the detrimental effect these groups have on neighbouring countries and raises questions about the reputation of the US and its commitment to stated American values.

Countries may therefore feel compelled to seek alliances beyond Washington, particularly if they experience the consequences of Iran's satellites first-hand.

In terms of consistency in foreign policy, the US can point to its commitment to Israel's security and its help maintaining Tel Aviv's qualitative edge.

Other considerations — such as the security and welfare of the region's people — often appear secondary, subject to the kind of pragmatic compromise that has characterised US diplomacy since World War II.