Syria crisis compounds as humanitarian aid runs out

Help fades

The deadly earthquake of February 2023 did not impact the trend to reduce assistance. That showed in the massive underfunding of the Syrian Humanitarian Response Plan for 2023. It has collected only a third of the $5.41bn needed, according to the UN Financial Tracking System figures for December. For 2022, it received only 37% of the required annual funding.

At the same time, the value of UN contracts with Syrian private companies was reduced from $199.7mn in 2021 to $167.2mn in 2022, a drop of 16%. Before this, UN contracts with Syrian companies amounted to $244.5mn in 2020 and $230.70mn in 2019.

The importance of international humanitarian assistance for Syria's population and its local economies has increased significantly since the civil war began in 2011 as the economic and social crisis has worsened.

The number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Syria has also expanded considerably. The United States and the European Union have been the most substantial funding sources for international humanitarian aid, which these groups often distribute or support.

Donor fatigue

The reduction in humanitarian funding for Syria's ongoing crisis limits the help offered by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies, and local actors on the ground. As is the case throughout the globe, most CSOs based in Syria or neighbouring states depend on international funding — whether from foreign states, UN agencies or international NGOs.

The media and Western officials often use a single term to explain the problems with funding: "donor fatigue". To a lesser extent, it also results from blockages in Syria's political process.

It also comes as the political priorities of donor countries change, especially in the West, with foreign assistance sent elsewhere. One form of aid – Official Development Assistance (ODA) – designed to promote developing countries' economic development and welfare, actually rose in 2022.

The ODA reached a record level last year at $204bn, up from $186bn in 2021, according to the OECD, a club of mostly rich nations. The rise came from increased spending on processing and hosting refugees within donor countries, up to $29.3bn in 2022 from $12.8bn in 2021.

Then came the increase of ODA to Ukraine after Russia's invasion, which soared to $16.1 bn in 2022 from $918mn in 2021.

Syria pays the price

The drop in international funding for Syria will make its humanitarian crisis worse. It will threaten the ability of the country's CSOs to continue. This will contribute to the already severe deterioration of the nation's socio-economic situation.

The lack of work opportunities and low salaries are pushing young Syrians — particularly university graduates and skilled workers — to leave the country in search of better living conditions.

Irregular migration is also rising. According to Frontex, Europe's border agency, the number of illegal border crossings by Syrians into the EU more than doubled between 2021 and 2022, from 46,395 in 2021 to 92,472.

Asylumn seekers

The number of first-time Syrian asylum applicants rose 17% year-on-year to 116,980 in 2022, with Germany the top destination. There has been a rise in the number of Syrians attempting to leave the country illegally via Lebanon. From January to December 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees says 51 boats were involved in such crossings, with 4,334 passengers on board.

Several fatal accidents have occurred in recent years during similar voyages, including a shipwreck of a makeshift boat off  Tartous, Syria, when over 150 people died in 2022.

Asylum applications from Syria in the first half of  2023 exceeded any comparable period since the refugee crisis of 2015 to 2016 at more than 66,000.

Plans for 2024

Humanitarian response plans for Syria in 2024 indicate that what help is available will focus on the most urgent humanitarian needs, highlighting the urgent need for a complementary development response.

That would be in line with the priorities set throughout the last decade. Aid has concentrated on providing basic needs such as food and in-kind assistance, vouchers for specific goods or services, cash, and shelter.

The complementary development response has remained limited compared to emergency aid. However, there have been modest improvements in the past few years, especially in areas outside the control of the Syrian government. Nevertheless, these projects remain primarily aimed at light infrastructure rehabilitation, with a few exceptions, particularly in the northeast.

The aid trap

More and more humanitarian groups and CSOs in Syria have argued for a shift away from emergency humanitarian aid toward help with development, including via the reconstruction of local infrastructure or funding help for agriculture and manufacturing sectors, to promote sustainable projects, which remain limited.

Better help may help tackle some structural problems hobbling the Syrian economy. There are various examples from around the world of long-term and sizeable humanitarian aid failing to generate the conditions for proper economic recovery, with sustainable growth the best way to restore and improve general living conditions.

Humanitarian aid, vital for navigating out of an emergency, can create a form of state dependency. But in Syria, as the availability of it is reducing, the government's and the economy's capacity to replace it is limited.

Syria's government budget expenditure is down by 60%, from $5.5bn in 2022 to $2.2bn in 2023. That means as aid drops, the country will become increasingly dependent on remittances sent home from abroad for the survival of its people.

Money from the diaspora

Estimates of remittances vary from $3bn to $6bn. Without these funds, vast sectors of the Syrian population cannot meet daily expenses, except through borrowing or running up debts with traders.

Remittances have become the primary source of finance for many families in the country. They do not play a significant role in funding humanitarian activity in absolute terms, but they do provide some support for numerous local initiatives, organisations and associations in Syria. 

Money sent back from the Syrian diaspora will probably not be enough to alleviate the suffering of the population at home. Families in the country will continue to develop various coping mechanisms and strategies to deal with worsening living conditions.

Deprivation and inflation

Deprivation is already growing as the state's provision of services declines, and basic necessities become harder to source. Some families still have not received their allocations for last winter, and there are significant delays again this year for the distribution of subsidized diesel. Each family should be able to obtain 100 litres in two batches for a reduced price of 2,000 Syrian pounds per litre via a smartcard.

But faced with the delays, many families have been purchasing diesel from the black market, with prices sometimes exceeding 16,000 pounds per litre. That is beyond the purchasing capacity for broad sectors of the population.

Inflation is also running at very high levels. The September 2023 standard reference food basket soared by 100% from the beginning of 2023, tripling year on year to 938,000 pounds, the equivalent of $81 at the official exchange rate.

Earnings cannot keep up. In August, the Syrian government doubled the minimum wage to 185,940 pounds a month, equivalent to $16.1. It was the first raise since December 2021, meaning a month's pay will buy 19.8% of what is needed for the September 2023 standard reference food basket.

Syria needs ways to find sufficient levels of humanitarian aid to survive while it transitions toward a move to funding for long-term and sustainable development.

Obstacles to change

Humanitarian aid can provide a critical boost toward economic recovery if carried out adequately. But it needs to encourage a transition towards proper recovery, with assistance moving on from funding day-to-day needs to provide infrastructure and investment in a properly productive economy.

It often needs to come with conditions to do that. And it works best in an environment in which foreign investors can join the process, not least in one free of economic sanctions. The state itself needs to take an approach to help development, and the socio-economic policies which serve the  interests of the majority of the population and attempt to boost production.

The Syrian regime is the main obstacle to this much-needed change as well as being the main cause of the country's dependence on humanitarian aid, and the dangers it faces now funding for that is fading.

Significant parts of the country's own population have faced catastrophe since 2011 due to the destruction and damage of the civil war. Its economic policies have profited a small minority of businessmen affiliated with the president at the direct expense of the common good.