James B. Smith is a retired US Air Force Brigadier General who has served as US ambassador to Riyadh since September 2009. Prior to his appointment, he held a variety of executive positions with Raytheon Company, a US defense contractor, where he was involved in corporate strategic planning and international business development. Smith was an early supporter of Barack Obama’s presidential campaign.
Before retiring from the military in 2002, he had a distinguished 28-year career that included flying combat missions out of Dhahran during Operation Desert Storm. Trained as a fighter pilot, he logged over 4,000 hours of flight time in F-15s and T-38s. In his final assignment, he was deputy commander at the Joint Warfighting Center of the US Joint Forces Command in Virginia. Prior to that, he commanded the 94th Fighter Squadron, the 325th Operations Group and the 18th Fighter Wing.
Smith is a 1974 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He holds a master’s degree in history from Indiana University, he is also a graduate of the Naval War College, the Air Command and Staff College, and the National War College, where he also served as a professor of military strategy. He recently spoke to The Majalla in his Riyadh office.
Riyadh, 25 April 2010
The Majalla : How did 9/11 impact the US-Saudi bilateral relationship, and do you think it has recovered since then? If so, what are the signs of that recovery?
We’ve had a very long and stable relationship with Saudi Arabia that 9/11 impacted in a negative way. But I think to a large degree we’re recovered from that...and I see that relationship getting stronger.
After 9/11 we went down to about 3,000 Saudi students in the United States. We’re back up to over 25,000, and I expect by the end of the year we will have upwards of 30,000. The visa process has matured. I suspect this year we will beat, by a wide margin, our record for the most visas in a single year. The economic relationship is maturing, and [There is] a long-standing educational relationship, which is providing inspiration and support to a new generation of educators who are going to fill these new [Saudi] universities.
And on the business side we’re fully supporting His Majesty’s vision, best represented by [Commerce and Industry] Minister Abdullah Zainal Alireza’s industrial strategy and a move to a knowledge-based economy. So we find ourselves in a relationship involved in a lot of different ways.
Q: The US-Saudi bilateral relationship, for a long time, was characterized as one based on oil-for-security. But the US is importing less Saudi oil now. How do you see that trend affecting the nature of the bilateral relationship in the future—I’m talking 10 years or more?
I agree that the relationship has been characterized as oil-for-security, but I would argue that it’s been different for a long, long time…[and now] is infinitely more nuanced and complicated than it’s ever been. And it's involved in many more things than just oil and security. We will continue to have strong relationships on the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] side, strong relationships on energy, not just oil. And in the business, education and medical fields, those ties are going to get even stronger.
Q: There are no major US arms sales to Saudi Arabia on the docket, and Riyadh’s latest import of military planes will be the [Euro-made] Typhoon. The US is training a 35,000-man security force for key Saudi installations, but overall its military relationship with the Kingdom appears to be less all-encompassing than previously. How has this aspect of the bilateral relationship changed in the last decade?
It changed 25 years ago. And understand that the Typhoon is a replacement for the [Euro-made] Tornado. The Saudi Air Force has always had a mix of US and British airplanes...[as part of] a balanced portfolio. And on major acquisitions it does not appear that that is shifting fundamentally. We maintain a strong mil-to-mil partnership, not just in acquisition of equipment but in the training of Ministry of Defense and Aviation, and the Saudi National Guard, and now the Interior Ministry. And as they move to upgrade [military] systems where we require interoperability, I'm confident that we will still have an American footprint there.
Q: Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear weapons power is one issue on which the United States and Saudi Arabia share similar views, that is, neither wants to see Iran possess a nuclear weapon or acquire the capability to make one. And yet, there appears to be some disagreement on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Is this accurate, and if so, how do the two differ on this matter?
I don’t see any daylight between Saudi Arabia and the United States on the issue. We’re both concerned with Iran’s failure to come to terms with its international responsibility, its flagrant dismissals of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and Security Council responsibilities. I actually see that we’re very much in agreement on the challenge that Iran presents to the region and the Saudis are equally concerned about the possibility of proliferation.
Q: If Tehran were to announce tomorrow that it had acquired the capability of manufacturing a nuclear weapon, what would that do to the US-Saudi bilateral relationship?
Nothing. We’re about as close on this, I think, as two partners can be. The challenge of course is how do you get the government of Iran to come to terms with its international responsibilities?
Q: Many people think that if Iran announced it had a nuclear weapon then Saudi Arabia would be under a lot of internal pressure to acquire the same. But the United States doesn’t want to see an arms race in the Gulf.
We are not just singling out Iran on the nuclear issue. President Obama has made a commitment to pursue a nuclear-free world. So you see the new strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians, the world leaders' summit on nuclear material…If your goal is nuclear disarmament then the proliferation of any number of countries runs against that objective. So not only do we see a nuclear weapons capability in Iran destabilizing to the region, [but also] the potential for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons runs counter to the objective of a nuclear-free world.
Q: The failure of the United States to take more seriously and effectively its role as honest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been a major thorn in the Saudi-US relationship. But unlike previous US administrations, the Obama administration has made clear that it regards this conflict as a threat to US national security. Do you believe that this is a permanent shift in Washington and if so, how might it affect US-Saudi ties?
The short answer is that it’s very clear from [US Centcom Commander Gen. David] Petraeus' remarks and other comments that the President and the Secretary [of State Hillary Clinton] have made that the administration sees this as a strategic problem, not just an issue of being an intermediary. That in Gen. Petraeus' words, the absence of a settlement puts American soldiers at risk. When you live over here, you come to terms with the commonly held belief that the absence of a settlement gives legitimacy to every extremist group around—even though they may or may not have ever done anything in support of the Palestinians. So it is clearly in the United States’ strategic interests to focus on a settlement. And the fact that the President made a commitment early in his administration, that this was going to be a centerpiece in terms of [his] international agenda, I think speaks for four or eight years that it certainly is a shift in our thinking.
There seems to be a consensus both in Israel and the United States and other places that it’s time [for Israelis and Palestinians to hold serious peace talks]. The fact that His Majesty put so much energy and political capital into an Arab peace initiative suggests that it’s time.
So I’m encouraged and hopeful. There is a window of opportunity I believe within the next few years where we can make a difference. The worry on all of our parts is if we miss this opportunity then we’re destined to another generation of conflict and missed opportunities.
Q: In the US view, has Saudi Arabia done enough to halt financial support that was flowing from some individuals and groups to violent Islamic extremists abroad?
They’ve worked very, very hard at that...We have partnered with them and I can attest to the fact that they have been very serious about closing the funding for extremist activity, as well as cracking down on it here in the Kingdom...[Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey] Feltman when he was here...called the Saudis our strongest partner in counter-terrorism...I would say the Saudis have shown a very strong commitment to closing the loop on terror financing...It’s in their interest. They were threatened as well as us.
Q: How would you characterize US-Saudi cooperation in the counter-terrorism sphere? Is the battle against Islamic extremism an important aspect of the US-Saudi bilateral ties?
We have a very strong relationship on the counter-terrorism front, both countering extremism here in Saudi Arabia and working in partnership against Al-Qaeda in other places. I take issue with the term Islamic extremism because I do not believe that the extremist violent element has any root in Islam. It is violent, aberrant behavior, which is not Islam.
Q: Under King Abdullah Saudi Arabia has been diversifying its basket of bilateral ties, forging closer strategic and business ties with India, Turkey and, in particular, China. How does the United States view this diversification and how will it affect the US-Saudi relationship?
We don’t view it negatively. I mean, as Saudi Arabia has matured on the international front it is natural for them to establish commercial and diplomatic ties [with other nations]. I do not believe that [this] signals on their part a weakness in our relationship.
Certainly when you look at the way that China and India have been growing they become the much more dominant economic partners for oil. Arguably the United States is showing a reduction, [and now] our largest oil provider is Canada. So that relationship has changed but it hasn’t fundamentally changed our bilateral relationship.
Q: Saudi Arabia also is seeking to modernize its economy, education system, court system and even some social traditions that restrict women’s participation in public life. Should the United States help Saudi Arabia advance this process and if so, how can it do that without being accused of interfering in the Kingdom’s internal affairs?
You ask ‘How can I help?’ It’s very simple. I’m actually not looking to interfere. I have made a conscious decision to take a positive approach and look for, what I would call, positive vectors, and support His Majesty’s modernization effort. So on the legislation for trafficking in persons, certainly we celebrated that and have offered our assistance for training in the judicial system. With the reorganization of the judiciary, we have brought in some legal training for contracts.
We certainly are involved in a positive way with the emergence of a magnificent generation of young women. Sixty percent of the college students this year are women. The first thing you can do is be a cheerleader for them. The next thing you can do is help female entrepreneurs be successful, and you do that by bringing in e-commerce so that their storefront is a website and you connect them with the global economy. And let them work the social agenda at their speed.
So we’re actually playing a supportive role in the success of their strategy [of moving toward a knowledge-based economy] as opposed to imposing a Western model.
Q: Some things in Saudi society are counter to what the United States considers universal values when it comes to women and religious minorities. Are these practices a problem for the US-Saudi bilateral relationship?
They will always be a source of challenge as long as they exist. If you go back to President Obama’s Cairo speech when he laid out a new beginning with the Islamic world, at the end of the speech he said there are still three things that are important to us: freedom of religion, women’s rights, and democracy. He defined democracy in a different way: as those states where the voice of the people is heard as being more stable.
Certainly we want to encourage those initiatives here in Saudi Arabia that give a voice to the people. We are supportive of the Shura Council. We look for expanded participation in the Shura Council. We’ve seen widespread media coverage of the Chamber of Commerce elections in both Jeddah and the Eastern Province. We see some movement on human rights issues like trafficking in persons. On religious freedom, there has been a gradual acceptance of religious freedom in private. But we would still continue to support religious freedom.
So are there problem areas? These are the areas where our government will continue to support positive change.
Q: Apart from government-to-government dealings, an important aspect of any bilateral relationship is people-to-people. But since 9/11 there has been a surge of Islamophobia and specifically Saudi-phobia in the United States. Do anti-Saudi feelings among Americans limit how close the two countries can be?
That is a challenge for a couple of reasons. The first one is that the Saudis know so much more about our country than we know about theirs. I have great hopes for the [Saudi] Commission on Tourism and Antiquities and their ability to expand tourism, because we need to get Americans here to see what’s positive in this country.
The challenge we’ve got in the United States is we’re locked on this number of 15 out of the 19 extremists [on 9/11] being Saudis. I think it’s time to rethink if you’re an American who formed an opinion about Saudi Arabia based on that. And if you’re a Saudi who formed an opinion about the United States based on our reaction to 9/11 it’s time to reconsider. There was a strategic objective by Osama bin Laden to drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia. And the way you do that is highlight Saudi Arabia as an extremist country. He succeeded.
I spend a lot of time encouraging businessmen and women in the US to come and do business, encouraging elected officials to come visit. But this will be a long-term challenge.
Q: Finally, how do you see the bilateral relationship evolving over the next 10 years?
I don’t see it atrophying at all. I see it getting stronger. The military-to-military relationship is important but it doesn’t stand out as [the most] important. I look at business, commerce, the trade we’re doing, the social exchanges, the education, the involvement of Americans inside the technocracy of Saudi. All of that together is much more important to me than a military-to-military relationship.
Interview conducted by Caryle Murphy – an independent journalist based in Riyadh and Pulitzer Prize Winner in Journalism in 1991. She is the author of “Passion for Islam.”
