One year on: How has Al-Sudani's government performed in Iraq?

Ministers were appointed who lacked the relevant background or experience in their areas of government. Al-Sudani 's acquiescence to the demands of the blocs within his coalition meant, in effect, that ministers were imposed upon him, signalling a lack of confidence at the senior levels of the government.

This underscored a persistent pattern in Iraq, where governments are beholden to powerful parties which treat ministries as their private enterprises, rather than as institutions serving the interests of the state.

The dollar crisis

Al-Sudani's first televised interview with an Iraqi channel since taking office came after 100 days of power. He appeared with a confident smile, and then had to address the currency crisis gripping the country.

With Iraq's national currency weakening fast, he sought to reassure citizens, advising them not to rush "to acquire dollars", adding: "The Iraqi dinar remains strong!"

But the very next day, the dollar's exchange rate surged to its highest levels in a month, as the government struggled to control the crisis.

At the time, the response to the claim did not necessarily seem to provide insight into the amount of confidence held among the people in their latest government. But it has since taken on extra significance and proved revealing about the lasting impression of the administration after its year in power.

It shows the limited ability of the government to get control over the challenges it faces and its capacity to manage crises in a nation where various forces and groups outside the formal state apparatus wield significant influence over daily affairs.

The dollar crisis was the government's first major challenge and the first sign of its struggles to take measures that won popular support. There was even talk among some of its major backers of a conspiracy backed by the United States to undermine al-Sudani as prime minister.

Whatever the government tried was not enough. With the unofficial currency markets beyond its control and more under the influence of criminal syndicates, most of the government's actions amounted to little more than mere statements and promises, serving as temporary measures to buy time. Its most significant gamble lay in securing an agreement with the US Federal Reserve to grant the Iraqi central bank certain exceptions.

Whatever else this revealed, it was a glaring failure to control the escalation of the dollar exchange rate. And the government stuck with policies that were not working, with al-Sudani supporting even the central bank officials involved.

His government persisted in implementing security measures to address the dollar crisis despite acknowledging that the issue was not primarily rooted in security concerns.

This showed an awareness that the country was reliant on the unofficial dollar market for a substantial role in meeting Iraq's need for Iranian imports.

Reform deadlines missed

The al-Sudani government has promised a series of reforms that appear to exceed its current capacity and potential.

These commitments include developing a comprehensive economic reform plan, rectifying the relationship between the federal government and the Kurdistan region, the passage of legislation related to the Federal Council and Federal Court, resolving issues concerning the Oil and Gas Law, and conducting provincial council elections. One of the most prominent promises is to hold early elections within a year.

The ministerial programme of the al-Sudani government, approved by parliament on 27 October 2022, outlined specific timelines ranging from one to three months for the submission of legislation and administrative actions addressing critical government matters.

It set a one-month deadline for resolving issues related to individuals facing accountability and justice proceedings. It also set timings for allocating and settling payments for people affected by the setting of the boundaries of the Iraqi Kurdistan region under the terms of Article 140 of the national constitution.

There were also three-month deadlines for assessing the performance of interim governors and implementing measures against those found to be inadequate. The government committed to amending the law over elections to Parliament and strengthening anti-corruption efforts within 90 days of its formation.

After a full year in office, it appears that these issues have remained unresolved despite the deadlines set out. And even after 12 months, little progress has been made apart from some changes in administrative leadership, most of which were influenced by powerful political parties.

Theft of the century

Al-Sudani 's first misstep in the fight against corruption came when he entangled his government in the "theft of the century" case with a commitment to recover funds embezzled from the state treasury.

The case – centred on $2.5bn missing from state coffers – was being run by the judiciary, and a primary suspect, Nour Zuhair, was already in custody.

But Al-Sudani sought to position himself as the saviour who would resolve what was arguably the most significant corruption scandal in the nation's history with possibly the largest misappropriation of state funds to date.

Again, the prime minister made pledges at press conferences – to round up the rest of those responsible – but there has not been substantial progress on the ground.

It appears that al-Sudani did not heed the lessons from one of his predecessors, Adel Abdul-Mahdi. Both leaders engaged in discussions about strategies, strategic projects, and agreements with major countries without first prioritising internal issues and creating an environment in which their wider strategies could thrive, opening the way for them to be able to implement international agreements.

Al-Sudani 's government team does not yet look capable of managing the critical matters in front of it and lacks any independence from the ruling parties and associated groups. It also looks unlikely to break away from the constraints of an obstructive and unproductive bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, the prime minister talks about ushering in a new era for government management and enhancing its relationship with the citizens.

International momentum

But Al-Sudani has been able to sustain the momentum of the previous government's engagement with regional and international powers, which took place during the war against Daesh in Iraq.

His administration has actively worked on strengthening relations with Arab and foreign nations interested in expanding their political and economic ties with Iraq. And rather than escalating conflicts, it has pursued a policy of containment in response to repeated violations of Iraqi sovereignty by Iran and Turkey.

It also sought to find solutions to the presence in Iraq of groups opposing the ruling regimes in those two neighbouring countries, which were operating from Iraqi territory.

And al-Sudani 's recent visit to Russia – where he voiced opposition to foreign interference in Iraq, particularly singling out the US – came as a surprise. This stance deviated from the diplomatic approach Iraq needs to navigate the ongoing tensions between Moscow and Washington.

It also gave the impression that Iraq may have abandoned its policy of maintaining neutrality in disagreements involving major powers, leaving it without a clear direction regarding its commitments to partnerships or strategic alliances, particularly with the US.

Hamas attacks complicate diplomacy

Then came Hamas' Operation Al-Aqsa Flood against Israel on 7 October. It presented a new challenge that was not factored into the al-Sudani government's previous calculations.

After it stated its opposition to the war, sieges, killings, and destruction resulting from Israeli military response in the Gaza Strip, Iraq's government now faces a dilemma. It must control armed factions operating within its area under the influence of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance.

Such factions have attacked US military installations in Iraq, putting the al-Sudani government in an embarrassing position. The prime minister has appeared incapable of effectively preventing these attacks or even identifying the responsible parties.

If the war between Israel and Hamas expands beyond Gaza, Iraq could get drawn into the conflict. That would amount to its most formidable and intricate challenge to its relations with the US. Al-Sudani and his ministers would face very tough decisions in finding a balance between their partnership with Washington and the internal influence of armed factions, some of which helped them into power.

This scenario would likely become the defining and pivotal moment for the fate of Al-Sudani 's government.

A lack of trust in government

The Al-Sudani government is keen to convey to the public that its primary objective is addressing the administrative chaos and corruption inherited from the administration of his immediate predecessor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi.

But the years of devastation and disorder cannot be solely attributed to the remnants of al-Kadhimi's rule. It also comes from the broader issues of accumulated chaos, corruption, and the misallocation of public funds resulting from the system of government itself, and the elements that remain in it from the country's authoritarian days. All these factors also exert significant influence within Al-Sudani's administration.

Therefore, Al-Sudani must acknowledge that his government's mission extends beyond assigning blame solely to al-Kadhimi and his team for corruption and destruction.

There is another contrast between the prime minister's rhetoric before taking office and his actions in his initial time in charge. Al-Sudani had promised an unconventional approach to address economic challenges and effectively manage institutions that directly impact citizens' daily lives.

However, he has not introduced a new political team aligned with that vision, despite his criticisms of those responsible for managing political and economic matters.

Al-Sudani has struggled to break away from the tradition of allowing political blocs to make government appointments. He has also given jobs to personal contacts of his own from government roles he once held.

It makes his team look conventional, with some of it having previously failed to deliver even the most basic services to citizens. It is not the kind of team that looks likely to create fresh outcomes.

Short-term focus

Once again, it looks like Iraq has a government focused on short-term strategies designed to create immediate political gains by placating factions with appeasement policies for traditional power structures.

This undermines the authority of the prime minister and makes the office look subservient to factional groups when it should be the highest authority responsible for formulating public policies and advancing the nation's interests.

Al-Sudani has been unable to change the established public perception of the relationship between the government and the people. He continues to rely on numerous political meetings and dialogues with political figures, media personalities, and business leaders closely associated with previous governments and vested power structures.

It appears that these meetings – where the prime minister often takes on a more vocal role – contribute to obscuring his vision rather than enhancing his capacity to listen to what citizens need from the government.

How to win back trust at a time of opportunity

Al-Sudani is deeply aware of the magnitude of the challenge posed by the corruption and chaos in Iraq. To address it, he must become more than a conventional civil servant and aspire to become and exceptional statesman.

After all, the measure of true statesmen is not made in times of prosperity. This status is conferred by confronting perilous challenges in tough times.

And al-Sudani has an opportunity.

Conditions and resources are primed for him to utilise Iraq's financial surplus and harness international and regional support effectively. He must initiate substantive reform aimed at achieving tangible political, service-oriented, and economic progress that resonates with the everyday lives of the people, especially when they rely on government services or healthcare.

Citizens must experience improvements in their daily lives and feel secure from the threats posed by armed groups.

Such positive real-world outcomes will not come from rhetoric. They will not be brought about by populist slogans or divisive sectarian or nationalist narratives that the political class often employs to legitimize its grasp on power. Neither will they come from appeasements and concessions to the leaders of powerful factions.

Instead, al-Sudani  must adopt transparent and comprehensive strategies to build trust  between the people and the government by lifting the quality of everyday life. Such a tangible accomplishment will be the source of his legitimacy and full popular support.

Improving the economy stands alongside this as the government's most potent means of countering the pressures exerted by political forces pursuing their self-serving interests at the expense of the state.

Instilling hope in the government and regaining trust will require unwavering determination, a resolute will, and a genuine commitment that knows no compromise.

The falsehoods, insincerity, duplicity and deceptions of the past must be set aside and for corruption and the threat of non-state armed groups to be dealt with. Only then can the Iraqi people get the tangible, real-world improvements they need.