A dam problem: How Iran’s water crisis flows from the Revolutionary Guard

There are expectations the crisis will explode onto the streets, triggering a wave of popular protests that would extend beyond Tehran and encompass all regions, similar to the uprising following the death of Mahsa Amini.

The regime has not taken any practical or scientific measures to address the water issue.  As usual, It has resorted to temporary, ineffective or at times provocative solutions.  While only around 7% of Iran's water flows from sources outside its borders, the regime has caused crises with neighbours over shared supply, including with Afghanistan over the Helmand River.

It has constructed massive dams and large canals to divert the flow of major rivers from one region to another. But experts believe the construction of this large number of dams is the primary reason for the loss of water resources, secondary to the drought.

Dam proliferation

Dams in Iran's northwest are suspected to be the main reason for 88% of Lake Urmia drying up. There are 57 dams in that part of the country. Similarly, the construction of 82 dams on the marshes of Lake Anzali has led to a decrease in the water level by one to two meters, causing the drying up of Lake Kaviani. The construction of six dams on its feeding water reservoirs and 14 dams on the Karkeh River has caused the river to dry up. There are plans to build 36 more dams on the river.

The construction of 40 dams on the Karun River has severed the main water artery of the province, which is now in drought. An additional 50 dams are planned to be built on the river. In the dry desert province of Sistan and Baluchestan – where there are only seasonal rivers – 23 dams have been built, and studies are underway for the construction of 25 more.

In the central desert regions, where only 10% to 12% of the country's water flows, there are over 200 dams already built or under construction.

Most of these dams are being constructed without sufficient expertise, adequate scientific and environmental research, and any study of their environmental impact. Many of the reservoirs behind the dams deteriorate rapidly, especially in hot areas. Their waters become spoiled, contaminated with sewage and the residue of chemical fertilisers. They breed mosquitoes and disease and give off foul odours, as at the Minab Dam in the south of the country.

And so why does Iran build these dams? Why does it persist in seeing them as a solution despite their failure, evident in the crisis's continuous and worsening state?

Revenue for the Revolutionary Guard

The answer relates to the economic arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters – established by the order of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the beginning of the phase of reconstruction in the devastated areas.

It was entrusted with managing work in various fields, including energy supplies, oil and gas exports, dam construction, water extraction, road construction, and road paving. It quickly became the sole executor of all government construction projects and eventually gained control over all industrial sectors in the country.

And so, it is the organisation managing the economic activities of the Revolutionary Guard that is responsible for building the dams. These construction projects require massive budgets. They also need government and political support, which only the Revolutionary Guard can provide.

Building dams generates immense profits for the Revolutionary Guard, which is why there are almost 600 dams in Iran, with an equal number under construction, ranking the country third in dam construction worldwide.

Nuclear water

Iran's artificial waterways also serve another purpose: feeding the regime's nuclear ambitions. Dams are part of the means with which water is re-directed to the centre of the country through massive, man-made channels and diverted rivers for use in nuclear industries, such as the diversion of one of the branches of the Dez River to the city of Qom.

Similar schemes have also been used in other economic areas, including steelmaking. All are initiatives fully controlled by the Revolutionary Guard.

Various excuses are made by the Revolutionary Guard to justify the haphazard construction of dams, including providing new sources of electricity. But Iran possesses abundant reserves of oil and gas, making its need for hydroelectricity unnecessary. Such dams only fulfill 10% of national electricity needs in a country subjected to a rationing system during power supply hours.

Dams have hit the province of Sistan and Baluchestan hard, in the poorest and most marginalised part of Iran. Half of its population has been displaced and impoverished, especially farmers and herders, as they had to move away from their sources of their livelihood.

The vast areas surrounding the dams have forced the locals to relocate, leaving behind their possessions, leading to economic, social, food, and health crises. Moreover, dams have had a significant and direct impact on the province's ecosystem, resulting in the loss of biodiversity, wildlife, and the drying up of wetlands.

The Ahvaz region has been devastated by dams socially, economically, and environmentally. It used to thrive with water reserves from vast marshes and abundant rivers, including the Karun River, Iran's longest and deepest river. This made it a secure habitat for various species of fish, mammals, and migratory birds, including those facing extinction.

It also served as grazing grounds for buffalo and cattle herds and was the second-largest wheat cultivation area in the country. Those remaining from its inhabitants say that the beginning of construction on the Koutound Dam during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's era brought about ruin.

It appears that the Revolutionary Guard is excessively building dams not to resolve the water crisis but out of greed to plunder as much of the country's wealth as possible.

This plan will gradually destroy Iran to the extent that many parts of the country will be uninhabitable within the next 40 years. Furthermore, altering the course of rivers will likely lead to future civil wars between regions and ethnic groups.