Saddam begged Khamenei on eve of Kuwait invasion: We offer a deal that meets all your demands

Arafat shuffles warring words between Tehran and Baghdad

The documents reveal that the messages from Saddam Hussein to Ali Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani were delivered by an envoy dispatched by the President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation to Tehran.

Alongside the messages, Yasser Arafat sent a special communication to Khamenei, conveying that Saddam Hussein's initiative was a goodwill gesture from Iraq to Iran.

Arafat emphasised the critical circumstances faced by the Islamic and Arab nations and urged Khamenei to respond positively to the initiative for the benefit of both countries and the greater good of the Islamic nation and Palestine. He implored Khamenei to expedite the process with love, brotherhood, and sanctity, as it was eagerly awaited by Muslims.

He proceeds to counter the message, pointing out, "Among the expressions and terms in your message, such as 'the imposed war' and 'slow understanding,' and concluding the message with the phrase 'peace be upon those who follow guidance' instead of 'peace be upon you,' which is the customary usage in such messages... Duty dictates that we adopt a new style of communication, one that differs from the language of war or the era that preceded it."

Additionally, he asserts, "Regarding UN Security Council Resolution 598, we have regarded it, since its acceptance in July 1987, as a comprehensive and enduring peace plan between our two countries, based on the agreed-upon principles and provisions."

"When peace is achieved, it is crucial for each country's military forces to remain within their own borders and refrain from extending into any hill, inch of land, or waters of the other country, in accordance with special circumstances, considerations of the ceasefire, and the state of non-war and non-peace."

On 19 May, Saddam responded to Khamenei and Rafsanjani, expressing that he and his leadership had understood from their message that they agreed to the proposal for a summit meeting to decisively resolve the pending problems between their two countries, whether they were the cause or result of the conflict.

Although pleased with their agreement, Saddam conveyed his disappointment with the spirit of the message, citing veiled expressions at the beginning and harshness in its conclusion.

In response to Rafsanjani's claims about the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Halabja, Saddam clarified that Iraq had withdrawn from Iranian lands that their armies had entered under known circumstances at the beginning of the armed conflict in 1980.

He pointed out that Iraq announced the decision to withdraw on 10 June 1982, and exactly 10 days later, they withdrew as declared.

Saddam differentiated this from the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Halabja, which occurred in special fighting circumstances. He asserted that Iraq's withdrawals from Iranian lands in 1982 and after the operations in the southern and central sectors in July 1988 were evidence of their goodwill and unwillingness to retain any inch of Iranian land.

"You mentioned in your letter," Saddam wrote, "that you withdrew from Iraqi territory, referring to your withdrawal from Halabja, which happened under known special circumstances. Our response to that is that we withdrew from your lands, which our armies entered under known circumstances at the beginning of the armed conflict in 1980, on 20 June 1982, 10 days after we announced our decision to withdraw in the media on 10 June 1982."

"In that announcement, we declared that we would withdraw within a maximum period of 10 days, and that is exactly what happened. Conversely, your forces withdrew from Halabja in special fighting circumstances, which are different from the circumstances in which our armies withdrew."

"Therefore, if you consider your withdrawal from Halabja, which took place in special circumstances, as evidence of good intentions that would nullify your greed or desire to retain the lands of others, then you should also consider our withdrawal from your lands in 1982 and … your lands… in the southern and central sectors in July 1988, as additional evidence, along with other evidence, of our goodwill and our unwillingness for Iraq to keep any inch of Iranian land."

Saddam Hussein also reveals that a second channel of communication between Tehran and Baghdad had existed, facilitated by the Iraqi ambassador to Geneva, Barzan al-Tikriti, and his Iranian counterpart, Cyrus Nasseri.

He suggests that the task of these delegates "should be to exchange views on the positions of both parties, enabling each side to understand the concerns and perspectives of the other. By doing so, they may be able to find common ground on certain aspects, which would help clarify the overall picture and facilitate discussions at the summit level, while reserving points of disagreement to be resolved during the summit meeting itself."

Regarding the venue of the summit, Saddam expresses that the Iraqi side is still awaiting a definitive proposal from Iran. He notes that their initial suggestion was Makkah Al-Mukarramah, but since Iran's response did not offer a clear opinion on the proposed venue, he suggests that "the two delegates may discuss this matter further to reach an agreement."

Furthermore, Saddam emphasises that "the summit meeting should include the main decision-makers from both countries," assuming that Iran agrees with the idea of a high-level summit.

Saddam insisted on the meeting with Khamenei, saying: "We adhere to our proposal that the President of the Revolutionary Command Council, the President of the Republic, and the Vice-President of the Revolutionary Command Council, from our side, and Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, from Iran's side, should attend the meeting."

Rafsanjani replied on 19 May 1990: "Given the prospect that your government is serious about choosing the path of peace, as it appeared in your letter, here is our reply to this second letter, hoping that you will not waste time in exchanging messages, from now onward, except when we have to (... ) I pray that this will be the last message and that we will witness serious practical steps on the path to peace."

"In your letter," he added, "there is a complaint about some of the phrases and contents of our reply letter. We, too, disapprove of raising harmful or painful topics in messages of peace."

"Unfortunately, the cornerstone of this building was laid in your first letter, in which you said you wanted to 'remove the sediments of conflict and pave the path of friendship.' However, in your first letter, you claimed we were confronting the entire Arab nation. This is unlikely to be the case, as most progressive governments and those with you in one trench on the front of confrontation supported us in this struggle, or at least were impartial."

He added, "The etiquette expected in formal correspondence was not followed in your letter, and I found phrases and expressions inappropriate and hurtful."

Rafsanjani was also clear regarding Khamenei's participation in the summit. He wrote, "Regarding the level of officials in the talks, it is better to be clear that His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei, the Guardian of the Islamic Revolution, will not participate."

"The President and other officials who will participate will certainly abide by the Leader's views. The President will have full powers and will certainly implement the decision. Therefore, as you expressed in your letter, there is no need to be concerned."

The response then referred to the dispute over the interpretation and implementation of Resolution 598: "Mr. Cyrus Nasseri is our representative in the talks with your representative. His mission is to discuss core issues to implement the resolution and prepare the ground for the resumption of peaceful relations between the two countries."

"We instructed him to avoid discussing formal and peripheral issues, which will only waste time and prolong the status quo. We must affirm that the meeting of the two countries' presidents will be appropriate and valid only if the two parties are confident of its positive results. If this is not guaranteed, the meeting may have more negative effects and losses than the current situation."

Iran refused to hold the summit in Saudi Arabia, affirming that "selecting an appropriate venue for the two parties will not be a problem for us, but the point of view should be defined on the eve of the start of the talks."

On 30 July, just three days before the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sent a message to Rafsanjani, revealing his determination to reach an agreement with Iran at any cost, as the decision to go to war against Kuwait was already in progress.

He wrote: "Following careful consideration of that which must be considered and a thorough review of the evolution of relations between — and the situation in — Iraq and Iran, as well as of the dangers encircling and encompassing the region, and with a view to maintaining our practice of launching initiatives that afford greater opportunities for the achievement of peace, we find ourselves confronted — in accordance with our national responsibility and the humanitarian the responsibility which our great principles place upon our shoulders — with the responsibility of launching a fresh initiative."

"Since our initiative this time addresses all the essential issues contained in the provisions of the Security Council resolution 598 (1987) at one time, in a single context, and in detail, we hope it will receive the attention which it's due. We hope that the initiative will be treated with sufficient seriousness to prevent our two peoples' being denied the opportunity of enjoying their right to live in conditions of peace whose every detail is agreed upon."

"In accordance with all the above, I advance the following initiative: I again raise the idea of holding a prompt meeting between the heads of the two states, at a place to be agreed upon, where they may discuss the issues which, if the subject of an agreement, may serve as the basis of a comprehensive and lasting peace."

"The discussion and agreement should cover all outstanding issues. Once a comprehensive agreement has been reached, no new issue may be raised by one side without the agreement of the other: to raise any such new issue shall constitute evasion of the agreement."

"The rubrics of the agreement shall be drawn from the provisions of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). The agreement shall be concluded on the understanding and assurance that the fundamental objective of resolution 598 (1987) is none other than to bring about a comprehensive and lasting peace by means of dialogue, that the elements of the agreement constitute an indivisible whole, in the form of an integrated and interrelated transaction, and that an infringement of any one of its provisions is an infringement of every one of them."

"The starting point for the dialogue and agreement on the issues is not important. However, agreement on any one or more components of the subjects under discussion shall remain dependent on agreement on the other items."

"Accordingly, either party to the dialogue shall be entitled to reply as it sees fit to any individual declaration made by the other party: this shall include the right to repudiate a partial agreement on any one of the agreed subjects of the dialogue."

"Withdrawal shall take place within a period of no more than two months from the date of the final ratification of the comprehensive agreement concluded by us, though if the period is shorter, so much the better."

"The agreement should be based on an inseparable relationship of interdependence between each step to be taken by the parties to the conflict, with respect to the commitment of each side under the agreement to take an appropriate or equivalent step such as will correspond to the commitment of the other side."

"We continue to consider that the subject of prisoners of war should be governed by the Geneva Convention. We, therefore, assume that their release should be based on the provisions of that Convention."

"Two years have passed since the time when prisoners should have been released in accordance with the Convention, i.e., from the cease-fire until the present."

"Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the peace process, we have no objection, in conformity with the principles and concepts referred to above, to accept a timetable for the release of prisoners based on the period specified in paragraph 4, namely, on a maximum period of two months from the date of the final ratification of the agreement. If agreement can be reached in a shorter period, so much the better."

"The dialogue concerning the Shatt al-Arab must be based on the three following rubrics:

{a) Full sovereignty over the waterway belongs to Iraq, as is its legitimate historical right.

{b) While Iraq shall have sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab, it shall apply the concept of the Thalweg line in respect of navigation rights between Iraq and Iran, including the right of passage, the right to fish, and the right to join in the control of shipping passing through the waterway and distribution of profits arising therefrom.

{c) The Shatt al-Arab issue shall be referred to arbitration on the basis of a formula to be agreed upon by the two parties, each one undertaking in advance to accept the results of such arbitration.

Until such time as the issue is decided by arbitration, a start will be made on operations to clear the Shatt al-Arab, in accordance with a formula to be agreed upon by the two parties, to make it viable for shipping and other uses.

The agreement will be based on the supposition that the two sides will jointly select any of the three above rubrics, on the understanding that the first rubric represents the right of Iraq and that the other two rubrics represent the wishes of Iran."

"There must be an agreement to drop paragraph 6 of the Security Council resolution 598 (1987) from the discussion and finally to set it aside, because it obstructs rather than promotes progress towards peace. Its consequences may give rise to rancour and hatred, and to revenge in the future, while peace could serve as an alternative path for the Iranian and Iraqi peoples."

"In this connection, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be informed, officially and in writing, of the agreement which we conclude."

"No start should be made on any of the aforementioned steps, as included in the peace agreement to be concluded by us between Iraq and Iran, before the completion of all legal measures for its ratification as required under the Constitutions of the two countries, in order to ensure that the agreement is final from the legal and constitutional point of view and does not admit any total or partial retraction whatsoever and that its provisions are effective."

"The instruments of ratification of the agreement are to be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations simultaneously in accordance with an agreement between the two parties."

"The new peace agreement between Iraq and Iran should include all matters upon which the agreement is reached. There shall be no objection, with a view to facilitating the rapid conclusion of the peace agreement, to the inclusion therein  — apart from new issues, land border questions, and other rights which may be agreed upon — of some of the contents of previous agreements from the history of relations between our two countries, and of that which was formerly agreed upon, provided that the provisions contained in the present letter are not thereby infringed."

"The agreement must include clear principles concerning the establishment of good-neighbourly relations, non-intervention in internal affairs, and respect on the part of each country for the political, economic, and social system which may be chosen by the other country, as well as an unequivocal affirmation of the rights of passage for all forms of shipping through the international waters of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz."

"It may be appropriate for the proper implementation of the agreement to be guaranteed by an accepted international body (the Security Council)."

"Although we recognise that the international situation does not allow us to set great hopes for the provision of assistance to us for reconstruction, we consider that the international assistance which is to be provided under paragraph 7 should be divided equally between Iraq and Iran."

"With a view to facilitating communications between us, and in light of the positive evolution of our relations, we believe that our embassies in Tehran and Baghdad should be opened once again, particularly since they remained open during the war and closed only in September 1987."

"This, Mr. President, is what we think will bring about a lasting and comprehensive peace between Iraq and Iran. It is an integrated proposal, the elements of which are interdependent and indivisible. This is what our experience has helped and even inspired us to seek, and it at the same time reflects the contents of the talks held between our representatives in Geneva, Mr. Naseri and Mr. Barzan."

"Everything is thus made clear, leaving no room for any contrary interpretation: what we seek is genuine, comprehensive, and rapid peace."

Indeed, Rafsanjani promptly responded and addressed all the points in Saddam's letter, stating: "We fully accept the point you emphasised in your letter regarding the urgency of pursuing peace. However, this does not mean hastily presenting formal proposals and elevating the level of discussions without substantive progress."

"Instead, we must adhere to internationally-recognised bilateral agreements and refrain from demanding beyond legitimate rights because it is inconceivable that negotiations achieve what could not be accomplished during an eight-year-long war."

Post-invasion

Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam sent a new message on 3 August, addressing the official Iranian statements and military actions in response to the invasion. He then reviewed his initiatives represented through his messages and meetings between the ambassadors of both countries in Geneva.

He stated, "My message on 30 July included specific measures and practical proposals, not merely general statements concerning the aspects outlined in Resolution 598, which both Iraq and Iran previously confirmed their commitment to."

"We are still waiting for your approval to determine a suitable day to host our envoys, whose identities were shared with you, the Foreign Minister, and our Permanent Representative in Geneva. Holding these talks with you and those you attribute to would mark a crucial phase towards achieving peace between Iraq and Iran."

He further stated, "I am confident, or at least, this is my belief, that you are well aware of the motivations behind the statements made since Thursday morning, 2 August, originating from both regional and external sources."

"You had your own assessment of these parties, and we had ours, and we all know their motives. However, it is important to recognise that these parties possess the capability to revise their stances through their own means and known capacities when they come to realize that their statement will not hinder the unwavering determination of the resolute Iraqi people, who are steadfast in asserting their rights and confronting oppression, betrayal, and conspiracies."

Additionally, he emphasised, "Those who provide us with weapons and declare a cessation of exports will only rectify the situation when they resume exporting to us. Similarly, those who suspend or sever economic relations will address the matter when they restore their connections with us."

"In the case of Iraq and Iran, any deviation from their rightful positions would lead to a missed historic opportunity for their respective people to achieve peace while safeguarding their legitimate rights."

"The consequences would be significant should we deviate from the progress achieved in our dialogue, which has laid the foundation of trust through the steps taken by both sides. We neither desire nor anticipate such an outcome for you or ourselves."

"In any case, if the publicly declared goals in the negotiations genuinely represent all your objectives, then rest assured that our declarations reflect our comprehensive goals without a doubt."

"Therefore, expediting the arrangement of the meeting and promptly designating a day to receive the envoys becomes crucial. Only through this path can we realise our legitimate aspirations and achieve the noble objective of peace for the people of both our nations. God is greater."

Saddam's concessions

On 14 August, Saddam sent an appeal letter to Rafsanjani in response to the one he had received on 8 August, along with an initiative presented on 12 August.

The primary objective of this initiative was to "achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace in the region… So that we may leave for those who have a pretext nothing that may prevent their involvement or perpetuate misgivings and suspicion so that none of Iraq's capacities shall remain unutilised away from the field of the major clash and can be mobilised for the goals of whose validity the noble Arabs and Muslims are unanimous, in order to keep mutual interference out of the trenches and remove suspicions and misgiving so that the worthy may find their way to establish normal relations between Iraq and Iran."

"We have decided as follows: To agree to the proposal contained in your letter of reply dated 8 August 1990 and received by our representative in Geneva, Mr. Barsan Ibrahim al-Takriti, from your representative, Mr. Cyrus Naseri, that the 1975 Accord should be used as a basis while standing in close relations to the principles set forth in our letter on 30 July 1990, particularly with regards to the exchange of prisoners and to paragraphs 6 and 7 of Security Council resolution 598."

He also expressed readiness to send a delegation to Tehran or to be visited by a delegation in Baghdad to "prepare the agreements and make ready for signature at the level at which agreement is reached."

"As a gesture of good faith, our withdrawal will begin on Friday, 17 August 1990 and we shall withdraw the forces opposing you along the borders so that only a token presence will remain, with border guards and police and no more, in order to carry out the day-to-day duties required in normal circumstances."

"There should be an immediate and comprehensive exchange of all prisoners of war, the full number held in both Iraq and Iran. This should take place across the land boundaries and by way of Khanaqin-Qasr Shirin Road and other crossing points to be agreed upon. We shall take the initiative in this matter and shall put it into effect as of Friday, 17 August." 

Saddam concluded his letter: "Mr. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, with this decision of ours, all has become clear, and thus all that you have desired and all that you have stressed has been achieved."

"It remains only for the instruments to be circulated before we can look down together from a commanding position onto a new life in which cooperation holds sway under the aegis of the principles of peace."

"Each of us will respect the rights of the others, we shall dismiss from our shores those who fish in troubled waters, and we shall perchance co-operate both in ensuring that the Gulf remains a lake of peace and safety, free of foreign fleets and forces of the foreigner which lie in ambush to our misfortune and in other spheres of life."

Then Rafsanjani surprisingly responded: "Dear Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq. We have received your letter dated 14 August 1990. Your acceptance of the 1975 treaty paved the way for the implementation of Resolution 598 and the resolution of disputes within its framework, transforming the ceasefire into a lasting and solid peace."

"The withdrawal of your forces from occupied Iranian territories serves as evidence of your sincerity and seriousness in pursuing peace with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Fortunately, this coincides with the scheduled date for the release of prisoners. We hope that your forces will continue to withdraw in accordance with the announced timetable and that the process of releasing prisoners from both sides will proceed rapidly until it is completed."

"As conveyed through our representative in Geneva, we are fully prepared to accept your representative in Tehran. The current positive atmosphere and goodwill intentions encourage us to aspire to comprehensive and stable peace while ensuring the preservation of all legitimate rights and borders for both of our esteemed Muslim nations. May peace be upon you."

Thus, Saddam made concessions and incurred losses, while Iran gained advantages.