IS media silence over attacks paints skewed picture of its strength

Contrasting views spark internal tensions

The leaked documents also reveal contrasting perspectives between media and military commanders in Syria regarding which attacks should be publicised. While some branches, like Deir ez-Zor, cooperate with media personnel, others, such as the Badia and Dara'a branches, reject the idea of publishing attack claims.

The military leadership — particularly in those regions—  reportedly enforces a media silence policy, citing concerns about compromising their security.

This divergence in views has resulted in internal tensions and disputes within the group.

Media officials critical of the media silence policy argue that it is counterproductive, benefiting the group's enemies and impeding its propaganda efforts. They contend that — aside from failing to deter counter-offensives by enemies — publicising IS activity would instil fear among "apostates" and potentially inspire similar attacks in Syria.

It is worth noting that IS has previously acknowledged its deliberate silence policy in its weekly newspaper, al-Naba. In an article published on 16 March, the group claimed that it intentionally withholds some attack claims for operational reasons.

Media silence paints inaccurate picture of group's strength

Drawing on that, the article argued that solely relying on the number of claimed attacks does not provide an accurate measure of a militant group's strength.

In a rare interview published on 28 July 2022, with the head of IS operations in Syria's Badia—a vast desert region connecting Homs, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor—a similar claim was made.

The official disclosed that IS conducted a significantly higher number of attacks than it publicly acknowledged, indicating a deliberate strategy of selectively sharing, delaying, or withholding information about its attacks for operational reasons.

Interestingly, the commander cautioned supporters who may be excited about sharing news of the group's attacks to refrain from doing so and strictly adhere to IS's official claims.

Following the publication of the interview, IS claimed responsibility for 19 attacks in central Syria, surpassing the total claimed by the group in the previous 13 months combined. This sequence of events may have aimed to establish the credibility of the commander's statements.

It is important to acknowledge that IS's narrative about media silence could be used to justify the notable decrease in the group's reported attack figures.

However, IS is not the only entity that has highlighted its strategy of underreporting. The Rojava centre, which monitors IS attacks in SDF-held areas, has pointed out that the group is known to carry out unclaimed violent activities in northeast Syria.

The centre also stated that out of the 285 attacks attributed by the media to the group in 2022, IS only claimed responsibility for 185.

Furthermore, on 23 June, IS claimed responsibility for attacks targeting Syrian regime forces and the SDF in northeastern Syria, resulting in the killing and injury of 19 fighters in six coordinated operations.

The January attack on Heseke's Sina'a prison last year is another reminder of the manpower and organizational acumen that IS still holds. These offensives, among many others in the recent past, strongly suggest that despite a drop in the number of claimed attacks, IS cells still maintain a position of advantage in many areas, enabling them to select and carry out attacks at their discretion.

This highlights the importance of adopting a more nuanced approach to the danger IS poses in Syria and the wider region.

Policymakers and analysts, therefore, should move beyond relying solely on official claims and adopt an evidence-based holistic approach that takes into account the group's military attacks and capabilities, as well as its media policies, financial resources, and influence over local communities.