Politics

IS will thrive as long as drivers of instability remain in Syria

In the absence of any clear and strict conditionality within the regional re-engagement with al-Assad’s regime, such groups have more grounds for optimism than concern about their future.

AFP

Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stand guard outside a house during a raid against suspected Islamic State group fighters in Raqa, the jihadist group's former de facto capital in Syria, on January 29, 2023.

IS will thrive as long as drivers of instability remain in Syria

Charles Lister

last update on 28 Jun 2023

While the regional normalisation of Bashar al-Assad’s regime continues apace, media coverage of events has generally presented developments as promising major, transformative change for Syria and its future.

However, in reality, there is little reason to believe that genuinely substantive change is actually likely. Tracks of unconditional re-engagement conducted by some regional governments since 2018 have not only resulted in zero positive change inside Syria – conditions have in fact worsened significantly.

Drivers of instability will remain

The new multilateral phase of engagement is being described as conditional, but it is highly unlikely to be reversed once it becomes clear the regime is inherently unwilling to substantively compromise.

In the coming weeks and months, it is possible that the regime will offer some minor concessions, enough to drag out the normalisation process such that it becomes impossible to reverse course. But even if cross-border aid access is extended, Captagon smuggling slowed, and perhaps a small amnesty announced, none of the major challenges associated with Syria’s crisis will be resolved.

Millions of Syrian refugees will never agree to return; more than 100,000 people will remain missing, presumed detained or murdered in regime prisons; Captagon will continue to flow, given the enormous profit margins associated with the trade; and most importantly, there will not be a genuine and inclusive political settlement. Thus, all the drivers of Syria’s debilitating instability will remain, and many will worsen markedly.

AFP — An SDF fighter monitors on Surveillance screens, prisoners who are accused of being affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) group, at a prison in the northeastern Syrian city of Hasakeh on October 26 2019.

For the likes of the Islamic State (IS), these new developments and their implications represent a dream scenario. Given the profound uncertainty resulting from al-Assad’s regional normalisation, as well as the near-complete loss of hope for the more than 12 million Syrians living outside regime control, IS will see opportunities aplenty.

Despite normalisation efforts, all the drivers of Syria's debilitating instability will remain, and many will worsen markedly. For the likes of IS, these new developments and their implications represent a dream scenario.

A blow to Western leverage

Moreover, the recent surge of regional engagement with al-Assad's regime has dealt a severe blow to US and European leverage on Syria policy and as a result, the sustainability of the US military presence in the northeast is now very much in question.

Should a US military withdrawal eventually occur, the one and only effective effort to contain and degrade IS inside Syria would no longer exist.

Alongside the SDF, US troops have played a vital role in crippling IS's capabilities in a third of Syria, as well as next door in Iraq. The regime's response to IS in recent years has wavered between indirect facilitation to pitiful attempts to challenge the group.

AFP — Syrian Kurdish Asayish security forces stand guard outside a house during a raid against suspected Islamic State group fighters in Raqa, the jihadist group's former de facto capital in Syria, on January 29, 2023.

IS and HTS upsurge

IS just defeated a weeks-long counter-offensive conducted by Syrian regime forces alongside the Russian air force and Wagner Group mercenaries in central Syria. It completed its most aggressive and deadly month in regime-held areas in years, killing over 115 people in April.

In north-western Syria, the situation regarding Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is more complex. Since its breakaway from al-Qaeda nearly six years ago, HTS has tied its fate more closely to the mainstream opposition's parallel struggle.

With Idlib's ceasefire in place, guaranteed in large part by Turkey's sizeable military presence, there has been no concerted military campaign underway to confront HTS for years and it has embedded deeply in Syria's northwest.

The recent surge of regional engagement with al-Assad's regime has dealt a severe blow to US and European leverage on Syria policy. Should a US military withdrawal eventually occur, the one and only effective effort to contain and degrade IS inside Syria would no longer exist.

The inevitable costs associated with withdrawing from north-western Syria all but remove any possibility of any seismic shifts affecting HTS.

Even so, Turkey's diplomatic re-engagement with al-Assad's regime will likely continue under Erdogan – creating conditions in which HTS will need to further cement its control in Idlib and continue to explore opportunities to expand its influence in northern Aleppo's countryside through malleable proxies, targeted coercion and localised deal-making.

AFP — Children of foreign Islamic State (IS) fighters watch a wildlife documentary feature in a class at the Orkesh rehabilitation centre in the countryside of Qamishli in northeastern Syria on March 7, 2023.

Rising concerns amongst Idlib's civilian population about what the future holds will probably trigger periodic bouts of protest against HTS, forcing the group into considering limited reforms and continuing its public relations campaign aimed at currying favour abroad.

Ultimately, until the underlying root causes and drivers of Syria's crisis are resolutely and irreversibly dealt with, terrorist groups and malign actors will continue to thrive.

The likes of IS and HTS are merely symptoms of Syria's crisis. In the absence of any clear and strict conditionality within the regional re-engagement with al-Assad's regime, such groups have more grounds for optimism than concern about their future.

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