There have always been general unanswered questions in high profile Arab discussions, most important of which are: Who rules Iran? And what does Tehran want? Specific questions have also surfaced, does Iran possess nuclear weapons? Is it trying to spread Shiism in the Arab region? The aforementioned questions have in turn lead to unorthodox inquiries and assumptions questioning whether Iran is considered a bigger threat than Israel in the region, and what the proper means to deal with that threat are. Usually, when all these questions are posed concerning a certain state in the region, it becomes an "issue" until it eventually evolves to become a threat under the assumption that if it is not dealt with, it shall dangerously aggravate.
Public opinion in the region is under the impression that the Arab states do not have any have specific policies towards Iran; it is though that Arab countries are either driven by the interests of political systems or they are simply blindly following "American orientations". In reality, the issue is a far more complex. As soon as facts concerning the Iranian paradox start unveiling, officials tend to take the path of discretion, which comes as a surprise to many. There still remains a large sector of scholars who are oblivious to the idea that the problem maybe rooted in Tehran and not in Arab states.
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to think that Arab officials have reached final conclusions concerning whether the ruler of Iran is the Supreme Leader or the President, and discussions have also proven futile in defining conservatives, moderates, and pragmatics. The current ongoing debate is concerned with the ruling equations and interactions of different concentrations of power in the state, may these focal points be the political institution, security systems, the revolutionary guard, the bazaar class, or the Beniad groups. As for Iran's regional orientations; there are several ideas that are always under discussion. For example, Iran now is acknowledged as a regional power like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but not a superpower, However, Iran cannot be considered a Middle Eastern China, since Iran has several weaknesses that are constantly present. What is obvious now is that Iran is merely highlighted by a "Regional Aura", which was strengthened through Arab or Arabic speaking media. Iran does not provide a political, economic, nor a cultural model to be followed. Here lies a controversy concerning whether Iran has fallen into the trip of which it was warned by Sa'don Hamady once, which is the "Illusion of Power".
One of the ideas that has become a debate is that Iran is vehemently involved in many of the Arab states' affairs, yet not through dealing with governments but rather through opposition and non-state actors. Iran has managed to effectively interfere in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza Strip and Northern Yemen. However, interestingly, it seems that Iran has reached its expansionary limits, seeing that it has spent too much to the extent that endangers is internal leadership. A number of the Arab countries have decided to hold upfront confrontations with Iran, to clear its influence in the region, like Morocco, Saudi Arabia and perhaps Egypt.
The Iranian behavior in the region is a cornerstone of controversy due to the notion that Iran's movements in the region are based on geostrategic frameworks that maybe Persian, but are definitely not Islamic nor Shiite. It is basically composed of national interests, bargaining cards and deconstructive activities manipulated by finance and intelligence. Here, one must not wonder much whether a Shiite state can endorse a Sunni group, because the answer is yes, since the issue is far from religious attributes. If the question is whether possessing nuclear arms could help in confronting Israel, then the answer is no.
On many other fronts, the same amount of clarity is not available, since Arab states discriminate between the Iranian and the Turkish model. And despite the Ottoman-like features of the latter, Turkey is considered a friendly nation to the Arab states for different reasons. What many fail to notice, however, is that the criteria for alliances and animosities is bound by the patterns of "security relations". In other words, the level of trust between security institutions is considered as a vital determinant in state to state relationship and, if ignored, states walk right into a political mine field.
Of course Iranian-Arab relations are not bound to remain eternally tense, for during the Khatami's era unprecedented cooperation initiatives were close to seeing the light, if it weren't for extremist interventions. Those who visit Iran will realize that people's awareness remains a relatively healthy one, even at the times of turmoil, where all countries have kept minimum level of communication. Accordingly, there's a conclusion that Iran is not necessarily an ally, yet not an enemy either, which has resulted in a regional cold war.
In light of the aforementioned, how to deal with Iran still remains as an unanswered question. There are those who push for dialogue, under moral and ethical reasoning, while on the other hand, there are those who push for confrontation. The latter believe that Iran has to realize that there's a price to pay for its regional adventures. Both approaches, however, are faced with trouble, for the camps of both the pigeons and the vultures have failed to provide explanations to concepts such as "engagement", which was tested through experience.
In the end, some guidelines to Arab debates concerning Iran can be determined, which underline the gray areas that still govern the current policies. The current Iranian policies have been practiced by Arab states previously, which have in turn resulted in harsh inter-Arab confrontations, none of which ended on a good note. Military catastrophes, international isolation, or internal changes are usually the result of state policies that attempt at changing their context, and maybe Iran would take a revision approach towards its policies before an imminent point of no return.
Head of the Regional Security & Arms Control Program at the Al-Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies, Cairo.
