75 years later, unpacking the Palestinian Nakba still difficult

Not least, there is a near-total silence on how some Arab regimes played a role in the Nakba and the establishment of the state of Israel. That, in itself, exacerbates the tragedy of the Palestinians, particularly around the following four issues, and one set of counter-factual observations, which this article details.

1: The Myth of Arab armies

Some Arab regimes were keen to back the narrative that they sent armies to prevent the establishment of Israel in 1948.

This narrative is not convincing. There were no true Arab armies in the broadly accepted sense of the term at that time. Some countries were barely beginning to obtain independence.

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The exaggerated role of Arab armies was really an attempt to cover up the failure of regimes. They prevented the Palestinians from receiving arms supplies, which could have helped them fend off the Zionists, with the intention to keep the Palestinian leadership weak and subservient to the other Arab regimes.

There was a famous response to Palestinian demands for armaments at the time: "We don't have any orders regarding this matter". It didn't mean there was no effort to help and no sacrifice by soldiers and martyrs who rushed to Palestine's defence.

But in the end, a lack of full help stopped them from mitigating the consequences of the Nakba. That should be recognised as the truth, free of exaggerations about an Arab army.

There were barely 60,000 troops inside Palestine into the Nakba and they lacked a unified leadership and proper weapons. They even contributed to the evacuation of Palestinians from several towns and villages, saying they were protecting them, or that the areas were becoming military zones. 

Meanwhile, the Zionist forces  numbered approximately 80,000 fighters, out of a total of roughly 650,000 Jewish settlers in Palestine in 1948.

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Historical research from Haitham Kilani, published by The Palestinian Encyclopaedia finds that the assistance provided to Palestinian resistance fighters by the Arab League's military committee, based in Damascus, amounted to only 1,600 rifles.

"It appears that the dispute between the 'Arab Higher Committee' and some Arab governments resulted in the transfer of weapons and funds donated by some Arab peoples and governments to the (Arab) Military Committee, where they were accumulated, while the Arabs of Palestine were in desperate need of them," he writes.

The irony is that the accepted Arab narrative has backed the Israeli state's official version of events, which spoke of an offensive by several Arab armies — to avoid portraying Israel as the aggressor — instead of refuting it.

In addition, the myth of the Arab armies lends support to Israel's portrayal of itself as invincible — a then-fledgling state which succeeded in quashing the armies of several established Arab nations.

2: Worsening the refugee problem

Palestine's refugee crisis is one of the most dangerous consequences of the Nakba and the establishment of the state of Israel, which became an aggressively colonial and racist state, driven by its settlers on former Palestinian lands.

As the Jews forced their Arab predecessors out, this displacement was made worse after responsibility for the refugees was internationalised —moving out of the hands of neighbouring countries and made the responsibility of the United Nations.

This led to the creation of UNRWA, a UN-affiliated humanitarian organisation. But it lacked the agency and political authority to provide protection for Palestinian refugees and their social and economic rights, that individual states would have had if responsible.

At the time of the Nakba, Palestinian refugees were accepted as temporary residents in various Arab countries and pathetic camps on the outskirts of cities were set up for them. 

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Jordan was the exception, which awarded them citizenship. However, they were still treated as a political, demographic, security, and economic challenge.

This left the Palestinian refugee in highly unusual circumstances. He is not a citizen and will not become one throughout his life, nor will he be protected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Read more: How Palestinian refugee camps became a gathering place for dreamers

What makes the situation even more bizarre is that the Palestinian is a refugee in Arab countries, not foreign countries, and is regarded as any other foreign refugee, despite the fact that Palestine has been a part of the Levant for at least the last three decades.

Additionally, the problem here is that the Palestinian has been deprived of two sets of identity – as Palestinians and Arabs – that means the Nakba has taken on a dimension in international law, creating stateless people.

This dilemma on national status could have been better handled by allowing Palestinians to have passports to make their lives easier, but such a move was blocked by the Arab League.

That move came in sharp contrast to many of the world's most advanced countries, which allow their citizens to hold two citizenships and issue citizenship to any person, regardless of language, religion, race, colour, or gender, within four or five months.

3: Obstructing a Palestinian political entity

The Arab world has resisted — or even obstructed — the formation of a political entity to represent the Palestinians.

The Arab League at the time refused a request from the Palestinian leadership to announce the establishment of the Palestinian state after the end of the British Mandate. After that, the issue was subjected to political wrangling between member states.

When the League of Arab States attempted to approve the establishment of a full Palestinian government in July 1948, two months after the Nakba, as suggested by the Palestinians' political entity – the Arab Higher Committee – the move was thwarted and instead, a civil administration was set up instead.

Four months after the Nakba, it was agreed to establish the "All-Palestine Government" in late September. By the time this occurred, the Zionist movement had succeeded in annexing more than two-thirds of Palestine and displacing about 800,000 Palestinians.

In contrast, Israel moved quickly.

When Britain declared the end of its mandate in Palestine on 14 May 1948, Israel declared the formation of an interim government on the same day. The establishment of the State of Israel was declared the next day.

That government lasted 10 months, until 10 March 1949. It was led by Ben-Gurion, who then chaired the first government after the first Knesset elections were held in January 1949. In the past 75 years, Israel has held 25 Knesset elections and elected 37 governments.

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Arab regimes have contributed to aborting the possibility of creating a Palestinian political entity. The Gaza strip was placed under the administration of the Egyptian government while the West Bank joined forces with East Jordan emirate to form the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan. 

The proposed "All-Palestine Government," was reduced to a small office in Cairo. It was then obliterated after the Arab League denied Palestinians passports. These passports were intended to protect their ethnic identity, to enable their daily lives and movements, and to deter claims of resettlement.

Picture how much effort and energy – as well as struggle, trouble and sacrifice – would have been saved if the Palestinians had been helped to build a proper political entity for themselves 75 years ago.

If they had succeeded, it would have had an impact on matters from national identity to organisation and representation in Arab affairs and international organisations.

Setting up an independent political entity now appears to be difficult. 

The unwillingness of Arab regimes to set up a political entity on the remaining Palestinian territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem – effectively boosted Israel's legitimacy because of a lack of a clear Palestinian entity to advocate on behalf of its people.

It compounds another Israeli success: preventing the Palestinians from establishing clear and unified political representation.  

4: Jewish immigration to Arab countries

Jewish people living in Arab nations have not encountered significant hostility over their religion and identity, in comparison to their experience in Germany and Eastern Europe.

Immigration into the Yishuv community of Jews living in Palestine before 1948, prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, was not significant from other Arab nations.

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They were coming in, mainly, from elsewhere, where there were greater threats. The total proportion from the Arab world accounted for between 8% and 10% of the 650,000 Jews in Palestine at the time.

But once Israel was set up as a colonial state for Jews, it prompted tensions in Arab countries. Added to the success of Israel, this created incentives for Jews to leave the Arab world for Israel, particularly from Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa.

In the first five years of Israel's existence, this immigration accounted for half of the Jews who came to live in the country. It provided Israel with the manpower it required to grow.

The number of Jews who immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1953 reached 687,000, with half of them coming from Arab countries. These Jews seemingly had no qualms about actively facilitating the Zionist movement that displaced Palestinians.

An outcome of an unfavourable climate

The Nakba cannot — and should not — be blamed on the actions of either the wider Arab world or its individual countries.

It was — and is — an outcome created by an unfavourable international, Arab and Palestinian climate in which the Palestinians themselves bear responsibility, due to their own divisions and an outmoded national movement based on tribal and familial lines.

Read more: Palestinians absent from their own cause

That contrasted with the modern political structure of the Zionist movement, which was transnational and intercontinental, and already had its own institutions, including The Hebrew University, founded several decades before the State of Israel.

Palestinians were unable to develop viable political entities, as Jewish settlers did. They continued to deal with their challenges in a reactionary manner which can still be seen in their current national discourse.

There is still an ongoing struggle to establish a state in what's left of Palestine — the Gaza Strip and a dismembered West Bank. Imagine the different positions the Palestinian cause would be in now if it had been able to set up a political entity over seven decades ago.

Regardless, the balance of power would have still favoured the Zionist movement, as it created Israel through colonialism. There was also a wider aim to counter the rising and promising wave of Arabism at the time.

Effects could have been mitigated

But that does not mean the Nakba was inevitable. Nor does it mean what happened had to occur in exactly the way it did. It could have been mitigated. The dangers posed to the Palestinians themselves, as well as the Eastern Arab countries and Egypt, by establishing Israel could have been minimised.

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Some military and nationalist regimes benefited from the polarisation of the Palestinian cause and the dispute with Israel. Having an issue so central to all Arabs helped enhance their own legitimacy and distract from their own internal failures.

Israel was aware of this and took advantage of it to enhance its own position, and its own legitimacy. It also shaped its own identity via the concept of existential threat based on the hostility between Arabs and Israelis.

The Nakba was a historical incident, with specific manifestations and consequences, that remain separate from subsequent events. What followed it were separate events which require separate analysis.

Despite their interconnections, the Nakba and what came after it should be distinguished from one another. Post-Nakba developments have different contexts and consequences.