Majalla - After the June elections in Iran, was there any real chance of the Islamic republic ending in a wave of democratic protest, or was this simply the wishful thinking of the western press?
The protest movement that broke out in June was of immense importance, and, thirty years after the Islamic Revolution, indicates a nation-wide rejection of the policies of Khamanei and Ahmadinejad. It represents the culmination of many different currents of protest, many of them wanting Iran to become a more ‘normal’, and open, country. The people want freedom. In some respects, it is similar to the popular movement that broke out in Eastern Europe against the communist regimes during the 1980s. However, as long as the main institutions of the state, and in particular the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards, and the intelligence services, remain more or less united, the opposition will not be able to prevail. In the 1980s, with Gorbachev, the Soviet and Eastern European communist leaderships lost the will to remain in power, and, in particular, abandoned the use of force to stay in power. This has not yet happened in Iran.
Majalla - How will this internal disruption affect Iran’s foreign policy, especially regarding the pursuit of a nuclear program?
There is much less disagreement between the different factions on international than on domestic policy. And all agree on Iran having a nuclear programme. What is striking is that the rise of a large democratic movement inside Iran has not aroused more interest and sympathy in the Arab world. Whatever happens in Tehran, Iran will retain a strong influence in the region
Majalla – What is Iran’s role in Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen? How does it compare to the other regional powers involved?
Iran’s roles in Iraq and Bahrain are very different. In Iraq, Iran has enormous influence and, while maintaining links to various parts of the opposition, is in effect supporting the government in Baghdad. In many ways, its goals – a stable, united, prosperous Iraq – coincide with those of the USA, with the obvious difference that it wants any future Iraqi government to be friendly to Iran. In Bahrain, Iran has long abandoned the irresponsible, insurrectionary, policies of the immediate years after the Islamic Revolution. The tensions in Bahrain have less to do with external interference, more with domestic Bahraini politics. As for Yemen, Iran’s role is greatly exaggerated. The causes of the internal problems, including the revolts in the northern and southern parts of the country, are a result of popular rejection of the Yemeni state. The only country with significant influence in Yemen is Saudi Arabia and this influence it has found hard to use in past decades.
Majalla - Nineteen years after unification, Yemen is still very unstable. Are the problems the country faces endemic ?
Yemen is becoming more unstable, and the main reasons for this are two: first, the historical reality that for most of Yemen, with the exception of the parts of former South Yemen controlled by the former socialist government, the power of the state in Yemen was always very limited – tribes always had a large measure of political, economic and military autonomy and this has become greater; secondly, the state system created by President Ali Abdullah Salih since he came to power in 1978 and extended, in the 1990s, to the former South, is based on corruption, clientilism and the pursuit of short-term gains by the ruling elite, political and military. The problems are indeed ‘endemic’ and not the result of external interference.
Majalla - Would regional intervention have any chance of success in Yemen?
There is usually very little external influence can do, except when all the parties involved sincerely want it. As for intervention, in the strong sense of despatching troops, it will only produce a counter-reaction – look at the examples of Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan in recent decades. The outside world can monitor events, and can give advice, but until the Yemenis find a solution to their own problems, there is little the rest of the world can do.
Majalla - Considering what is occurring in Iran, Yemen, and with Hamas in Gaza, where do you think political Islamic movements are heading?
The one generalisation that can be made with some confidence is that Islamism, as a political movement and political ideology, will remain important throughout the region for many years to come. The emergence of particular political, or armed, groups is only part of a much broader process of social and cultural change which is continuing to spread in the region, and which will provide the context for political action for many years to come. One has only to look at society in, for example, Syria, Iraq, Egypt or Morocco to see this.
Beyond this observation, the picture is a very varied one. It is nearly always a mistake to generalise about Islamist movements, or indeed any kind of political change in different countries. Of course, what happens in one country does affect another, but each movement has primarily national roots, and its future must be assessed in terms of what is happening in that country: it makes little sense to compare Afghanistan with Lebanon or Somalia. And this is all the more so, as these movements, while they do have contacts with each other and do inspire and provide models for each other, do not act in a highly co-ordinated manner, as did the former communist movement.
In overall terms, one can distinguish between at least four categories of Islamist movements. First, there are those states where armed Islamist movements of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s have tried, and failed, to take power and where they are, for the moment, in retreat: Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia. Iraq may also be an example of this, insofar as the main opposition forces militarily active now are those of national, or regional, opposition, not those based on religious ideology, Sunni or Shii: this would, of course, change if the Jaish Mahdi of Muqtada al Sadr decided to re-launch armed opposition, or if, following an American withdrawal, the country became plunged into a serious Shii-Sunni civil war. Secondly, there are states where radical Islamism has been in power and where there is now growing opposition to its control: Iran and Sudan are the two examples of this, although in both the Islamist regimes retains power and, very importantly, the will to keep power. Thirdly, there are countries where Islamist movements, having tried to challenge the state overall, have accepted, at least for the time being, a place within the political process: we should not forget the main example of this, Turkey, where Islamists are in power since 2002, and other examples would include Morocco, Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and, of course, Hizbullah in Lebanon. Whether these groups will increase their influence through political means, or will at some point in the future break with the political system and return to revolt, is an open question. Finally, there are those countries where Islamist groups are in open, armed, conflict with the state: these include Somalia, Yemen, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan. In Somalia and part of Palestine (Gaza) armed Islamists have taken power, and in the others they are continuing to wage military opposition to their states. In none of these do I see the prospect of rapid victory for these armed groups, nor do I see the prospect of political settlements in the proximate future. There are many chapters still to be written in the history of Islamist movements.
Interview conducted by Chris Phillips - An Associate of The Foreign Policy Centre and a columnist on Middle Eastern politics for The Guardian Online
