On 25 July 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) won the Palestinian national elections. While this electoral victory was the culmination of a long process of progressive political integration it was met by consternation, not only on the part of Israel and the international community but also by its internal rival, Fatah. Israel and the Quartet (US, EU, UN and Russia) responded by attempting to subvert the Hamas-led government through political and economic isolation while simultaneously empowering Mahmoud Abbas with this hope that this would force Hamas towards a more moderate stance and discredit it to the point that the Palestinian people would voluntarily oust it from power. Fatah, long-use to political supremacy, was unable to accept its electoral loss and also blatantly attempted to subvert Hamas’s ability to govern.
An increasingly bloody power struggle ensued with both factions mobilising armed militias, stockpiling weapons and resorting to killings in the Occupied Territories. By June 2007 clashes between the two factions degenerated into an all out struggle for the control of the Gaza Strip and in under a week Hamas overran PA security installations and key Fatah centres to take control of the Gaza Strip.
A History of Rivalry
In the two years since this violent putsch, Hamas has managed to consolidate its hold over Gaza despite its continued political and economic isolation, and a deteriorating security environment. External challenges to administering Gaza have come in the form of the pressures exerted by the West Bank-based PA which, immediately after the takeover, boycotted security, judiciary and other government sectors in Gaza, steeply curtailing its administrative links with the Hamas government. It also urged PA employees in the public sector to halt working or risk being struck off the government payroll. The PA also sought to deny the Hamas government revenue by declaring a tax-holiday across Gaza and made only intermittent salary payments to non-essential public sector staff (such as hospital cleaners and municipal workers). In addition, the West Bank-based PA occasionally interrupted Gaza’s fuel subsidies and, according to the International Crisis Group, even pressured donors to postpone new Gaza projects.
Hamas’s other external challenges have included the Israeli blockade which banned exports, sharply limited imports and prohibited the passage of over 100,000 Gazan labourers into Israeli territory. In fact by late 2007, in response to continuing Palestinian shelling, Israel further reduced food supplies, slashed fuel imports and restricted foreign currency supply – a policy which with minor shifts holds till today. As a result, Gaza’s manufacturing, construction and transport industries have been devastated and the bulk of its private sector workers have been laid off. Hamas has thus come under increasing pressure to break the blockade in order to kick-start Gaza’s collapsing economy. Consequently, its ability to govern Gaza is heavily dependent these two external forces – i.e. upon the Israel lifting the blockade on the one hand and the PA releasing funds for the public sector in Gaza on the other.
Within Gaza, Hamas has also had to overcome a number of obstacles including Gaza’s powerful and heavily militarized network of clans and families and various other party militias. These militias have not only included traditional secular rivals like Fatah but also other Islamists like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and increasingly a host of pro- Al-Qaeda groups, including most recently the Jund Ansar Allah.
Yet despite such formidable challenges Hamas has not only survived but also managed to consolidate its regime. It has done so by choosing to focus on the factors it can control, such as its internal challenges, while continuing to behave like a resistance movement towards those it cannot, like the external influences as exercised by Israel and the PA. Hamas has used security to demonstrate its governance credentials and it has achieved relative internal order by establishing an unchallenged monopoly of violence by using its reorganised security apparatus.
The Gaza blockade implemented by Israel and international actors with the hope of isolating and eventually ousting Hamas has thus failed to weaken the group and has instead facilitated its ability to govern unimpeded while simultaneously marginalising the more moderating influences within the group. While the Gazans may fault Hamas for being unable to end the siege, they also blame Israel for imposing it, the international community for supporting it and Fatah for acquiescing to it. As a result, Hamas has been free to remake the political landscape of Gaza and consolidate its position by making internal security and the use of force the backbone of its administrative rule in the territory.
Hamas’s Monopoly on Violence
The tone of how Hamas would administer Gaza was set during its brutal takeover of the territory in June 2007. The confrontation leading up to the putsch was itself triggered by Hamas’s security concerns as Fatah insisted on retaining control over the security apparatus in Gaza in the face of Hamas’s determined efforts to bring these security forces under its own authority.
Knowing that its position in power would never truly be secure unless backed by force, Hamas also sought formal recognition for its Executive Support Force (ESF) – a force that was set up after its 2006 electoral victory and which is now the Gaza police. The resulting takeover itself was remarkably violent and the internecine bloodshed accounted for more Palestinian lives in 2007 than the conflict with Israel. Unlicensed public assemblies, particularly if linked to Fatah, were seen as a disturbance to the peace and dispelled often through the use of live ammunition. Small acts of dissent were also brutally repressed often with the use of disproportionate force.
As Hamas targeted rival security groups and Gaza’s civil society, human rights organisations reported that Gaza’s amputee population doubled in four days. Unwarranted detentions, summary executions and torture have come to characterise both Hamas’s takeover and subsequent campaign to gain control of the territory. What has resulted since is a seizure of all Gaza-based PA institutions, the systematic quashing of political and civil opposition, a strengthening regime of censorship and surveillance and a consolidation of Hamas’s security apparatus which is unashamedly utilised to implement these changes.
Thus, the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s paramilitary wing, have been transformed from an underground guerrilla force into a uniformed, disciplined and effective military force responsible for suppressing armed groups within Gaza and also protecting it from external attacks. Hamas has also reformed the ESF into three branches responsible for managing Gaza’s internal security: the Civil Police, the Internal Security Forces (an intelligence agency) and the National Security Force (a border police force). In short, it has established and maintained administrative rule in Gaza by acquiring an undisputed monopoly on security which has given it the ability to control an area hitherto run by competing clans and rival militias.
While there has certainly been a dramatic decline in internal chaos as a result the popular response has been mixed: while some Gazans feel relief at the restoration of internal law and order others continue to live in a state of distrust, anxious about Hamas’s hegemony and fearful of its use of force and violence. At least some of these fears are justified as Hamas has also used these transformed security forces to clamp down on any challenges posed by competing militias and clans to consolidate its control over Gaza. Clans had steadily amassed power in Gaza since the second intifada when Israeli incursions resulted in a rapid weaponisation of families which stepped in to provide military protection and economic support where the government infrastructure could not.
However, after the takeover Hamas launched a campaign to dismantle the economic and military clout of Gaza’s clans. Families were, often forcibly, disarmed, their informal welfare economy was regulated and family associated criminal activities such as kidnapping, car theft and drug smuggling were sharply curtailed. Declining clan influence has reinforced Hamas’s ability to govern Gaza effectively and the resulting stabalisation and pacification of society has been welcomed by many in the Gaza Strip even though some observers accused Hamas of pitting clans against one another in order to consolidate their party’s rule.
Hamas’s ability to effectively administer Gaza has been further bolstered by bringing various armed militias under control. The flight of Fatah’s Gaza-based leadership during the takeover had left the movement divided and directionless and its militia demoralised. Even so, some within Fatah adopted a strategy of armed struggle and operating under a diffused leadership resorted to tactics reminiscent of those Hamas had used in the first intifada. Their new tactics included wall graffiti, shootings and fire-bombings, and an escalated targeting of Israel with the hope that the latter would provoke a military response against Hamas. Hamas reacted by confiscating weapons, arresting politicians, security personnel and suspected insurgents and violently suppressing all those either associated with the movement or suspected of supporting/sympathising with it. As a result, the challenge posed by Fatah within Gaza was effectively, albeit brutally, crushed.
Islamists groups such as PIJ also constitute a key challenge to Hamas’s position as the principle arm of the Islamic national resistance and it has tended to curb their activities by confiscating weaponry, monitoring and limiting training exercises and on occasion forcefully taking control of their mosques. At the same time, while Hamas has stringently restricted the use of force by militias within Gaza it has mostly turned a blind eye to their activities against Israel and consistently shied away from either curbing rocket fire into Israel or dismantling the rocket-manufacturing industry that makes these attacks possible. In doing so, it has made clear that it has little to gain from persuading militias to attack Israel, especially in light of Israel’s continued siege and military incursions into Gaza. At the same time, in controlling militia activity within Gaza, Hamas has also clearly signalled that it will not tolerate any obstacles to its internal authority and control.
However, Hamas has typically adopted noticeably harsher measures against the more radical Islamist factions recently appearing on Gaza’s political landscape. The August 2009 crackdown on Jund Ansar Allah, for instance, was one of the most violent incidents in Gaza since the Israeli offensive Operation Cast Lead and symbolised Hamas’s deep intolerance towards any internal political challengers, especially those who could be even loosely linked to a wider Salafi-Jihadist ideology. This stance may be rooted in Hamas’s rejection of repeated Al Qaeda attempts appropriate the Palestinian cause and gain a foothold in the Territories. Moreover, though their allegiances and pedigrees remain unclear, Hamas may also fear that these radical factions could potentially supply Al Qaeda with inroads into Gaza and in doing so open it to unprecedented Israeli and international intervention, thus altering the conditions under which it is has so successfully established and strengthened its rule.
The Unrelenting Economic Challenge: A Deal Breaker?
While this focus on internal security has been the benchmark of Hamas’s administrative programme in Gaza it has been unable to force Israel to lift the blockade imposed after the 2007 takeover, despite repeated efforts to do so. This blockade, has generated unprecedented macro-economic compression in Gaza. The UN Relief and Works Agency in Gaza recently reported that the number of Gazans considered "abject poor" had tripled to 300,000 this year, in other words, one in every five Gazans. Under these conditions, Hamas’s principle economic goal has been that of survival. At the same time, the economic sanctions and the resultant collapse of the private sector have been a mixed blessing for Hamas authorities. On the one had, the slow strangulation of Gaza’s economy has created a humanitarian crisis, engendered popular discontent and limited Hamas’s ability to govern. Yet, on the other hand, it has also allowed Hamas to achieve economic dominance and effectively tightened its grip on Gaza.
A host of factors have allowed Hamas to finance itself and its activities and prevent a total economic meltdown. Firstly, despite deep hostility and many irregularities, the Fayyad-led PA continues to be the largest contributor to Gaza’s salary bill and therefore the main force moving the Palestinian market. Given that almost 50% of Gaza’s workforce is on a government payroll this contribution is a crucial and indispensable source of economic support for the Hamas government. Ironically, it was the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the restoration of non-Hamas governance in the West Bank which motivated Israel to resume the customs transfers that replenished PA coffers and enabled the PA to assist Gaza.
Secondly, the UN and other international donors have continued to pump money into Gaza for welfare operations while also substantially increasing their humanitarian assistance to compensate for the dramatic drop in development aid since mid-2007. According to the International Crisis Group, UN agencies spent over $350 million in Gaza in 2008 alone. The Hamas government has also found innovative new ways to generate additional funds. For instance, in the initial months after the takeover the government charged approximately $400 as bail for those held on suspicion of anti-Hamas activities. Observers have noted that foreign donations have also contributed significantly to the revenues of the government in Gaza. Iran, for one, has made sizeable contributions and along with various other Gulf states the Hamas government is thought to have received as much as between $150 million and $200 million in revenue from foreign donations.
Finally, Hamas has also benefitted from establishing a monopoly over and regulating the extensive tunnel smuggling between Gaza and Egypt. In an environment where the sanctions prohibit everything but a limited list of humanitarian items these tunnels have become vital lifelines for Gaza. Hamas not only controls the majority of these tunnels but also regulates prices and collects taxes on all goods passing through them. According to one shop owner in Gaza, a value-added tax of 14.5% is levied on every item that comes through the tunnels.
In control but until when?
In the two years since its takeover, Hamas has not only managed to successfully “administer the crisis” but also consolidate its power and cripple potential foes. Most ministries and public sector institutions have been fully purged of Fatah loyalists and replaced by Hamas sympathisers, establishing a somewhat stable, albeit brutal, regime. Hamas’s model of governance seems to be based on securing internal order and regime consolidation on the one hand and refusing to compromise on the movement’s key principles with regards to its external challengers, Israel and the PA.
However, even though Hamas has managed to survive under circumstances of extraordinary pressure Gaza remains volatile. For one, the present economic situation is neither viable nor sustainable in the long-run. Hamas’s attacks on Israel and the resulting ‘War in Gaza’ have not altered the situation on the ground: the crossings remain largely shut, reconstruction and rehabilitation is progressing at a snails pace, rockets continue to be fired into Israel and tunnels from Egypt are still being used to smuggle weapons. It is also clear that unless the blockade is lifted Hamas will keep launching fresh rounds of attacks upon Israel and it is only a matter of time before Israel mounts a new offensive in response.
Moreover, without a rapprochement between the Palestinian factions in the West Bank and Gaza, the international community is unlikely to permit Gaza’s recovery for fear of assisting Hamas. At the same time, neither Hamas nor Fatah will relinquish their exclusive holds on power so easily. However, Palestinian reconciliation is key, for without it the siege will continue and the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza will eventually delegitimize Hamas’s other achievements, finally inhibiting all of its efforts to govern Gaza.
Rashmi Singh - Research Fellow at the School of International Relations, and Fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University
