The Palestinians hold countless heated and bitter debates about their conditions, choices, and destinies. This has been the case for about a hundred years. The problem now is that so few of these debates are clear, direct, or realistic.
The factions – especially Fatah and Hamas, and to a much lesser extent Popular and Democratic Fronts and other groups on the left – dominate the discourse. It is evasive and leads nowhere. The discussion seeks only to justify the failures of the factions by covering up all the gaps between them and their problems and shortcomings.
The discussion does not explain why there are so many factions. They proliferate primarily because many of them fail to represent multiple segments of the Palestinian people, either at home or abroad. The factions are without a place in both the peaceful struggle against Israel and the military one.
Most no longer have a distinct intellectual or political identity. They are over half a century old, making them exhausted, with nothing more to offer. The founding principles of most of the groups have entirely disappeared, while the armed struggle is no longer applicable from abroad, leaving refugees excluded from Palestinian politics.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has been sidelined. The two most essential factions have turned into authorities, each within its own territory – Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza – despite the continued occupation. Palestinian rights have been reduced to establishing a state in part of the land for part of the people with part of their rights.
There is a crisis within Palestinian politics. It is not only related to the legitimacy of the national movement, but also to disagreements then divisions within it and the way it has developed from one form of struggle into another. It is a profound and comprehensive crisis affecting everything from methods of work to internal relations, the character of the entities involved and the discourse between them.
This crisis is not new. It did not start with the division between Fatah and Hamas. Nor did it begin with the Oslo accords. Those are all manifestations of conditions which go further back, to when the Palestinian national movement accomplished all that it was capable of in its early stages, between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.