The growing threat to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and neighboring regions from pirates operating off the shores of lawless Somalia has engendered an unparalleled global response. Over the past year, a number of countries and multinational institutions have deployed naval forces to the region to counter the pirate threat.
Despite the unprecedented extent of this effort, this mishmash of ad hoc multinational and national initiatives, involving some 50 combat ships and several thousand foreign military personnel, has had only a limited effect. These various contingents typically have conflicting mandates and rules of engagement. They have also become fixated on responding to immediate problems rather than organizing a robust regional maritime structure, which could replace the foreign fleets when they inevitably withdraw.
The United Nations, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and diverse national governments are conducting several separate multilateral and single-country maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden region. The UN Security Council has adopted several resolutions calling on member governments and regional security organizations to take measures to counter regional piracy. In December 2008, the EU organized Operation Atalanta, primarily to defend food deliveries to Somalia. NATO conducted an earlier mission with the same goal, and recently sent another fleet that is duplicating Operation Atalanta.
Along with these missions by international organizations, various national governments have launched their own initiatives. These warships police the waters off Somalia, either in loose coordination with the multinational fleets organized by NATO and the EU or separately. Participating countries include China, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The governments of Iran, Japan, and South Korea recently announced their intentions to dispatch warships to fight the pirates.
In January 2009, twenty-four UN member states and five multinational organizations organized a Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia. At present, it includes 28 member countries and six international organizations: the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, the International Maritime Organization, NATO, and the UN Secretariat. The widespread extent of this participation reflects the importance of preserving unhindered commercial shipping in this pivotal body of water locate athwart the routes used by oil tankers existing the Persian Gulf and container vessels moving between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal.
These diverse contributions also result from the pirates attacking ships regardless of their nationality, including those from Islamic nations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The pirates are equal-opportunity brigands. On November 15, 2008, they hijacked the Saudi-owned MV Sirius Star while it carrying approximately $100 million worth of oil to the United States. Following this incident, an extraordinary session of the Arab League Council condemned the pirates and underscored the necessity of “promoting Afro-Arab Cooperation in support of efforts to combat piracy.”
Despite its widespread participation, the Contact Group thus far has mainly given its members another platform to conduct a dialogue among themselves on regional piracy issues. The Group has yet to achieve much progress in realizing its six stated objectives: strengthening operational and information support for counter-piracy operations; creating a counter-piracy coordination mechanism; improving judicial processes; enhancing the self-defense capabilities of commercial shippers; elevating public information and diplomatic efforts; and tracking the pirate’s money.
Meanwhile, during the first five months of 2009, the number of piracy attempts had already overtaken the number of attacks that occurred in all of 2008. Last year, the Gulf of Aden was the scene of 111 incidents, including 42 vessels hijacked. So far this year, 114 attempted attacks have already taken place.
The current confusing mixture of overlapping and competing unilateral and multilateral initiatives needs to be reorganized and made more harmonious. The initial priority should be on improving coordination among the diverse flotillas conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. A suitable division of labor is needed to take advantage of the unique assets of each country and international organization operating in the region.
Over the longer term, an enduring solution to the Somali piracy problem will require the advent of a stable government in Somalia that can enforce the country’s laws against piracy as well as revive the economy. New employment opportunities are required to diminish the appeal to impoverished Somalis of becoming a pirate. Given adequate logistical and financial support by the international community, Somalia authorities might at some point form an effective coastal force to patrol the country’s territorial waters.
Pending the advent and consolidation of an effective Somali government, the international community should assist friendly Somali groups to build the capacity needed to curtail the activities of the pirates, insurgents, and other threatening groups operating in Somalia. The foreign countries concerned about piracy around Somalia should also encourage the littoral states in the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea regions—which include Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania as well as Somali—to form a regional maritime coastal patrol.
Countries external to the area should provide funding, training, and advanced surveillance and other technologies to these local actors to strengthen their maritime security capabilities. They should also develop additional legal authorities to allow for the effective detention and prosecution of pirates and other transgressors. At present, the foreign fleets often release pirates soon after their capture because of uncertainties regarding their legal status.
In addition to countering piracy, a regional maritime security force could address other transnational maritime problems near Somalia, including stopping illegal fishing and monitoring environmental threats. The pirates have gained some local support by claiming to defend Somalis against poaching and maritime dumping by foreign ships. Establishing a regional coast guard that included Somali participation would deprive them of this argument as well as offer an alternative source of employment to potential sea pirates.
Richard Weitz - Ph.D. - Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute- Washington DC.
