A Yemeni pro-democratic protestor shows her hands painted in the colors of her national flag and text reading in Arabic: "We want the implementation of decisions" during a demonstration in Sana'a on 3 January 2013 (MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images)[/caption]As President Abd Al-Rahman Rabuh Mansur Hadi visits Washington DC, and much of the rest of the world departs on their summer holidays, it’s worth looking back at a momentous year in Yemen. While the news from Yemen has mostly been eclipsed by more exciting global, and even regional events, what has occurred in the country may also have profound effects on the region.
The year began with the international community gingerly nursing Yemen through the initial stages of the GCC Initiative, in particular the vital reforms of the armed, security and civil services. Simultaneously, Yemen’s body politic expelled much of the past decades’ cancer—involving some tense moments in Intensive Care. Yet as the major stages of the security sector reform took effect, and Saleh loyalists were slowly replaced by others (some would say Hadi loyalists), so the situation stabilized, culminating in the diplomatic appointments of the main Saleh family members/former senior security commanders abroad.
Of all the lessons which dictators will have learned from the Arab Spring, it is that those with familial control of the armed forces can butcher the opposition to a standstill (Libya, Syria, Yemen); those whose families neglected their military ‘duties’ for trade (such as Tunisia and Egypt) are unable to cling on (not that military ‘duty’ ever stopped the scions from enriching themselves). Yet this lesson, of progressive reform and side-lining, is an important one for any future changes of ruling cliques in the region, and builds on the catastrophic failure of to do so in Iraq.
President Hadi was the ‘consensus’ candidate in a one horse race, and indeed much of his success lies in his ability to avoid alienating any faction, domestic or foreign. He has toured the region, meeting the regional powers with activist foreign policies: his first trip was to Riyadh at the end of March 2012, and visited Doha almost exactly a year ago and then again at the end of March this year when he attended an Arab League summit. He also visited Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman in November 2012. President Hadi has also courted the global powers, meeting US, UN, and EU leaders in October 2012, and a trip to Moscow at the beginning of April this year, when he met Vladimir Putin and reminisced about the old days.
Yet it is domestically that Hadi has been most successful, aided by the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar. Hadi has met mistrustful Southern leaders on numerous occasions, visited the people of the forgotten Tihama, and reached out to the Zaydi Revivalist Houthis.
Above all, Hadi has overseen the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which was written off by some as a white elephant. While this had a bumpy start, it is close to completing its first session and has reported back with some serious findings and recommendations, in particular over the Southern and Houthi issues. This principle is hardly revolutionary, but the public recognition of—and apology for—the wrongs of the previous regime will go a long way to placating those affected, so long as the apology is followed by restitution. This, too, is a lesson that others in the region (and beyond) might heed.
Yet the processes of the NDC are almost as important as the product. Not only did the selection process—under UN supervision—reach out to many in Yemen who had previously been politically voiceless, but in a society as hierarchical as Yemen became under Saleh’s oligarchy, the NDC recaptured some of Yemen’s traditional egalitarianism. Above all, the formation of the nine thematic working groups, and their requirement to canvas grassroots opinion, was another refreshing throwback to the days before the “city sheikhs” were made dependent on Saleh. If Yemen can carry these processes forward into the new Majlis, then it may have a chance of representing its people, rather than condoning the profiteering of a kleptocracy. And if these lessons are learnt by other regimes in the region, anxious to prevent the spread of the Arab Spring, then they too may not just survive, but thrive. The lesson is clear: Arabs like democracy just as much as anyone, and welcome a first among equals as their leader.
For a man once written off as a nobody, and for a country written off as a failed state, Hadi and the Yemenis have done much over this last year to be proud of: the death-grip (and grasping hands) of the Sanhani clique have been loosened from the levers of power (many have been moved into sinecures, the price for their acquiescence), and they have been replaced by less corrupt individuals (although it remains to be seen whether power corrupts these too). The NDC has begun its second session, and the terrorists and insurgents have been driven from territory in Abyan and reduced to mounting sporadic raids and close quarter assassinations.
Problems still loom—not least the jihadists, the Southern separatists led by Ali Salim Al-Baidh, the failing water table, and the economy. But those are either manageable in the short term, or long term issues that need strategic attention. Ahead lies the second, grueling phase of Hadi’s presidency—overseeing the constitution drafting, and preparing for elections to replace him.
Could President Hadi have acted more decisively? Almost certainly, but he would equally as certainly have met the same fate as the heroic Ibrahim Al-Hamdi. Hadi’s done well: now it’s time to take some well-deserved R&R before the next term.
