Only a few weeks ago, the Head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in Mecca, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi, expressed his support of the mixing of men and women at the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.
To the surprise of many, and the outrage of some, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi noted that ‘the term ikhtilat, or the separation of sexes, was a recent adoption that was unknown to the early people of knowledge… Mixing was part of normal life for the Ummah and its societies.’ ‘The word in its contemporary meaning has entered customary jurisprudential terminology from outside’, Al-Ghamedi said.
As a the head of the Hai’a, as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice is known, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s statement is not just significant because it was he who said it. A sign of the evolution of social mores in the Gulf states, Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s interpretation of ikhtilat also speaks of the weight that the opinion of the youth in the Gulf has on social and political developments of the region.
These progressive opinions might have been felt by some before, but they are only now being heard that they have the majority of support from the youth in the country – a constituency, so to speak, that has continued to show support for the Sheikh Al-Ghamedi’s controversial assessment when rumors of his potential dismissal abound.
The story of the youth in the Gulf, and their growing influence over the developments of the region however, is not one that should be taken for granted. The youth in the Gulf have historically trodden a fine line between fortune and calamity – as they are bound by numerous religious, cultural and economic constraints.
The Reformation
In the past, the youth in the Gulf have been viewed by elders as individuals of lesser wisdom, maturity and experience. This has impeded their development and internalized a feeling of inferiority associated to the hierarchical structure that governs societies in the Gulf.
According to Mounira Jamjoom, at Oxford University, younger generations have been considered fledglings in the eyes of their elders, leaving their potential for innovation and leadership locked; and as the story of Sheikh Al-Ghamedi shows, religious beliefs play a significant role in shaping the conservative upbringing of the youth in Gulf societies.
Consequently, religious conservatism combined with disenfranchisement has led to trends in religious extremism amongst Gulf communities – trends that have appealed to younger generations in the region. The New York September 11 attacks speak to this trend, but they also created the perception that Gulf upbringing is based on radical religious ideas that prepare the youth for Jihad. This external outlook has severely taken its toll on young populations in Gulf societies, as surely the majority of the youth does not share its beliefs with those extremists.
In fact, contrary to popular belief, the rise of a new phenomenon known as the "objectification of religion" has started building up in Gulf societies. This phenomenon is characterized by the “popularization” of religious discourse, that is, the understanding that the interpretation of religious discourse is no longer limited to scholars, but also includes average individuals. This has created a ripple of revolutionary thought, stretching the boundaries of the youth's identity beyond the religious framework.
The Middle Class Effect
How can these changes be explained? Despite the challenges the youth in the Gulf faces, there appears to be a wave of reform altering the position of the youth on the political arena. According to Vali Nasr’s most recent book, Forces of Fortune, the growth of the middle class as a result of a strong performance in the private sector, can encourage political change, even in the context of religious and social constraints.
In essence, Vali Nassr describes the region’s balance of power as being reshaped by the upwardly mobile middle class, and echoes Barrington Moore’s famous explanation of the democratic revolutions of the West, “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”. In a similar way, Nasr has pointed out that the entrepreneurs, investors, professionals and consumers of the region, are tipping the scales of politics away from extremism, and tipping the scales altogether. For the youth in the Gulf who have found themselves prominent members of this growing middle class, this trend has not only moved them away from extremist politics. The growth of the middle class has, perhaps more significantly, altered their position on the political scene making them important players whose opinions are intrinsically valuable because of the economic power they growingly represent.
As Nasr notes ‘The great hope of the new middle class rising all around the region – pulling itself up out of the poverty that has provided such a ripe terrain for the fundamentalist call – is that these business-minded shop-keepers, traders, craftsmen, and civil servants, have little or no interest in extremism. The Islam they respect is more moderate and they have generally not thrown their support behind fundamentalist parties in elections – at least not until those parties have abandoned the fundamentalist component of their stated goals.’
Opportunities Not To Be Missed
However, Nasr’s assessment poses an important challenge. It is necessary to remember that he is describing a trend in progress. The fulfillment of his prediction on the middle class’s potential to embody change in the politics of the region might not be met if their economic resilience is hindered. Unfortunately for the Gulf’s youth, the states of the Gulf are not consistent in their ability to promote the economic interests of the middle class, and there remains a risk of squandering the potential of the youth as a part of this “reforming” middle class, and of squandering the potential of the middle class as a whole.
Shortcomings in the political, economic and societal structures pin down the promising youth sector. As a result, despite the wealth of Gulf economies, their communities should be further scrutinized for the economic potential that they have.
Oil revenues make for a very large part of Gulf economy, yet opportunities to take advantage of peaking oil prices by reforming the economy have been wasted. The recent financial crisis was considered a double edged sword, since high oil revenues have been extremely beneficial to Gulf economies, yet they have shown the need to diversify sources of revenue. The oil based economies have faced an unemployment problem, directly affecting graduating youth.
The problem of unemployment for the youth of the Gulf can be traced to two main factors. The first is that due to a lack of diversity the economy has resulted in limited employment options for the fresh labor force. Secondly, the Gulf is plagued by low wage standards and working conditions in the oil sector, and consequently attracts more immigrant labor while pushing away the domestic labor force.
Accordingly, the public sector's appeal has exceeded that of the private sector, due to the security it provides to its employees. Statistics show that the majority of the labor force in the Gulf is employed in the public sector: almost 90 percent of all Qataris in full time employment in 2007 worked in the public sector, compared with 50 percent of Saudis, 86 percent of Emiratis and 84 percent of Kuwaitis.
However, the public sector has reached the upper limits of its ability to absorb new entrants into the labor force. Recalling again the lessons proposed by Nasr, it is the resilience of the private sector that provides the opportunity for political change. If the youth then should find itself mainly in the public sector, its ability to contradict dated policies of the establishment would be compromised. In other words, part of the youth’s independence and strength is dependent on its capacity to exploit its successes in the private sector.
Interestingly, the employment problems that have been sparked by the economic crisis have encouraged Gulf states to encourage private sector employment. This has resulted in a significant rise in private sector employment although unemployment among Gulf nationals is still on the rise.
Yet, the private sector initiatives in place are not perfect – and different trends can be observed amongst the different Gulf states. For one, there has been a surge in the creation of family owned enterprises. These enterprises have created high salary expectations for the graduating youth of some Gulf states. For example, the youth in countries like the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait refuse to take relatively low-paying jobs, while the youth in countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain display a greater margin of flexibility.
Gender Equality and Tolerance
The potential of the private sector to support the empowerment of the youth in the Gulf however is limited, and other challenges stand in the way of the youth’s development. One prominent example is the issue of gender equity in the Gulf states.
Due to cultural and religious requisites, the female sector of the community is regularly deprived of several rights. The challenges that face young women in Gulf countries are very different from those facing the male sector. Young females have become more concerned with issues that address their independence such as their ability to participate in the economic, political and cultural realms of their communities.
It should be noted, however, that there has been a slow albeit significant improvement among the majority of Gulf countries with regards to the empowerment of women specifically, and gender equity more generally. The reforms that have been carried out have enabled women to participate in economic and political fields, in addition to enhancing their social status. Nevertheless, women still remain subordinates when it comes to family-related issues, such as marriage, divorce and custody.
The presence of these inequalities poses important challenges to the youth in the Gulf as a whole, not just to women. In the 2009 Arab Human Development report, produced by the United Nations Development Program, the report notes how the insecurity – defined in physical, emotional, economic and social terms – that women face, hinders the development of Arab states. Most obviously, by limiting opportunities for women, states are limiting the professional and social development of half of their labor force which consequently diminishes the state’s overall capacity for development. Yet, the views of Sheikh Al-Ghamedi speak to the understanding that the loosening of conservative social norms might encourage the empowerment of women, and further promote the potential for development of the youth in the region.
The youth in the Gulf has demonstrated significant signs of empowerment, evidence that their position in the political and social realm of the region is changing, and that they are the force behind much reform. Nasr has indicated however, that their empowerment has been a result of the growth of the middle class. This phenomenon holds a great deal of potential for the development of the youth in the Gulf, but many challenges lie ahead before this potential can be realized. From limited economic opportunities, to questions of equality, the youth in the Gulf has a long road to travel if it is to continue on the trend of empowerment that it has recently begun. What is certain is that the Gulf states stand to gain much from the promise that the youth has shown.
Wessam Sherif and Paula Mejia
