Meshud was undoubtedly a big catch. He was identified by Pakistani authorities to be behind Benazir Bhutto’s assassination and the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, among several other suicide attacks. Above all, the activities of his network were a major threat to the stability and security of the Pakistani state. Regarding the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan allows the Afghan Taliban and other militants to escape to Pakistan territory, where regular US troops cannot chase them. The drone attacks are thus the solution the US army and intelligence found to go around this obstacle.
Counter-terrorism experts have observed the advantages of a programme which allows the C.I.A. to hunt down high profile terrorists and militants. When asked about the positive aspects of the drones programme, William Cohen, former Defence Secretary for the Clinton Administration, told me that ‘it is a delicate situation for Pakistan that obviously does not welcome any foreign troops operating inside the country.’ However, ‘to the extent that the US is able to operate the drones under their control, then they perceive that as something quite beneficial. It has been quite successful’, he added. It is this apparently invisible presence of the drones that is considered the most important aspect of this programme. It allows the US to monitor insurgents and kill them in situations that would either be too risky or politically untenable for US troops to be sent in, and apparently it is much cheaper too.
While the Obama Administration is a strong supporter of this strategy, which is backed in Congress by both Republicans and Democrats, the Pakistan government has officially expressed its concerns about what it considers a violation of its sovereignty. These declarations, however, are clearly directed to appease a Pakistani audience who is very sceptical of the country’s ties with the United States. In reality, all seems to indicate that the Pakistani government secretly allows the US to conduct such attacks (it is even reported that it requested that the US provide such technology to the Pakistani army). Not surprisingly, the success of the drone strike that killed Mehsud is attributed to a close collaboration between Pakistani intelligence and the C.I.A.
Most studies which look at the number of casualties caused by drone attacks in Pakistan present extremely conflicting results, with huge disparities between each study in what concerns both the number of militants killed and that of civilian casualties. Perhaps the most reliable study to date on the casualties of the drone attacks is an assessment of the existent assessments made by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann from the New America Foundation. This study was based on several sources such as The New York Times, Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Agence France-Press, CNN, BBC and the Pakistanis Daily Times and The News. Bergman and Tiedemann concluded that, in just over 80 drone attacks in Pakistan, between 600 and 800, or 66 and 68 per cent of those killed were militants. This means that for two militants killed one civilian life is lost.
From a humanitarian perspective, 33 per cent of civilian casualties is a considerably high figure. And while the drones’ invisibility provides an alternative for what would otherwise be an unsustainable military presence, some of the most negative consequences of the drone attacks are also invisible. If counter-terrorism experts find this programme a real asset, some counterinsurgency specialists have been firm in pointing out that it sends the wrong message to the Pakistani people. Today, ordinary Pakistanis have begun to realise, for the worst reasons – such as the fighting in Swat Valley and the intensification of suicide attacks against civilian targets – that the war against militants is indeed their war. This acknowledgement is very important for the legitimacy of Pakistani efforts to crack down on insurgents. Also in this perspective, and bearing in mind that the crucial element in counter-insurgency is the “battle for the hearts and minds” of the local population, the drones are undeniably a source for concern.
Manuel Almeida
