Yemen's situation is complex, and available information is insufficient for making accurate analyses on the conflict. However, this does not imply that simplistic explanations regarding potential political alliances are acceptable. The fact is, political alliances between parties in different countries are not based merely on superficial similarity between two parties. Regarding the special relationship between Iran and the Houthis, one can deduce that the Houthis’ concerns have very little to do with those of Iran's interests in the region. The Houthis would not be fighting if they knew that they were fighting for Iran. Poverty and neglect, more than sectarianism, are the factors that have united people together against the government of Yemen.
In addition, sectarian identity is not necessarily a component of political identity. The fact that the Houthis have a Zaidi leadership does not mean that they have a Zaidi political identity or that they are a sectarian movement. Personal leadership tendencies and priorities do not necessarily represent the preferences and priorities of their tribal communities. Thus, the ideas of Hussein Al-Houthi, or Abd Al-Malik, his brother, do not represent the ideas of all the people fighting with him.
Furthermore, the presence of weapons in the hands of Houthis does not mean that a certain state has provided them with these weapons. In Yemen, medium and heavy weapons are available to any tribe. And, if we take into account the six wars which the Yemeni army fought without success, we can add military defeats as another source of weapons.
The most superficial explanations attribute the conflict to sectarian similarities. That is, the similarities between the Houthis and the Shia of Iran. Yet, in order to understand the events of Saada, we need to go beyond these simplistic explanations and accept that similarity does not mean consensus, coalition or support. We must assume that relations and political alliances are much more complex than we imagine.
One thing is certain, however, the events of Saada are part of a political and security conflict in Yemen. Most of the analyses are made by parties of the conflict. Thus, they will not try to seek accuracy as much as they will try to tell the story from their point of view. The government of Yemen is facing a crisis of legitimacy. Most of the Yemeni opposition parties no longer see reconciliation with the government as a possibility. Instead they demand radical change.
Consequently, in an attempt to solve the legitimacy crisis it is facing, the government has tried to fabricate the Houthis' relationship with Iran to gain international and regional support to help it solve its internal crisis. However, we find that many members of the Yemeni opposition – both in the South and the North of the country, and, recently, Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar – are keen to refute those accusations against the Houthis. Not only they do not want the government to benefit from making such accusations, but they also want to approach the Houthis as an armed force that could serve their political project or individual ambitions.
Some Arabs accuse Iran of involvement as a way of warning Tehran not to interfere. It seems that the message had been conveyed to Iran. Iran's official discourse regarding the events of Saada has changed. This change in discourse has been explained by some as an evidence of Iran's involvement in the Yemeni conflict; however, it is no more than a confirmation from Tehran that it does not have any role in this conflict.
The magnitude of Saada's crisis is a manifestation of the failure of the state. On a related note, the conflict is also a manifestation of the struggle over the future governance of Yemen between President Ali Abdullah Saleh El-Ahmer, Brigadier General Ali Mohsen El-Ahmer, and Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah El-Ahmer.
Thus, understanding the crisis and finding a solution for it starts from Sanaa, goes through Saada, and returns back to Sanaa in the end. Yemen has become a failed state. It is not capable of providing basic services such as security, complete control of its territories, justice, and protection of public funds. The conflict over the future of governance in Yemen is between two parties that are armed well, but their equal strength deters them from entering into a direct confrontation. Instead, they are forced to live in a state of stalemate.
These two factors – the failure of the State and the struggle over power – led to a civil war, immediately after Hussein El-Houthi was arrested several years ago. In this war, heavy weapons, air force, and all the armed forces are being used. Therefore, attempts to understand the magnitude of the crisis based on an analysis of the Houthi forces do not help much. There is no doubt that the Houthis are a strong player in Yemen, but this only explains their holdout in the short-term. It does not explain their long-term capabilities, nor does it explain their vast deployment.
What explains this is the failure of state institutions, which led to public discontent towards the government. Therefore, the tribes have nothing to lose in their fight against the government. Instead, they might be able to achieve several gains, the least of which is the opportunity to express themselves. The power of the Houthis can also be explained as a result of the struggle over governance. This struggle has made the conflicting parties transform Saada into something like a proxy war zone. Each party fights its opponent by involving it in the confrontation against the Houthis. The Yemeni President has managed to involve the forces of Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar in the fight. And Mohsen on his part has managed to involve the President's forces. This creates an opportunity for the Houthis to benefit and expand.
Saada's crisis should be viewed in the context of a unity crisis in Yemen, the crisis of the future of the state of Yemen, and the crisis of security in the Gulf region. More than half of Yemen's population live below poverty line, and the country's levels of unemployment have reached more than 35% percent. Yemen, therefore, does not need a crisis to exhaust its already limited resources. The collapse of Yemen, with its highly dense of population, will lead to further calamity and a real security threat for the Gulf states.
