Security forces use teargas to disperse rallies staged by opponents of Egypt's interim government on the third anniversary of the 2011 revolution. (Mosaab Elshamy/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)[/caption]
The transitional roadmap is already plotting Egypt’s course, but in the mean time a perpetual cycle of violence is throwing obstacles in its path. The heightened insecurity has led many to ask whether the completion of the roadmap will necessarily equate to an end to the violence. The short answer appears to be no.
Despite the overwhelming ratification of the constitution, Muslim Brotherhood protests continue and are likely to last beyond parliamentary and presidential elections. This year, the third anniversary of the January 25 revolution saw security forces use lethal force against protesters; confrontations between police and pro-Mursi demonstrators resulted in at least 49 deaths. The same day, Islamist militants shot down an Egyptian military helicopter in the Sinai Peninsula with a surface-to-air missile, killing five soldiers.
The roadmap announced immediately after Mursi’s ouster stated that the interim government, backed by the military, would oversee a new constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections that would see the safe passage of Egypt to democracy. However, their vision of democracy so far does not appear to be a stable one.
Many of Egypt’s woes are, of course, a hangover from poor governance under Mursi, but the interim government has done little to staunch the bloodshed, and in many instances has aggravated the situation. The Rabaa Al-Adawiya massacre on August 14 last year was the watershed moment, where hundreds of Mursi’s supporters were killed by Egyptian military forces. In response, militant groups in the Sinai, which have long terrorized the peninsula, stepped up their operations against the army. The Islamist militants—who are not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood but are against Mursi’s ouster—are now launching near-daily attacks against the military.
Ordinary Egyptians have also been caught up in the battle between the army and Sinai-based militants. Fears of jihadi-type attacks in more densely populated areas were made reality when twin bombings hit the Nile Delta city of Mansoura in late December. Then four bombs ripped through Cairo on the eve of the anniversary of the revolution, killing six. Yet it is doubtful elections can do anything to stop these militants waging war on the wider population.
At the other end of the spectrum, dozens of secular revolutionaries who have criticized the new government have been arrested, and often detained for several months without charge. Details of their harsh treatment in prison have been revealed through letters they write from their cells. There have been few anti-government protests by the original revolutionaries since Mursi’s ouster, but there is every chance that if this treatment of their comrades continues, it will only be a matter of time before they once again take to the streets in protest. This is likely to lead to more bloodshed if government security forces respond with the same deadly force used against pro-Mursi protests.
So what will end the cycle of violence in Egypt? Reconciliation between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and the current government seems impossible. Eventually the protests will subside, but there is no telling when this may happen. It will not be the completion of the roadmap that will see the end of protests; instead, the threat of lethal military force may thin out opponents.
The proxy war in Sinai is likely to continue, a war that the military-backed government actually benefits from as it extends its mandate to “fight terrorism,” even when those it fights are not terrorists. Most worryingly, this war is no longer confined to the Sinai, but has spread to the rest of Egypt.
There is no clear solution to ending the violence. What is evident is that, instead of attempting to find a solution, the roadmap, in the name of political agendas, has allowed violence to spread unchecked throughout the country.
All views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, The Majalla magazine.
