Sunday’s high-level Syrian-Israeli meeting in Amman, held under US mediation, was an urgent exercise in damage control. Convened days after Israel attacked Abu al-Duhur airbase, it sought to halt further Israeli military operations, prevent Israeli-Turkish tensions from spilling onto Syrian territory and revive negotiations towards a security agreement.
Yet the strike exposed the central weakness of the existing diplomatic channels. Damascus, Israel and the United States had spent the preceding days in intensive contacts intended to resolve the dispute and prevent escalation. Israel attacked anyway. The problem was therefore not a lack of communication, but the absence of effective restraints on Israel’s operations inside Syria.
For now, US-sponsored diplomacy is better equipped to contain the fallout from Israeli strikes than to deliver lasting security. A breakthrough may depend less on another round of talks than on whether Israel’s election produces a government prepared to sign—and abide by—a binding security agreement.
The 18 August strike exposed the limits of Washington’s influence. Israel said it targeted Abu al-Duhur to prevent Türkiye from deploying troops and advanced military systems at the base. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office claimed that Damascus was on the verge of breaching an agreed security “status quo” despite repeated Israeli warnings.
Syria and Türkiye denied planning any permanent Turkish deployment. In the days before the strike, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani reportedly held conversations with Mossad chief Roman Gofman and US envoy Tom Barrack.
Al-Shaibani explained that the runway repairs were intended for the Syrian air force and posed no threat to Israel. Barrack later said US intelligence had not corroborated Israel’s assessment. Israel nevertheless struck before those diplomatic efforts had run their course. Eight strikes damaged the base’s runways and storage facilities but caused no reported casualties.
