Syria cannot build lasting stability in a political vacuum

Stability cannot depend on suppressing every institution capable of organising dissent

Syria cannot build lasting stability in a political vacuum

Debate over Syria’s political future has persisted since the fall of the Assad regime, but the formation of the transitional legislature has brought it into sharper focus. While there is broad agreement that political life must be revived after more than half a century of authoritarian rule, there is far less agreement over when that revival should begin.

The message emerging from the transitional authorities and influential pro-government voices is that political parties will eventually be permitted, but only once Syria is deemed sufficiently stable. This position was recently articulated inside the parliament building by Jamil al-Hassan, a prominent pro-government media figure, who portrayed the formation of parties and political coalitions as a threat to national unity, and was echoed by Nawar Najmeh, a member of the committee that oversaw the formation of parliament, who argued that parties should not be established until Syria has achieved stability, developed a new social contract and reached a sufficient level of political maturity.

These conditions may sound like reasonable safeguards. In practice, however, they could postpone organised political life for years. Supporters of this position also leave several fundamental questions unanswered: What is the cost of waiting? Who will decide when Syria is finally “ready”? And how can political maturity develop while political organisation remains suspended?

The case for delay

The official position is not framed as outright opposition to political parties. President Ahmed al-Sharaa has repeatedly said that Syria’s future political system will include political participation and direct elections. But a growing body of public statements suggests that the transitional authorities want to defer party politics until the final stages of the transition.

That caution reflects both Syria’s recent history and the regional failures the new leadership wants to avoid. The fear is that parties formed too quickly would coalesce not around economic and social programmes, but along sectarian, ethnic, religious, tribal or regional lines. An early opening, in this view, could institutionalise wartime divisions and turn parliament into an arena of entrenched rivalry and paralysis.

Figures close to the authorities have voiced these concerns with increasing bluntness. Speaking inside parliament, pro-government media personality Jamil al-Hassan warned legislators against forming parties and blocs, arguing that they would divide the legislature, obstruct the transition and undermine national unity.

Nawar Najmeh offered a more measured version of the same argument. He said parties should emerge only after constitutional principles and a new social contract are established, society has stabilised, transitional justice has progressed, and political culture has matured.

Conversations with government officials indicate that this position extends beyond media figures and members of electoral bodies. It appears to reflect a wider preference within the transitional leadership, including al-Sharaa’s apparent inclination to delay a new political parties law until the transition is nearing its end.

A growing body of public statements suggests that the transitional authorities want to defer party politics until the final stages of the transition.

A flawed sequence

The concerns behind this argument are not unfounded. Political parties are not inherently democratic or constructive; they can become vehicles for militia influence, foreign funding, sectarian mobilisation or elite capture. The flaw, however, lies in the assumption that stability, political maturity, national unity and a new social contract can all be established before organised political life is allowed to develop.

In reality, each of these goals is inherently political. Transitional justice requires difficult choices about accountability, punishment, reconciliation and compensation. Such decisions cannot be left to the transitional authorities alone. A new social contract can emerge only through genuine negotiation among groups with deep-rooted legitimacy and through a process that builds broad consensus. Stability, meanwhile, depends in part on whether communities have legitimate channels through which to shape decisions and hold those in power to account.

None of this can be achieved in a political vacuum. Political maturity does not precede political practice; it develops through it. By making legal party activity conditional on resolving Syria's deepest disputes, the authorities risk postponing organised political life until after the period in which it is most urgently needed.

No roadmap to unity

Postponing party politics is unlikely to make Syria less divided. The country's fractures are political, social, economic, regional and ideological, as well as sectarian and ethnic. They reflect different experiences of the war, unequal access to power and resources, and competing visions of the state. Delaying parties simply makes these differences less visible, less regulated and less accountable.

The new parliament already proves the point. Candidates were required to run as individuals rather than through parties or formal lists. Yet blocs quickly formed around regional interests, ideological affinities and proximity to the presidency. Political organisation did not disappear. It moved into personal networks, private meetings and messaging groups.

In the absence of parties, politics does not become neutral; it becomes informal. Personal loyalty, tribal affiliation, regional identity, money and access to officials take the place of public programmes, transparent membership and formal accountability. The result is not unity, but opaque competition.

Nor has the government offered a credible alternative for building consensus. Throughout the transition, it has repeatedly prioritised speed over inclusion. The national dialogue conference, consultations on the constitutional declaration and the formation of parliament all moved forward without producing the broad consensus needed to sustain the transition. If this approach continues, Syria's divisions are more likely to deepen than recede.

Political parties are not rewards granted after stability is achieved. They are institutions through which stability is built.

Fragmentation favours power

The debate also obscures who benefits from postponing political life. The strongest organised force gains precisely because everyone else remains fragmented. This imbalance is especially consequential in parliament. Figures aligned with the transitional authorities already possess influence, political networks and the means to build coalitions and shape votes. Independent MPs do not. If legislators remain isolated, their ability to scrutinise legislation, demand information, question ministers or press for institutional reform will be severely limited. Effective oversight requires coordination, as do legislative amendments, public hearings and investigations.

A parliament without political blocs or strong coalitions is therefore not necessarily more united. It is simply easier to dominate. Rather than functioning as an independent institution, it risks becoming a collection of individual legislators negotiating separately with those in power.

The government's preferred timeline is also impossible to measure. When is political culture sufficiently mature? What would count as the completion of transitional justice? Who decides when stability has been achieved, or a new social contract finalised?

These are contested processes that could take years, if not decades. Making party formation conditional on their completion creates an open-ended veto over political rights. It also allows those already in power to decide when their potential competitors may begin to organise.

Regulate, don't postpone

The alternative is not an immediate, unregulated rush into elections. Syria does not need hundreds of paper parties, sectarian franchises or organisations backed by armed wings. It needs a regulated political opening that begins now and develops alongside state-building.

Political parties are not rewards granted after stability is achieved. They are institutions through which stability is built. They turn grievances into programmes, aggregate interests and create channels for negotiation across regions and communities. They also make political actors more visible. Citizens can see who belongs to a party, how it is financed, what it stands for and whether its leaders can be held accountable. Informal networks offer none of that transparency.

Without credible political alternatives, tribal, sectarian, ethnic and regional identities will remain the easiest vehicles for mobilisation. If the authorities want politics to move beyond communal affiliation, they must allow Syrians to organise around ideas, interests and policy.

Besides, political parties cannot be built overnight. They need years to recruit members, develop platforms, establish local branches and learn how to negotiate and compromise. They cannot be legalised shortly before elections and expected to compete fairly with figures who already enjoy access to the state, public visibility and established networks.

Syria cannot wait until authorities deem it ready for pluralism. It needs political institutions that will help make pluralism possible.

Delay is therefore not neutral. Every year without legal political organisation strengthens those already in power and weakens potential alternatives. By the time parties are finally permitted, the field may be so unequal that legalisation changes little.

Pluralism cannot wait

Syria cannot afford uncontrolled fragmentation. But unity cannot require silence, and stability cannot depend on suppressing every institution capable of organising dissent. A successful transition does not eliminate political conflict; it gives competing interests peaceful and legitimate ways to confront one another.

Opening political life will inevitably create friction. Some parties will be weak, poorly led or opportunistic. Coalitions will form and collapse. Parliament may become noisier, and decision-making slower. But these are not signs of failure. They are the normal costs of building a system that manages disagreement through negotiation rather than coercion.

The real choice is not between national unity and political parties. It is between transparent competition governed by common rules and opaque competition dominated by those already closest to power. Syria cannot wait until authorities deem it ready for pluralism. It needs political institutions that will help make pluralism possible. Building them is not a reward to be granted after a successful transition; it is one of the conditions for achieving one.

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