Some transformations overtake states without ever being formally declared. Often, this is not for reasons of secrecy. Rather, the state gets so absorbed in carrying out the change that it leaves no time to understand it, still less to explain it. Laws change, money moves, and institutions are reconstituted, but public discourse remains at the doorway, unaware of transformation within.
Jordan is living through precisely such a period. The state is moving from one model to another and gradually revising elements of its long-standing philosophy of economics, politics and public administration, but Jordanians are largely unaware of what is ending in their country and what is beginning.
The problem is scarcely a lack of plans; not only do they exist, but they are dense with detail. In January, the government of Jafar Hassan launched its executive programme for 2026-29, encompassing 392 projects and assigning a substantial role to partnerships with the private sector as part of a wider programme of modernisation. This is far more than a conventional government plan; it is an ambitious attempt to redesign the state, redefine its functions, and reshape its relationship with the economy and society.
Importance of understanding
Yet statistics, however accurate, cannot tell the whole story; tables cannot explain why all this is happening, and data cannot tell Jordanians where they stand, who will bear the cost of transition, or who will reap its rewards. Whether any of these projects will reflect in their salaries, villages, schools, or jobs is unclear to them.
Jordan’s old model was clear, even in its shortcomings. The central state was the country’s largest employer, its principal investor, and the main distributor of jobs, services, and rewards. Relations with it usually passed through public employment, the tribe, the member of parliament, and wasta (the networks of personal influence and mediation). These were deeply embedded features of the system, woven into the way it managed society and maintained its internal balances.
That model cannot continue. The public sector cannot absorb the same numbers, the state cannot sustain the old networks of welfare and patronage, and the economy cannot wait for big decisions to be delayed much longer. Whether by design or dictation, Jordan is moving towards a model in which the state acts as regulator, catalyst, and partner to the private sector, not as an employer to all.
