Why Syria is arresting more Assad-era figures

The third group carries even greater symbolic weight. These are men accused of involvement in some of the Assad era's most notorious crimes, from chemical attacks and massacres to assassinations and systematic abuses against civilians. Among them are Adnan Abboud Halweh, accused of responsibility for the 2013 Ghouta chemical attack, and Amjad Yousef, linked to the Tadamon massacre.

Several drivers

The arrests appear to be driven by several factors, beginning with mounting public pressure. Since the fall of the Assad regime, local communities have demanded that those responsible for crimes be identified and brought before the courts.

That demand is not abstract. It comes from communities that lived under siege, families who lost relatives in detention, and survivors who know the names of those who tortured, informed, issued orders, or profited from repression. Delaying efforts to address these demands would not only weaken the legitimacy of any post-Assad order but also continue to fuel revenge killings, hate speech, and intercommunal tensions. At the same time, the arrests allow the authorities to manage public anger, even as the harder work of building a credible transitional justice framework continues to move slowly.

Security is another important driver. Former regime networks have not simply disappeared. Some figures still retain weapons, money, local influence, and links to outside actors. That creates a risk that they could exploit fragile security conditions and deteriorating living standards, especially in areas where the new state's authority remains uneven.

For the transitional authorities, pursuing former officers and security officials is therefore not only a matter of accountability. It is also a way to prevent old networks from destabilising the transition, project stability, and show Syrians and potential investors that the state can prevent spoilers from derailing the transition.

The justice test

These arrests may bring several immediate political gains. But on their own, they are not justice. Accountability cannot be reduced to a series of security operations. Syria does need to pursue those responsible for atrocities, but the credibility of that effort will depend on how it is carried out and what comes next.

Such a campaign must be grounded in institutions and credible legal processes, not left to security discretion. People need to know who is being pursued and why. Arrests should be accompanied by transparent investigations, an impartial judiciary, independent civilian oversight, safeguards against abuse, and public communication that informs people without prejudicing trials before they begin.

They also need to form part of a broader transitional justice framework capable of addressing the scale of violations committed over more than a decade. Without that, arrests may satisfy the demand for action, but they will not build confidence in the rule of law.

The stakes go far beyond the fate of former officials. This campaign will help define the character of the new Syria. A transition built on law must show that even those accused of destroying the law are subject to it, not placed outside it. That is not a concession to the former regime. It is the only real break from it.