Why might-is-right mentalities prevail in our region

Absent fair political solutions, recourse through arms remains, for many, a preferred means of addressing unresolved dilemmas

Why might-is-right mentalities prevail in our region

Can a meaningful connection be drawn, without artifice or contrivance, between the rising tensions in Yemen among factions that claim alignment against the Houthis and the intermittent fighting in Syria between the Syrian Democratic Forces and units of the Syrian army? Is there a deeper similarity between the protracted war in Sudan and the political deadlock in Libya, where the divide between east and west has hardened into a durable and self-sustaining rift?

This is the picture at year’s end across the Arab world. On one hand, notable progress has been made in the search for stable positions within emerging global power dynamics, alongside economic transformations in many countries that are shifting from consumption towards investment. On the other hand, a paralysing stasis has settled over long-standing crises, most notably the unresolved question of the nation state, its legitimacy, and its ability to represent what are now familiar sectarian, ethnic, and regional components.

The Iraqi and Lebanese models of consociational democracy, a system of power sharing among components that has evolved into forms of semi-autonomous rule operating beyond the reach of accountability, justice, and citizenship, and that prioritises signature identity, as the late researcher Elias Harik describes it, over national identity, have proved neither effective nor equitable in the distribution of power.

These arrangements elevate the individual's status as a member of a group with real or imagined distinguishing characteristics above belonging to a state governed by a constitution, laws, and regulations that bind all individuals and groups, regardless of their particularities.

Those who call for national unity appear incapable of engaging effectively unless powerful regional actors intervene

Unsuccessful models

Neither model proved successful nor equitable in distributing power among the groups. Some of these groups resorted to arms and violence under various pretexts, such as confronting the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq or resisting Israel in Lebanon, to seize control of the state in its entirety and subordinate it to their domestic and regional projects. This trajectory led to deep political crises in both countries.

As for those who call for unity and the centralisation of the state, they too appear incapable of engaging effectively and on equal terms with the components unless powerful regional actors intervene through costly and complex mediation. This has been evident in recent months in both Yemen and Sudan.

For proponents of centralised authority, the only exits from civil war and fragmentation are temporary, short-term solutions that conceal a persistent refusal to confront the depth of communal fractures and the repeated failure of projects of unity and centralised governance.

While federalist trends are evident in Iraq, where the Kurdistan Region has become an undeniable reality despite persistent disputes over budgets and contested territories such as Kirkuk, and the recurring crises that follow each parliamentary election over the formation of a government reflecting the so called balances, or more bluntly, the limits of both Iranian and American influence, Lebanon appears to be moving towards a form of undeclared federalism. There, Israel's war in the south and parts of the Bekaa Valley coexist with a thriving tourism sector, relative security in Mount Lebanon and the north, and a city open to all in the capital, Beirut. These three forms of authority are all awaiting something that remains undefined and unclear to the majority of Lebanese.

The issues of the state, legitimacy, governance, mandate, representation, and political participation have made little substantive progress

Unresolved dilemmas

Is this moment contingent on the end of Israel's war, the return of the displaced to their destroyed villages, and the reconstruction of those areas? Or does it depend on the economic and financial reforms demanded by international institutions as a condition for assistance to rehabilitate Lebanon's collapsing infrastructure and restore the role of a banking sector that played a disastrous part in the country's 2019 collapse? All of this unfolds amid a host of unresolved dilemmas concerning how each group conceives its role in Lebanon's present and future.

Perhaps what has unfolded in Aleppo and Hadramout over recent days and weeks stands as a final reminder, as the year draws to a close, that the issue of the state, legitimacy, governance, mandate, representation, political participation, and the recognition of diverse identities and cultural rights have seen little substantive progress. It also underscores that recourse through arms remains, for many, a preferred means of addressing these unresolved dilemmas, and that the outside world is not always a dependable friend or ally.

All of this proceeds on the assumption that the state, as a framework for political community, remains viable. That premise itself demands serious and sustained scrutiny.

**This article is a direct translation of the author's original**

font change