Culture takes over from the law after Muslim Brotherhood ban

It sought to convey to the West exactly what it wanted to hear, such as emphasising its participation in electoral processes and in peaceful change. The religious theorising advanced by figures such as al-Qaradawi forbid attacks on Western targets and issued legal opinions permitting political participation. This went hand-in-hand with a change to its earlier rhetoric on the sovereignty of God and on societies labelled as ignorant, as it had been in the era of Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian political theorist and revolutionary who was a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Qaradawi's 2004 book Our Islamic Discourse in the Age of Globalisation argued against describing the West as 'infidel'. Instead, it suggested using the phrase "those who are not Muslims" instead. Likewise, he promoted the concept of citizenship as an alternative to the traditional legal covenant of protection in dealing with Copts in Egypt.

Al-Awa, for his part, declared an end to the traditional legal view of territories as being those of 'Islam' or 'unbelief'. In his 2006 book For Religion and Homeland, he argued that this era had passed. Similarly, several Brotherhood leaders declared that there is no worldly punishment for homosexuals in Islamic law. To this end, some used the slogan: 'Do not wrong homosexuals.'

An Arab focus

All of this was part of the movement's 20-year adjustment, so that it would be directed solely towards fomenting revolutions within the Arab region. Once it failed in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolutions in 2012, many of its members fled abroad and the Brotherhood ceased all activity that might disturb their host states, including open opposition to those states' policies.

Today, Brotherhood policy could be summarised as an effort to seize power exclusively within the Arab region, including through terrorism and incitement, while remaining compliant in its dealings with surrounding states. The movement maintains layers of discourse, yet its extremist ideology remains entrenched at the core. It pragmatically gives its discourse a liberal programme, but lacks the tools needed to understand the nation-state system, which is fundamentally at odds with its ideology. In this, it resembles the secret societies of past centuries.

Early signs are that the Brotherhood is bowing to Washington's decision, but its focus will remain on the Arab world. For decades, it has worked to distort Arab culture with a set of judgements that attack homelands and states, undermining any sense of belonging that is not to the movement, whose mindset is still that of a cross-border militia. To counter this requires not only a legal pursuit but a cultural and academic pursuit, to track the changes in the Brotherhood's process of adaptation and survival.

The movement has become skilled at navigating the law, such as by changing the banners under which it operates, and by blurring the line between religion and organisation. The role of culture lies in replacing the concepts that the movement seeks to inject and in systematically tracing the policies it conceals. Increasingly, it does so online, where the focus has moved towards creating a social base, rather than reactivating the organisational structure. In short, the chameleon is once again changing its colours and patterns.