Lebanon's inability to confront Hezbollah speaks to its structural failure

Meanwhile, diplomatic engagements with regional and Western powers, including Iran, have thus far yielded no results. For Tehran, whose strategic posture is deeply invested in Hezbollah's arsenal, the retention of arms remains non-negotiable. Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader, recently declared that "Hezbollah's weapons are more vital to the Lebanese than bread and water". Iran continues to insist that its allies retain their arms, perhaps in anticipation of future hostilities.

There appears to be no way out without a fundamental shift in Arab and Western approaches—one that acknowledges the structural failure of the Lebanese state, its refusal to confront crises, and its open and covert complicity with those who created and perpetuate them.

Leniency over rearmament

Turning again to the domestic scene, the Lebanese authorities are not only lenient on Hezbollah's rearmament—they also face serious accusations of intentionally obstructing economic reforms that could rescue the country from the collapse inflicted by its ruling elite since 2019. Such reforms would inevitably require political change. Observers argue that Lebanon's true power brokers—unchanged in name or nature—refuse to implement the reforms required by international and regional actors as a condition for electing Joseph Aoun as president.

This collusion appears to have angered the US and encouraged Israel to go for the military option. It must also be said that the economic crisis has been exploited and used as a lever to keep the very forces that drove the country into economic collapse and the latest Israeli war firmly entrenched in power.

New framework needed

As Lebanon prepares for parliamentary elections in May—the first since the 2024 war and the second since the financial implosion—intense competition is expected for at least one seat designated for the Shiite community. Challengers are hoping to break the long-standing monopoly of the "Shiite duo" of Amal and Hezbollah, which has endured since Lebanon's first post-civil war elections in 1992.

Yet even if this seat is lost, the broader political architecture would remain unchanged. Real power remains concentrated in the hands of a political class —mainly the Shiite parties and their allies—that continues to profit from Lebanon's crises and has little incentive to pursue meaningful resolution.

In this bleak context, there is little hope of an off-ramp without a new Arab and Western framework—one that directly addresses Lebanon's systemic dysfunction and the complicity of its leadership in perpetuating decline. While international trusteeship under Chapter VII of the UN Charter appears politically unattainable, the alternative to a robust international response may well be a deepening descent into war, lawlessness, and endemic corruption.