West Bank annexation could upend the region

Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel remains a cornerstone of regional stability. It has survived two intifadas and recurrent Gaza conflicts, but annexation would push it to the brink

West Bank annexation could upend the region

When King Abdullah II told the BBC in mid-October that the Middle East is “doomed” without a credible peace process and a Palestinian state, it was more than rhetoric—it was a warning, and a deeply personal one. For Jordan—a country that has been both the custodian and casualty of every failed peace effort for three generations—the prospect of complete Israeli annexation of the West Bank is an existential threat.

That warning now feels eerily prescient. Just days after the interview aired, Israel’s parliament advanced a bill to annex large parts of the occupied West Bank, drawing immediate international condemnation and fuelling fears of a regional crisis. The measure—backed by far-right ministers including Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich but opposed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Likud party—would apply Israeli civil law to territory long recognised as occupied under international law, effectively formalising annexation.

Seismic consequences

The vote is the first of four required to pass the legislation. If that occurs, the consequences for Jordan could be seismic. Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel, signed by King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin, remains a cornerstone of regional stability. It has survived two intifadas, wars in Iraq and Syria, and recurrent Gaza conflicts. But annexation would push it to the brink.

In Amman, officials describe the treaty as “interlocked” with Jordan’s relationship with Washington. Any rift, therefore, risks jeopardising the country’s financial and military lifelines—more than $2bn in annual US assistance and privileged access to US defence cooperation.

Since Israel’s war on Gaza began two years ago, anti-Israel protests have been a fixture in Amman and other cities. But the government’s verbal outspokenness and its withdrawal of its ambassador from Tel Aviv have done little to calm the anger on the street—especially in light of its quiet security cooperation with Israel.

If formal annexation proceeds, King Abdullah will face overwhelming pressure to suspend or abrogate the treaty. Any change to the treaty would mark the lowest point in bilateral relations since 1994 and likely trigger a reciprocal diplomatic downgrade by Egypt.

If formal annexation proceeds, Jordan—and possibly Egypt as well—could come under pressure to walk back their peace treaties with Israel

Demographic anxiety and economic strain

For Amman, the most alarming prospect is not the diplomatic fallout but the demographic one. Annexation would almost certainly accelerate Palestinian displacement from the West Bank into Jordan, whether in large waves or steady trickles—a scenario that strikes at the heart of Jordan's anxieties. Of its 11.6 million people, an estimated 60% are of Palestinian origin. Apart from that, it hosts 2.39 million registered Palestinian refugees, alongside large refugee communities from Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Another influx from the West Bank, where 3.4 million Palestinians currently reside, would upend the delicate demographic balance between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians.

Amman's security establishment has long feared the Israeli right's argument that "Jordan is Palestine." What once seemed rhetorical now feels dangerously plausible. Should Israel formalise annexation, Jordan could find itself forced to absorb yet another displaced population—one with no realistic prospect of return—fundamentally altering its social fabric.

The economic implications would also be dire. Jordan's economy is already under severe strain. Unemployment stands at 21% overall and nearly 46% among youth, while public debt exceeds 116% of GDP. The US remains Jordan's largest donor, but assistance under the 2022 memorandum of understanding is not guaranteed. President Trump's willingness to use aid as leverage—most recently demonstrated by suspending funding to UNRWA— has left Amman acutely aware of its dependency.

Without substantial external aid, a refugee surge would overwhelm Jordan's already strained infrastructure, drive up prices and exacerbate unemployment. And it remains unclear if the Gulf states—once reliable sources of support—will be willing or able to contribute funds to offset these challenges.

The economic implications of a Palestinian refugee surge into Jordan would also be dire, as its economy is already under severe strain

Defensive response

In the short term, Jordan's likely response to annexation would be defensive: reinforcing its borders along the Jordan Valley, declaring annexation an act of war, and calling for urgent US mediation.

For its part, Washington would face a dilemma—balancing its strategic partnership with Jordan against domestic political pressures to support Israel. But in light of Washington's failure to warn Doha before Israel's strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar last month, US promises may not be enough to reassure King Abdullah of its support. 

For the moment, Washington appears attuned to the risks. In the wake of the Knesset vote, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that annexation would be "counterproductive" and threaten the Gaza ceasefire deal.

The absence of a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood poses a direct threat to Jordan's internal stability and, by extension, to the fragile regional order that has endured since the Oslo Accords. With rare alignment among Arab, Islamic, and European actors around a two-state solution, a narrow but genuine window for diplomacy has opened, and the door of the White House is, for now, ajar. Resolving this is now time-sensitive.

font change