"What happened in Syria has, in reality, surpassed the killing and destruction left by the hordes of Hulagu in the Levant (the Mongol conqueror of Syria during the 13th Century). Hulagu was more merciful than this modern era." With these words, former Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa describes the reign of his former boss, Bashar al-Assad, in the second volume of his memoirs, released recently by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies in Doha.
Not originally meant for publication during his lifetime, given that their author resides in Damascus, they were suddenly approved after the dramatic fall of the Syrian regime on 8 December 2024. Al-Sharaa completed them in 2019, and they came exactly ten years after the release of the first volume, entitled The Missing Narrative, which al-Sharaa completed in 2010, months before the outbreak of the Syrian revolution.
While the first part covered his early childhood, youth, and long years of service under Hafez al-Assad, the second volume comes to fill in the gaps and complete what was left untold in The Missing Narrative, focusing on the Bashar al-Assad era, where Farouk al-Sharaa served first as foreign minister in 2000-2005, and then as vice president until 2014. They are the first memoirs by a Syrian official since the fall of the regime, and will soon be complemented by the memoirs of Sharaa's predecessor, Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam, who defected in 2005 and died in his Paris exile in 2020.
Al-Sharaa begins his recollections of Bashar since the young Assad's return from London after the sudden death of his elder brother Basil, who was killed in a car accident on 21 January 1994. Preparations began, almost overnight, for him to become the new heir apparent for Hafez al-Assad, who had been in power since 1970. He was gradually assigned specific political tasks, particularly in Lebanon, with an army promotion to the rank of "colonel."
Al-Sharaa says that Bashar’s power-hungry attitude started showing from Day One: "He measured loyalty by whether higher-ranking officers would walk beside or behind him—never in front of him, no matter their rank. Once, Major General Ibrahim Safi, commander of one of the most prominent military divisions, complained to me that Bashar would step ahead of him and walk in front during his visits to Lebanon."
When Hafez al-Assad died on 10 June 2000, Bashar was promoted directly from "colonel" to "general," skipping the ranks of brigadier, major general, and lieutenant general.
The Damascus Spring
The first encounter between al-Sharaa and Bashar had been at the former's house, at Bashar's request, before his father’s death. Following the Ninth Regional Congress of the ruling Baath Party in the summer of 2000, Assistant Regional Secretary Abdullah al-Ahmar asked al-Sharaa to deliver something akin to an oath of allegiance to Bashar during his speech. Al-Sharaa refused, however, and commented in his memoirs: "I improvised a speech praising the late president because I found no justification for praising Bashar—he had no record yet, unlike his father, whether in the party, the state, or the military."
It seems that the new 34-year-old president noticed this minor detail and never forgave him. A deep-seated resentment toward al-Sharaa took hold of Bashar, lasting until his very last day in power and surfacing at every juncture, whether in minor or major events. The main reason for this, says al-Sharaa, was that he often opposed Bashar on several matters, starting with the president's decision to shut down the intellectual and cultural forums that flourished at the beginning of his rule, popularly known as the Damascus Spring. Tackling bold and sensitive issues, al-Assad had them shut down and ordered the arrest of their organisers and speakers, including the well-known industrialist and former Damascus MP Riad Seif.
I expressed my surprise to the president regarding the order to arrest this man, who had done nothing worthy of accountability except hosting people in his home, with the full knowledge of the authorities and the security services. The president replied: 'It’s not about what was said in rooms open to everyone, but what was said behind closed doors or on their phones. They should know that every word is recorded.' Due to my insistence on knowing the real reason for the arrest, al-Assad deliberately informed me that they had been using sectarian language.
Extending Émile Lahoud’s term
Al-Sharaa discusses the Damascus Spring, albeit briefly, specifically mentioning the shutdown of Al-Domari newspaper, published by the internationally renowned cartoonist Ali Ferzat. He then moves on to regional issues such as the Arab Peace Initiative of the 2002 Arab Summit in Beirut, the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, and the extension of Lebanese President Émile Lahoud’s term in 2004. He says Bashar was determined to extend Lahoud’s term, despite al-Sharaa and others advising him not to. They all said this would provoke the French, Americans, and the Saudis, not to mention widespread opposition among Lebanese, including Syrian allies like Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.
Al-Sharaa presented the president with a list of alternative names to Lahoud, including MPs Nassib Lahoud, Jean Obeid, or even Suleiman Frangieh, leader of the Marada Movement, who recently re-entered the Lebanese presidential race with Hezbollah’s endorsement but withdrew in favour of current President Joseph Aoun.
I proposed Suleiman Frangieh as an alternative, telling al-Assad that he was a personal friend of his, known for his love of Syria. He replied: 'That’s true, but he’s still too young.' Noticing my surprise—since they were close in age—he added: 'I meant politically.'
Like his father, Bashar al-Assad took advice from nobody and often did the opposite of what sensible people were telling him. Al-Sharaa recalls how Bashar first nominated Lahoud for the Lebanese presidency back in 1998, also managing to convince his ageing father to endorse the nomination, thus making Lahoud the successor to then-President Elias Hrawi.
Al-Sharaa and Khaddam travelled to Paris and met French President Jacques Chirac at the Élysée Palace, who handed them a small piece of paper with names he deemed suitable for Lebanon’s presidency. Lahoud’s name was at the top.
Upon returning to Damascus, they met with Prime Minister Rafic Hariri at Khaddam’s residence, who had opposed Lahoud from the start. He asked: "Couldn’t you find anyone but Lahoud?" Al-Sharaa replied: "President Chirac, your friend, put his name at the top of the list." Hariri responded: "I was the one who asked Chirac to put his name first because I was certain President Hafez al-Assad wouldn’t choose him for that very reason."
Relations with Hariri
Regarding Rafic Hariri, al-Sharaa recounts their first meeting in 1986 in a modest state-leased apartment in Damascus, two years after he was appointed foreign minister. Upon seeing the simple furnishings, Hariri remarked: "This is not fitting for Syria’s foreign minister." Al-Sharaa writes: "As if hinting that he would contribute to changing the residence or refurbishing it, I later heard he had done so for several senior Syrian officials. He wasn’t convinced I was comfortable there, but I ignored his hints of assistance."
Al-Sharaa praises Hariri extensively for his wisdom, humanity, investment in Lebanese education, and generosity. When al-Sharaa underwent surgery at the American University of Beirut Hospital in 1999, Hariri offered to cover his convalescence in Paris, but al-Sharaa declined, preferring to recover in Damascus. They remained on friendly terms, visiting each other whenever al-Sharaa was in Beirut or Hariri in Damascus, until Hariri’s assassination on 14 February 2005.
That day, al-Sharaa hosted a lunch at the Nobles Restaurant in the Damascus International Fairgrounds, honouring Miguel Moratinos, the outgoing EU envoy for the Middle East peace process. An aide came up and handed him a note: a massive explosion had occurred in Beirut, possibly targeting Hariri’s motorcade.
"I called President Bashar on my mobile as we left the restaurant to ask if he would send someone to Beirut or issue a condolence message. Bashar asked: 'Should the message be protocol or political?' I insisted it be political because the target of this assassination was Syria and Lebanon."
Soon after, accusations of killing Hariri were directed at Syria’s security apparatus in Lebanon and Bashar al-Assad personally, prompting the Syrian regime to first ignore the event, and then to treat it with scorn and disdain.
Al-Sharaa was surprised to see Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam among the mourners at Hariri's funeral. Al-Assad denied any knowledge of Khaddam's travel and refused to authorise him to offer condolences to the Hariri family in his name, or that of Syria.
Ghazi Kanaan's 'suicide'
Events escalated with the internationalisation of Hariri’s case, mounting accusations against al-Assad, and the Syrian army’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, in compliance with UN Resolution 1559. German investigator Detlev Mehlis arrived in the region, demanding to interrogate several high-ranking Syrian security figures, including Major General Bahjat Suleiman (head of internal security), Brigadier General Rustum Ghazaleh, and Major General Ghazi Kanaan—Syria’s longtime intelligence chief in Lebanon, who had become interior minister. Kanaan had 'committed suicide' after his interrogation on 11 October 2005.
Though Kanaan was accused of involvement in Hariri’s killing, despite their deep friendship, al-Sharaa met with him before his death at Bashar’s request. Kanaan insisted they meet outside the interior ministry, fearing his office was bugged. Al-Sharaa reported the conversation to al-Assad and would later ask if Kanaan's death was truly suicidal or deliberate murder. Here, al-Sharaa reveals a small detail:
The president immediately picked up the phone and spoke to his office director, Abu Salim Daaboul, saying: 'Abu Mudar is sitting next to me.' He asked Daaboul to read Kanaan’s final letter to him. Daaboul read the message aloud as the president put the phone on speaker. Kanaan had pleaded with the president to care for his family and children, and his letter was filled with praise and gratitude.
This was the official narrative promoted by al-Assad and his aides. Another version came from Assef Shawkat (al-Assad’s brother-in-law), which was, in al-Sharaa's own words, "more detailed and graphic." Shawkat claimed he had a 9 a.m. appointment with Kanaan on the day of his suicide, but Kanaan arrived at the ministry around 8 a.m., then left for home, calling to say he might be slightly late. "Perhaps Kanaan brought the gun he used to kill himself, since he no longer carried one after becoming minister," said Shawkat.
The promised meeting with Ehud Olmert
Al-Sharaa touches on Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s efforts to broker peace between Syria and Israel, arranging a meeting between al-Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. The opportunity arose during the Union for the Mediterranean summit in Paris in July 2008, attended by al-Assad, Olmert, and numerous heads of state.
Al-Sharaa writes: "Al-Assad told me that the Syrian people would support any peace formula he personally approved without scrutiny." This, of course, confirms that Bashar al-Assad viewed the Syrian people with disdain, believing they were ignorant, politically disengaged, and incapable of critical thought.
Al-Sharaa reminded al-Assad that his father never ignored "even the opinion of a doorman outside his office," but Bashar replied that if he did, he wouldn’t be surprised if one of his guards shot him. "Fortunately or not", wrote al-Sharaa, "that promised meeting never happened, likely due to Olmert’s hesitation and fear of Israel’s security and military establishments."
On the Arab Spring
In the final chapter, al-Sharaa discusses the Arab Spring, which began in Tunisia in late 2010, quickly spreading to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and finally Syria in March 2011. He mentions al-Assad’s infamous interview with The Wall Street Journal on 31 January 2011, where Bashar said: "Syria is not Tunisia or Egypt." Al-Sharaa was baffled by this disavowal of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, explaining that Bashar hated Mubarak for addressing him as "my son Bashar"—since Mubarak was two years older than Hafez al-Assad.
"It took me years to realise how deeply narcissistic the young al-Assad really was. The hundreds of photos and slogans plastered on every wall and pole—placing him above all else—were just a small example of how he thought. He never ordered their removal, as if their permanence was the goal, not Syria’s future."
On the Syrian Revolution
Al-Sharaa claims he repeatedly urged al-Assad to implement serious, radical reforms: fighting corruption, releasing detainees, allowing political parties, and lifting emergency law—steps toward what he calls a pluralistic, democratic state. Then came the arrest of the children of Daraa, al-Sharaa’s hometown, who were detained in the Palestine Branch military prison (reserved for suspected spies and traitors) for writing on their school walls: "Your turn is coming, Doctor."
This infamous incident sparked the Syrian Revolution and al-Sharaa’s testimony on the event ran as follows: "Reports claimed some children had their nails pulled out during torture, but Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, head of the National Security Bureau, who handed the students back to their families, told me he saw no evidence of this."
Massive, peaceful protests erupted nationwide, initially demanding reforms before shifting to calls for "the fall of the regime." In Daraa, a statue of Hafez al-Assad was destroyed, and Bashar convened an urgent meeting with his party and political team, which al-Sharaa describes as follows:
His distress was centred clearly on the damage to his image in Daraa. In a trembling voice, Bashar said: 'I only care about the attack on President Hafez al-Assad’s statue, not my personal image,' turning to his right as if directing his suppressed anger at Assistant Regional Secretary of the Baath Party, Mohammed Said Bekheitan.
Bekheitan understood the message and tried to calm him: "Mr. President, everything will return to normal ... the statue, the photos." Al-Assad never questioned why there were so many images of him and his family, or why countless statues existed—symbols many saw as provocative, representing tyranny and dictatorship. Al-Shara concludes that al-Assad likely saw them as essential to the regime’s psychological dominance.
Nonetheless, al-Assad promised reforms, prompting al-Sharaa to famously tell journalists that "good news was coming" in the head of the presidential address. But Bashar never uttered anything promising or good, abiding by the classic regime argument that the peaceful demonstrators were nothing but "armed terrorist gangs," infiltrators, and protesters paid in dollars, refusing, even for a moment, to acknowledge his mistakes or that these protesters were Syrians with dignity and constitutional rights.
The National Dialogue Conference
In July 2011, al-Assad formed a National Dialogue Committee chaired by Farouk al-Sharaa, inviting 213 figures to a political discussion at the Sahara Resort on the outskirts of Damascus. Only 187 attended, with 26 declining—including prominent opposition figures like Burhan Ghalioun, Samir Aita, and Haitham al-Maleh (whose brother at the time was in Assad's jails).
Al-Sharaa writes: "I knew beforehand that exiled opposition figures wouldn’t attend, as their names were still on Syria’s travel ban list. I circulated a memo to all embassies to resolve this and issue them passports. But this never happened, and when I asked al-Assad for an explanation, I only got: 'There are security files (wanted lists) for over 300,000 citizens—they can’t be processed that quickly.'"
Al-Assad seemed very unenthusiastic about the National Dialogue, only agreeing to it under pressure and to deceive the international community. He had already made up his mind to go for a full security crackdown, and calling the army to crush the uprising, at any cost.
As the conference neared, his reluctance towards a political solution turned to hostility. The first red flag for al-Sharaa was the president's refusal to allow live TV coverage of the sessions. When the vice-president argued it would be in the national interest for the public to witness the dialogue, al-Assad reluctantly agreed, conditioning that only the opening session would be broadcast live. Then the cameras were abruptly turned off, prompting al-Sharaa to comment: "People didn’t realise it was the president who ordered it—only he had that authority."
Article 8 of the Constitution
A major debate erupted over Article 8 of the constitution, drafted by Hafez al-Assad in 1973 and which remained in place until 2012. This controversial article stated that the Baath Party was "the leader of the state and society." Most Syrians wanted it abolished, but al-Assad fiercely clung to it.
Al-Sharaa recalls: "The president called me, insisting I must not allow Article 8 to be discussed at the National Dialogue. I replied: 'I can’t stop it—this is a conference, and it governs itself like all conferences.'"
Later, Safwan Qudsi, a Dialogue Committee member, called him to say that the president had ordered him to block any discussion of Article 8 at the conference.
Coinciding with the opening session, US ambassador Robert Ford paid a sudden visit to the city of Hama, unintentionally giving al-Assad the perfect pretext to sabotage any potential outcomes. He sent tanks to Hama to intimidate peaceful protesters who had welcomed Ford with open arms.
Al-Sharaa praised the demonstration, but al-Assad snapped: "They welcomed the American ambassador with flowers." To this, al-Sharaa asked if the hundreds of thousands carrying flowers were all from Hama. Al-Assad retorted: "Who said there were hundreds of thousands? It was no more than 80,000." This remark is telling—al-Assad downplayed the numbers and labelled them all as American agents.
He then orchestrated disruptions to undermine the conference, sending buses of shabiha (regime thugs) to protest outside the American and French embassies on 11 July. He also arrested 1,600 people from Damascus’ Midan neighbourhood and directed party figures to attack the conference—including some who attended it without objecting to its outcomes, like the heads of the Peasants’ Union and the Syrian Students’ Union.
Isolation and retirement
Although al-Sharaa would remain in office until the end of al-Assad’s second term in 2014, he chose to quietly withdraw, refusing to attend meetings or engage in official duties. His last public act was attending the funeral of Syrian officials killed in the 18 July 2012 "Crisis Cell Bombing," including Defence Minister Dawoud Rajha, Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, and Major General Assef Shawkat.
"After that, my office was shut down, and most of my staff—even janitors—were dismissed. A few were transferred to other ministries. Messages were sent to anyone connected to me in the state, forbidding visits or contact. Officially, my resignation was never announced, leaving it to Arab and foreign media speculation, sometimes calling me a defector, other times under house arrest or foreign protection."
My final assessment of Assad
Al-Sharaa writes: "Drowning in self-love, the president refused to hear anything but words of praise. He had psychopathic tendencies—a complete lack of empathy, no fear of consequences, no remorse for mistakes, and no reaction to people’s suffering or even the concerns of those around him. At first glance, these traits might seem like strength or courage, but it was courage utterly devoid of wisdom." In conclusion, Syria’s former vice president says Bashar al-Assad dreamed of 'turning the republic into a kingdom' as his term neared its end: the al-Assad Arab Kingdom."
