In a move that has largely gone unnoticed, US President Joe Biden signed the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act into law on 24 April, immediately putting it into effect.
Captagon, an addictive, amphetamine-like drug, is cheaply produced and has posed a significant security concern in the Middle East and beyond.
Since 2019, Syria has emerged as a regional hub for the production and smuggling of Captagon, generating billions of dollars in illicit funds for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its associates—effectively turning the country into a narco-state.
Dubbed Captagon 2, the act empowers the White House to impose new and direct sanctions on those directly involved in the manufacture and illegal trade of this dangerous drug, aiming to disrupt and dismantle this illicit trade in the Middle East.
Symbolic or real measures?
While the law signals a commitment from the US to combat Captagon trafficking, its effectiveness will depend on the Biden administration shifting away from using sanctions as mere symbolic gestures and instead employing them to effectively target the structures that facilitate Captagon proliferation.
The Captagon 2 Act is seen as a continuation of previous congressional actions that have targeted the growing Captagon trade in Syria. The original Captagon Act, passed by Congress in December 2022, aimed to establish a coordinated strategy among US federal agencies to disrupt and dismantle the Captagon trade and narcotics networks associated with the al-Assad regime in Syria.
Subsequently, the US Treasury imposed two rounds of sanctions targeting Syrian regime figures and Lebanese actors involved in the production and trafficking of Captagon.
Read more: Can US-UK sanctions dismantle Syria's drug industry?
In March 2023, in coordination with the UK, the US sanctioned six individuals, including two members of the Assad family (Samer Kamal al-Assad and Wassim Badi al-Assad), a militia commander affiliated with Military Intelligence (Imad Abu Zureik), a prominent Lebanese drug dealer (Noah Zaitar), and two Syrian traffickers posing as businessmen (Khaldi Qaddour and Hassan Muhammad Daqqou).
The second round of sanctions, issued a year later, targeted two individuals (Taher al-Kayali and Mahmoud Abulilah Al-Dj) for drug trafficking.
While these individuals were indeed sanctioned due to their participation in the Captagon trade, the Biden administration had to justify these actions using other executive orders, particularly those aimed at combating human rights abuses or preventing financial support to the Syrian regime.
Clear legal basis
In contrast, the Captagon 2 Act provides a clear legal basis for the White House to target any foreign individual, entity, or network involved in narcotics activities and associated with the Syrian government or Hezbollah.
Furthermore, it mandates the Biden administration to evaluate a list of 8 associates of al-Assad, previously sanctioned under other executive orders, and determine if each of them meets the criteria for sanctions under the Captagon 2 Act, potentially subjecting them to sanctions under this new legislation as well.
Beyond its political and symbolic importance, serving as a reminder that al-Assad is not only a war criminal but also involved in narco-trafficking, the Captagon 2 Act primarily empowers the White House to impose additional sanctions. Thus, its effectiveness in disrupting al-Assad's drug network hinges on the US's strategic application of these sanctions to inflict maximum damage.
