Yemen's choice: Between lasting peace and permanent war

Divisions emerge

However, this peaceful movement for political change was sabotaged by various factors. First, during the transitional phase, the key figures in charge began acting in bad faith.

While the initiative outlined a specific timeframe and limited the constitutional powers of the transitional authority as head of state, disagreements soon emerged.

Some leaders began arguing that there should be no timeframe for the transitional authority and that power should be transferred only after adequate progress has been achieved. Critics argued that this was simply a delay tactic which would set the stage for a new dictator to take control. 

Secondly, there was a noticeable shift towards violence, which stood in stark contrast to the 2011 movement's goal of ending the cycle of seizing power through violent means in Yemen, such as coups, assassinations and domestic turmoil.

Several factors contributed to this shift, including Ali Saleh's desire for retribution, the militant stance of the Houthi movement, and their realisation that they could gain more through force than through political and electoral channels. 

Thirdly, despite a broad-based commitment to the agreement, largely driven by fear of opposing the international community represented by the United Nations, the Houthis who viewed their position as "we have nothing to lose" were not necessarily concerned about upholding the agreement.

From bad to worse

The current situation has gone from bad to worse. Politicians have lost significant influence in the face of the growing strength of armed factions who do not see eye to eye with any group regarding the structure of a Yemeni state.

While Yemen has had its fair share of wars and conflicts, the current conflict challenges the very essence of the Yemeni state.

Will Al Houthis' religious ideology overtake Yemen? Or will it split into separate states? Can the country adopt a federalist system?

The shift toward authoritarianism is another concerning factor, which has only worsened after the proliferation of armed groups in the country.

This development has unfortunately reversed hard-won progress such as freedom of the press, the establishment of parliamentary systems and other governmental checks and balances that had been put into place.

How do we convince those reluctant to share power to do so? 

The current agreement reinforces a culture of violence. The representatives of Yemen are primarily armed groups with little political expertise. 

Unlike some historical instances in mid-20th-century Yemen, where weapons were aligned with national political goals, here the weaponry is closely linked to themes of dominance and tribalism.

Therefore, how can an agreement legitimising violence prevent future outbreaks of violence?

UN influence seems to have waned, as demonstrated by their indifference to Al Houthi's intransigence. Such an approach sets a dangerous precedent for other bad actor groups to adopt the same approach towards the UN.

What next?

The agreement might only succeed in its initial phase. If implemented effectively, this could significantly lessen the population's suffering.

This includes fair salary distribution, provided it's conducted transparently and without tampering with the actual state employee records. Payments should be merit-based and not handed out based on loyalty and favouritism.

Roadblocks should also be dismantled, which serve more than just a military tactic but also divide territories based on war gains.

Yemen appears to be far from achieving lasting peace. Deep-rooted factors fuelling the conflict still exist, which makes a future marked by peace and prosperity a distant dream.